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Re´sume´
Cette the`se aborde certaines caracte´ristiques des politiques de re´gulation
et de la concurrence dans le secteur des Technologies de l’Information
et de la Communication (TIC). Plusieurs proble´matiques de re´gulation
ex-ante sont aborde´es, traitant de l’investissement dans les infrastruc-
tures de re´seaux fixes de te´le´communications et de la mise en place de
tests de ciseaux tarifaires par les autorite´s de re´gulation du secteur des
te´le´communications en Europe. Sont e´galement e´tudie´es diffe´rentes
proble´matiques de politique de la concurrence, comme l’impact de la
vente lie´e de produits cre´ant des couˆts de changement pour les util-
isateurs ou la prise en compte des terminaux d’acce`s pour l’analyse
du marche´ du livre e´lectronique en droit de la concurrence. Les im-
pacts de la re´gulation sectorielle sur la politique de la concurrence
sont e´galement analyse´s, avec une application a` la de´finition et la ges-
tion par les autorite´s de concurrence de la pratique de ciseau tarifaire
dans les industries de re´seaux. Enfin, cette the`se met en perspective
diffe´rents avantages et inconve´nients des interventions ex-ante et ex-
post, respectivement par les autorite´s de re´gulation sectorielle et de
concurrence.
xAbstract
This thesis approaches several distinctive features of regulation and
competition policy in the Information and Communications Technol-
ogy (ICT) sector. It tackles some issues in ex-ante regulation on
investment in new fixed telecommunications network infrastructures,
and the application of margin squeeze tests by European regulatory
authorities in the telecommunications industry. It also analyzes issues
related to ex-post competition policy, such as the impact of bundling
products with switching costs, or the competition authorities’ investi-
gations in the electronic book market. Further analysis on the impact
of ex-ante regulation on ex-post competition policy is provided, in
particular via studies on the definition of a margin squeeze conduct in
network industries, and how competition authorities deal with it. Fi-
nally, this thesis evaluates several advantages and weaknesses of both
ex-ante regulatory authorities’ and ex-post competition authorities’
interventions.
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3Chapter 1
Re´sume´ e´tendu de la the`se en
franc¸ais
1.1 Introduction
Ce manuscrit de the`se de doctorat en e´conomie industrielle et les articles de
recherche qui le constituent sont e´crits en anglais. Cette premie`re partie du
manuscrit vise a` donner un re´sume´ de chaque chapitre de cette the`se dans la
langue de Molie`re. Une version plus de´taille´e se trouve dans les parties et chapitres
suivants.
1.1.1 Re´gulation et politique de la concurrence dans le
secteur des TIC
Le secteur des Technologies de l’Information et des Communications (TIC) corre-
spond, selon l’Organisation pour la Coope´ration et le De´veloppement Economique
(OCDE), a` tout ce qui capture, transmet, et expose des donne´es et de l’information
par voie e´lectronique. Etudier et analyser ce secteur avec les outils de l’e´conomie
industrielle est une entreprise tout a` fait fascinante. En effet, non seulement
ce secteur est en constante mutation et be´ne´ficie re´gulie`rement d’avance´es tech-
nologiques majeurs qui remettent en cause toute son organisation, mais il con-
stitue aussi un terrain propice au de´veloppement d’organisation industrielle par-
ticulie`res, souvent dues aux relations verticales entre firmes ou aux e´conomies
d’e´chelle.
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Les particularite´s de ce secteur se traduisent sous plusieurs formes. L’une
d’elles est qu’un certain nombre de marche´s du secteur des TIC sont re´gule´s ex-
ante par des autorite´s administratives de re´gulation sectorielle, tout en e´tant sujet
a` une re´gulation ex-post par des autorite´s de concurrence.
Dans cette the`se, j’e´tudie certains aspects de la re´gulation dans le secteur des
te´le´communications, puis certains comportements strate´giques des firmes pouvant
se heurter a` la politique de la concurrence et les re`gles qui en de´coulent. Enfin,
j’e´tudie l’interaction entre re´gulation ex-ante et politique de la concurrence ex-
post en me penchant sur les effets de ciseaux tarifaires.
1.1.2 Questions de recherche et plan de la the`se
Cette the`se est compose´e de trois partie de recherche, chacune pre´sentant deux
chapitres de recherche correspondant a` deux travaux distincts.
1.1.2.1 Re´gulation dans le secteur des te´le´communications
La premie`re partie de recherche de cette the`se adresse des proble´matiques lie´es
a` l’application de la re´gulation ex-ante dans le secteur des TIC, et plus partic-
ulie`rement dans l’industrie des te´le´communications. Cette partie est compose´e
de deux chapitres, chacun abordant un sujet diffe´rent.
Dynamique d’entre´e et d’investissement dans les infrastructures de
nouvelle ge´ne´ration: Analyse empirique dans le secteur des te´le´communications.
Le premier chapitre de cette partie est consacre´ a` l’e´valuation empirique de
l’e´chelle de l’investissement dans le secteur des te´le´communications. L’e´chelle
de l’investissement est une re´gulation applique´e par de nombreux pays europe´ens
qui vise a` favoriser l’investissement progressif en infrastructure de re´seaux de la
part des nouveaux entrants. Or, cette re´gulation n’est base´e sur aucun mode`le
the´orique, et il n’existe pas a` ce jour d’e´valuation empirique de ses effets. Le
but de ce chapitre est d’estimer l’impact de cette re´gulation sur les investisse-
ments des entrants. Je montre que l’e´chelle de l’investissement n’a aucun impact
sur l’investissement en re´seaux de nouvelles ge´ne´ration de la part des entrants,
mais qu’il existe un impact positif faiblement significatif de cette re´gulation sur
l’investissement au niveau du de´groupage de la boucle locale.
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Les tests ex-ante d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires dans le secteur des te´le´communications:
Qu’est-ce qu’un ope´rateur raisonnablement efficace? Le deuxie`me chapitre
de cette premie`re partie de recherche est consacre´ a` l’analyse des pratiques de
re´gulateurs europe´ens en terme d’e´valuation ex-ante de ciseaux tarifaires. De
nombreux re´gulateurs europe´ens conduisent des tests d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires
afin de s’assurer que leur re´gulation de l’acce`s ne produit pas d’effet anticoncur-
rentiel, par exemple. Or, il n’existe pas de re`gles claires re´gissant cette analyse
d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires ex-ante, et il existe de nombreuses asyme´tries d’un
pays a` l’autre. Ce chapitre vise a` comprendre ce que les re´gulateurs mode´lisent
lorsqu’ils conduisent de tels tests, en analysant les de´finitions d’un “ope´rateur
raisonnablement efficace”. Je retranscris ensuite les ajustements the´oriques faits
au test classique (“Equally Efficient Operator”) afin de mode´liser des ope´rateurs
raisonnablement efficaces.
1.1.2.2 Politique de la concurrence dans le secteur des TIC
La seconde partie de recherche de cette the`se traite de deux proble`mes de politique
de la concurrence ex-post dans le secteur des TIC, chacun adresse´ au sein d’un
chapitre.
Vente lie´e et couˆts de changement. Le premier chapitre de cette deuxie`me
partie de recherche analyse l’impact des couˆts de changement sur une strate´gie de
vente lie´e e´tablie par une firme en position dominante sur un marche´ donne´. Ce
chapitre porte sur une question relative a` certains marche´s du secteur des TIC,
tel que celui de la te´le´phonie mobile et de son interaction avec les services de
paiement sur mobiles. Il explique pourquoi une firme simultane´ment en position
dominante sur un marche´ donne´ et active sur un marche´ en concurrence peut
avoir inte´reˆt a` pratiquer la vente lie´e, afin de transfe´rer les couˆts de changement
des consommateurs du marche´ en monopole vers le marche´ en concurrence.
Politique de la concurrence dans le secteur du livre e´lectronique. Dans
le deuxie`me chapitre de recherche de cette seconde partie, j’e´tudie les effets de
l’application de la politique de concurrence, et plus particulie`rement les de´cisions
du Department of Justice (DOJ) ame´ricain, sur le marche´ du livre e´lectronique.
Dans ce marche´, les autorite´s ame´ricaines (et europe´ennes) ont impose´ un type
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d’organisation industrielle entre e´diteurs de livres et revendeurs en ligne. Elles ont
interdit les organisations industrielles de type “agency”, ou` les e´diteurs choisissent
eux-meˆmes le prix de de´tail paye´ par les consommateurs. Dans ce chapitre,
j’analyse les distorsions de marche´ lie´es aux deux diffe´rentes organisations, et
j’explique en quelle circonstance l’une est pre´fe´rable a` l’autre en terme de bien-eˆtre
social. J’e´tudie e´galement le roˆle des liseuses et appareils permettant d’acce´der
aux livres e´lectroniques et de les utiliser.
1.1.2.3 L’interaction entre re´gulation et politique de la concurrence:
le cas de l’effet de ciseaux tarifaires
La troisie`me partie de recherche de cette the`se s’attarde a` l’analyse de proble´matiques
re´sultantes de l’interaction entre re´gulation ex-ante et politique de la concurrence
ex-post dans le secteur des te´le´communications. Elle porte plus pre´cise´ment sur
l’analyse de l’effet de ciseaux tarifaires, lorsque la politique de la concurrence
ex-post est applique´e dans des marche´s re´gule´s ex-ante.
Ciseaux tarifaires et pre´servation du monopole dans les industries
re´gule´es. Le premier chapitre de cette troisie`me partie de recherche explique
comment une firme verticalement inte´gre´e en position de monopole et re´gule´e sur
le marche´ amont peut entreprendre des ciseaux tarifaires via un prix de de´tail
faible, afin de bloquer l’entre´e d’un concurrent aval dans le court terme pour
pre´server sa position de monopole amont sur le long terme. Ce chapitre apporte
ainsi une explication rationnelle a` la pratique des ciseaux tarifaires dans les indus-
tries de re´seaux. De plus, il explique dans le de´tail en quoi cette pratique diffe`re
d’autres abus de position dominante bien connus en politique de la concurrence,
et pourquoi il convient de la de´finir comme abus a` part entie`re.
L’interaction entre ciseaux tarifaires et re´gulation de l’acce`s. Le dernier
chapitre de recherche de cette the`se traite de la question du lien entre effet de
ciseaux tarifaires et re´gulation de l’acce`s. Dans ce chapitre, j’e´tudie l’impact de
la re´gulation de l’acce`s a` un monopole naturel sur les incitations a` engager une
strate´gie anticoncurrentielle de ciseaux tarifaires pour une firme dominante ver-
ticalement inte´gre´e. Je montre notamment que le re´sultat e´tabli de la litte´rature
comme quoi une augmentation de la charge d’acce`s me`ne a` une diminution des
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incitations a` pratiquer des ciseaux tarifaires n’est pas robuste a` une mode´lisation
en concurrence homoge`ne.
1.1.2.4 Plan de la the`se
La suite de cette the`se est organise´e comme suit. Le reste de cette partie I est
de´die´ a` un re´sume´ e´tendu en franc¸ais de chaque chapitre de recherche. Le reste de
la the`se est re´dige´ en anglais. La partie II comprend une introduction ge´ne´rale.
la partie III contient deux chapitres de recherche et porte sur la re´gulation dans le
secteur des te´le´communications. La partie IV analyse deux proble´matiques lie´es
a` l’application de la politique de la concurrence dans le secteur des TIC. La partie
V contient e´galement deux chapitres de recherche, qui portent sur l’application de
la politique de la concurrence ex-post dans le secteur des te´le´communications, et
plus particulie`rement le marche´ des re´seaux fixes, qui sont re´gule´s ex-ante. Enfin,
la partie VI de cette the`se est une conclusion ge´ne´rale.
1.2 Re´gulation dans le secteur des te´le´communications
1.2.1 Dynamique d’entre´e et d’investissement dans les in-
frastructures de nouvelle ge´ne´ration: Analyse em-
pirique dans le secteur des te´le´communications
1.2.1.1 Introduction
Dans les industries de re´seaux, les proble´matiques d’investissement constituent un
point crucial des relations entre les acteurs du marche´ (firmes, pouvoirs publics).
De manie`re ge´ne´rale, les re´gulateurs sectoriels qui fixent le cadre du marche´
ex-ante font face a` un arbitrage entre promouvoir la concurrence et favoriser
l’investissement. Par exemple, dans le secteur des te´le´communications, il y a
eu un de´bat important relatif a` la question de savoir si le de´veloppement de la
concurrence par les services retardait l’introduction de la concurrence par les in-
frastructures, qui est souvent vu comme le but d’une re´gulation sectorielle. En
effet, la the´orie standard pre´dit qu’un entrant qui loue un acce`s au re´seau de la
firme en place posse`de un couˆt d’opportunite´ a` l’investissement dans ses propres
infrastructures, qu’il ne posse`de pas s’il ne loue pas cet acce`s au re´seau.
8 1. Re´sume´ e´tendu de la the`se en franc¸ais
L’e´chelle de l’investissement (Cave [2006]) est une approche re´glementaire qui
propose de re´soudre cet arbitrage du re´gulateur. Cet approche postule que la
concurrence par les services non seulement introduit aise´ment de la concurrence
sur un marche´ donne´, mais constitue e´galement une e´tape pour promouvoir la
concurrence par les infrastructures. L’ide´e de cette approche est qu’une phase de
concurrence par les services permet aux entrants d’acque´rir de l’expe´rience et une
connaissance du marche´ qui leur permettra par la suite d’investir dans leurs in-
frastructures plus facilement (Bourreau and Drouard [2010] e´tudient l’effet d’une
phase d’acquisition d’expe´rience sur les incitations des entrants a` l’investissement).
Les re´gulateurs europe´ens ont en effet base´ leur re´gulation en se fondant sur
cette approche. D’une part, des re`glements europe´ens obligent les firmes en place
a` louer leur re´seau au niveau de la boucle locale de cuivre (“Local Loop Un-
bundling”, LLU) aux entrants. D’autres part, de nombreux re´gulateurs obligent
e´galement les firmes en place a` louer leur re´seau a` un niveau plus agre´ge´ aux en-
trants (niveau d’acce`s “bitstream”). Enfin, certaines firmes en place de´veloppent
elles-meˆmes de telles offres commerciales, au niveau bitstream et a` un niveau plus
agre´ge´ encore (niveau “resale”). Ces diffe´rents niveaux d’acce`s ne ne´cessitent pas
tous les meˆmes investissements en infrastructures de la part des entrants. Par
exemple, pour louer un acce`s LLU, un entrant devra construire son re´seau de
collecte et “backbone”, alors que pour un acce`s resale il n’aura pas besoin de
telles infrastructures. En haut de cette e´chelle de l’investissement, un entrant
peut investir dans l’inte´gralite´ d’un re´seau de communications, en construisant
son propre re´seau d’acce`s; il s’affranchit ainsi de louer une partie du re´seau de la
firme en place. Diffe´rentes technologies permettent aux entrants d’investir dans
leurs re´seaux d’acce`s apre`s avoir loue´ un acce`s au re´seau de la firme en place:
le cuivre, la fibre, la boucle locale radio (“Wireless Local Loop”, WLL), ou le
courant porteur en ligne (“Power Line Communication”, PLC).1
Bien que cette approche re´glementaire ait e´te´ imple´mente´e par de nombreux
re´gulateurs europe´ens dans le secteur des te´le´communications, elle ne be´ne´ficie
d’aucun support the´orique, et il n’existe pas d’e´tude empirique validant ses con-
clusions sur l’investissement des entrants.
1D’autres technologies, telles que le cable ou le satellite, ne sont pas compatibles avec un
acce`s au re´seau de te´le´communications de la firme en place, initialement construit pour la
te´le´phonie fixe.
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Figure 1.1: L’e´chelle d’investissement et les diffe´rents niveaux d’acce`s
La Figure 1.1 de´taille les diffe´rents niveaux d’acce`s de l’e´chelle de l’investissement,
telle que pre´sente´e par Cave [2006]. Plus l’entrant souhaite s’affranchir de sa
de´pendance au re´seau de la firme en place, plus il doit investir dans ses propres
infrastructures de re´seaux, et plus il pourra ope´rer des choix techniques propres
et diffe´rencier son offre.
1.2.1.2 Analyse empirique
L’analyse empirique se base sur des donne´es publiques de la Commission Eu-
rope´enne, portant sur un panel de donne´es de 15 pays (Allemagne, Autriche, Bel-
gique, Danemark, Espagne, Finlande, France, Gre`ce, Irlande, Italie, Luxembourg,
Pays-Bas, Portugal, Royaume-Uni, Sue`de) sur 17 semestres (juillet 2002-juillet
2010).
Les variables de´finies sont les suivantes:
• log(Newlines) correspond au nombre de lignes haut-de´bit appartenant aux
entrants, de´veloppe´es via leur infrastructure propre de nouvelle technologie
(fibre, WLL, PLC), en logarithme.
• log(LLUlines) correspond au nombre de lignes haut-de´bit loue´es par les
entrants au niveau LLU, en logarithme.
• log(BAlines) correspond au nombre de lignes haut-de´bit loue´es par les en-
trants au niveau acce`s bitstream, en logarithme.
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• incmob est une variable de controˆle qui repre´sente la part de marche´ de la
firme en place dans le marche´ de la te´le´phonie mobile. Cette variable est
un proxy pour le pouvoir de marche´ de la firme en place.
• Les variables de controˆle pour les chocs de demande sont le PIB par teˆte en
euros constants en logarithme, log(GDPpercapita), la population du pays
en logarithme log(Pop), et le taux de pe´ne´tration de la te´le´phonie mobile
mobpenrate.
• La variable de controˆle pour le couˆt des re´seaux est la densite´ de la popu-
lation density.
L’impact de l’e´chelle de l’investissement sur les investissements en nouvelles
infrastructures des entrants est mode´lise´ comme suit:
log(Newlines)i,t = β0 + β1 log(Newlines)i,t−1 + β2 log(LLUlines)i,t−2
+ βxcontrolsi,t + εi + ηt + ui,t, (1.1)
ou` Newlinesi,t repre´sente le nombre (en stock) des lignes haut-de´bit des entrants
dans le pays i au semestre t qui sont base´es sur les technologies fibre, WLL, et
PLC. LLUlinesi,t correspond au nombre de lignes des entrants base´es sur l’acce`s
a` la boucle locale de la firme en place (LLU), et controls un set de variables
de controˆle. Comme le haut-de´bit de´pend de spe´cificite´s lie´es a` la demande du
marche´ ou a` des facteurs institutionnels, des effets fixes par pays (εi) et temporels
(ηt) sont introduits.
Le test empirique porte sur l’hypothe`se de l’e´chelle de l’investissement, selon
laquelle la concurrence par les services promeut l’investissement en infrastructure
des entrants. Pour tester cette hypothe`se, il faut e´valuer l’impact de l’entre´e au
niveau de la concurrence en services sur l’entre´e au niveau des nouvelles infras-
tructures. Ainsi, l’hypothe`se de l’e´chelle de l’investissement est ve´rifie´e si β2 est
significativement positif.
Paralle`lement a` cette e´valuation empirique sur les plus hauts niveaux d’acce`s
de l’e´chelle de l’investissement, une autre analyse est conduite, sur les niveaux
d’acce`s infe´rieurs. Cette analyse sur cette “e´chelle re´duite” (par contraste avec
“l’e´chelle comple`te” e´nonce´e ci-dessus a` l’e´quation (1.1)) permet d’observer si
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l’approche de l’e´chelle de l’investissement est valide si l’on conside`re le de´veloppement
de l’acce`s a` la boucle locale (LLU) comme une finalite´ de la re´gulation.
L’e´chelle re´duite est e´value´e avec le mode`le suivant:
log(LLUlines)i,t = β
′
0 + β
′
1 log(LLUlines)i,t−1 + β
′
2 log(BAlines)i,t−2
+ β′xcontrolsi,t + εi + ηt + ui,t. (1.2)
Si l’hypothe`se de l’e´chelle de l’investissement est ve´rifie´e pour cette e´chelle re´duite,
nous devrions observer β′2 > 0.
Les estimations empiriques sont effectue´es a` l’aide de la technique GMM
(“Generalized Method of Moments”). Les re´sultats de l’estimation, indique´s en
Table 1.1 montre qu’il n’y a aucun effet significatif du de´veloppement de la con-
currence au niveau de la boucle locale (LLU) sur l’investissement des entrants
en infrastructures de nouvelle ge´ne´ration (Newlines). Par contre, via l’analyse
sur l’e´chelle re´duite, nous observons un effet positif et (faiblement) significatif de
BAlines sur LLUlines. Ceci implique un effet de l’e´chelle de l’investissement
jusqu’au niveau de la boucle locale.
1.2.1.3 Discussion
Ces re´sultats ont e´te´ re´plique´s suivant diffe´rentes me´thodes d’estimation (OLS,
IV) et diffe´rents mode`les (en flux de lignes), et des tests de robustesses ont e´te´
conduits. Plus pre´cise´ment, nous avons, pour ces tests de robustesse, pris en
compte le nombre de niveaux d’acce`s a` l’e´chelle, le de´veloppement du cable haut-
de´bit, l’intensite´ de la re´gulation, et les prix de la boucle locale. Le re´sultat
principal, sur l’e´chelle comple`te, reste inchange´ pour tous ces tests de robustesse.
A contrario, le re´sultat positif sur l’e´chelle re´duite ne passe que certains tests, ce
qui nous pousse a` de´finir ce re´sultat d’un effet e´chelle de l’investissement positif
sur l’e´chelle re´duite comme “faible” (faiblement robuste).
En conclusion, ce chapitre montre que l’e´chelle de l’investissement, une ap-
proche re´glementaire, sans base the´orique ni empirique, largement employe´e par
les re´gulateurs europe´ens, semble inefficace car elle ne remplit pas son objectif
premier qui est l’investissement des entrants dans leurs propres infrastructures
d’acce`s local. Cette approche de re´gulation semble toutefois avoir un effet positif
pour l’investissement jusqu’au niveau de la boucle locale (LLU), mais ce re´sultat
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Echelle comple`te Echelle re´duite
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff
log(Newlines)t log(LLUlines)t
log(Newlines)t−1 0.552***
(3.78)
log(LLUlines)t−1 0.613***
(4.80)
log(LLUlines)t−2 -0.0931
(-0.91)
log(BAlines)t−2 0.0515*
(2.10)
incmobt -0.489 1.453
(-0.26) (1.03)
log(GDPpercapita)t -1.802 0.220
(-0.76) (0.38)
mobpenratet -0.00549 0.0126
(-0.31) (1.72)
densityt 0.0484 0.0602
(0.63) (1.46)
log(Pop)t 8.817 -4.637
(0.60) (-0.58)
N 171 207
Arellano−Bond test AR(1) -2.08 -2.12
(p− value) (0.038) (0.034)
Arellano−Bond test AR(2) -0.30 -1.17
(p− value) (0.761) (0.242)
Hansen J − test (p− value) (1.000) (1.000)
F − test (time) 3.90
(p− value) (0.0089)
Notes: t-statistiques entre parenthe`ses. Niveaux de significativite´: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Variables instrumente´es: log(LLUlines)t−2, Instruments: log(BAlines)t−4.
Effets fixes temps inclus dans la re´gression sur l’e´chelle comple`te.
Table 1.1: Re´sultats principaux
n’est pas entie`rement robuste.
1.2.2 Les tests ex-ante d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires dans
le secteur des te´le´communications: Qu’est-ce qu’un
ope´rateur raisonnablement efficace?
1.2.2.1 Introduction
Dans le secteur des te´le´communications, de nombreux cas antitrust re´cents ont
e´te´ base´s sur l’analyse d’effets de ciseaux tarifaires. Cette pratique consiste pour
une firme en place verticalement inte´gre´e a` fixer des prix de gros et de de´tail tels
que la marge dont disposent les entrants sur le marche´ aval ne leur permet pas
d’ope´rer profitablement sur le marche´.
Alors que les autorite´s de concurrence basent leur analyse des tests de ciseaux
tarifaires sur le droit de la concurrence et la jurisprudence, les re´gulateurs con-
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duisent e´galement des tests de ciseaux tarifaires afin de s’assurer, par exemple, que
les prix de gros re´gule´s ne produisent pas un tel effet; et ce, souvent sans se baser
sur des lignes directrices pre´cises. Aussi, les pratiques des re´gulateurs du secteur
des te´le´communications en matie`re de test d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires divergent.
Ce chapitre porte sur l’analyse de tels tests, et sur les ajustements the´oriques
possibles pour que les re´gulateurs mode´lisent un “ope´rateur raisonnablement ef-
ficace”.
En effet, alors que la droit de la concurrence europe´en de´finit clairement qu’un
ope´rateur “aussi efficace” constitue la base a` adopter pour conduire un test de
ciseaux tarifaires ex-post, les re´gulateurs ex-ante ne posse`dent pas cette base
et ajustent le test de l’ope´rateur aussi efficace pour le transformer en un test
d’ope´rateur raisonnablement efficace.
1.2.2.2 Ajustements the´oriques
En droit de la concurrence europe´en, un test de ciseaux tarifaire est de´fini par
le test EEO (“Equally Efficient Operator”), qui compare le prix de de´tail fixe´
par la firme en place (p) a` la somme de la charge d’acce`s (re´gule´e ou non) aux
infrastructures essentielles de la firme en place (a), et le couˆt aval de cette meˆme
firme (c). Une firme en place n’induit donc pas d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires lorsque:
p ≥ a+ c. (1.3)
Ainsi, ce test permet le de´veloppement dans l’environnement concurrentiel d’entrants
au moins aussi efficace que la firme en place verticalement inte´gre´e.
Cependant, les re´gulateurs qui interviennent ex-ante ont pour but de fac¸onner
le cadre concurrentiel, non pas de faire respecter les re`gles du jeu concurrentiel
comme le font les autorite´s de concurrence. Aussi, ces re´gulateurs peuvent parfois
ajuster le test EEO pour e´tablir un test REO (“Reasonably Efficient Operator”)
qui permet aux entrants de surpasser les de´savantages concurrentiels induits par
les asyme´tries entre eux et la firme en place.
Trois ajustements possibles concernent le couˆt de la firme en place utilise´ dans
le test EEO. Le premier de ces trois ajustements prend en compte les e´conomies
d’e´chelle de la firme en place, qui be´ne´ficie ge´ne´ralement d’une plus grande base de
consommateurs et donc de plus grandes e´conomies d’e´chelle. Ainsi, le re´gulateur
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peut fixer une base de demande the´orique D˜ a` laquelle sera e´value´e le couˆt aval
de la firme en place:
p ≥ a+ c(D˜). (1.4)
Le deuxie`me ajustement de couˆt tient compte des e´conomies d’envergure de
la firme en place. Cet ajustement permet au re´gulateur de fixer un parame`tre,
α, pour tenir compte de tout, partie, ou non, de l’avantage concurrentiel induit
par les e´conomies d’envergure de la firme en place. Celle-ci peut en effet produire
diffe´rent produits (aux quantite´s q1 et q2) et attribuer ses couˆts fixes F a` l’une,
l’autre, ou les deux productions, lorsque l’entrant ne le peut pas:
p ≥ a+ c+ αF
q1
. (1.5)
Le dernier ajustement possible a` tenir des asyme´tries de couˆt entre firme en
place et entrants conside`re simplement les couˆts spe´cifiques aux entrants, cs, dans
le test de ciseaux tarifaires:
p ≥ a+ c+ cS. (1.6)
Par ailleurs, un ajustement possible peut eˆtre effectue´ sur le parame`tre de
la charge d’acce`s dans le test de ciseaux tarifaires. En effet, lorsque plusieurs
produits de gros (re´gule´s ou non) sont disponibles, le re´gulateur peut conduire
un test pour chaque type d’acce`s de gros, ou alors ne conduire qu’un seul test en
prenant en compte un mix (moyenne ponde´re´e) de ces produits de gros. Le test
avec ce mix s’e´crit ainsi:
p ≥
n∑
i=1
γi(ci + ai), (1.7)
ou` γ = (γ1, ..., γn) ponde`re les couˆts et charges d’acce`s, avec
∑n
i=1 γi = 1 et
γi ≥ 0, ∀i = {1, ..., n}, et ci correspond au couˆt aval de la firme en place associe´
au produit de gros avec la charge d’acce`s ai.
Enfin, le dernier ajustement possible pour les re´gulateurs afin de modifier un
test EEO en test REO porte sur le parame`tre prix du test. En effet, un test REO
peut prendre en compte le fait que la firme en place pratique la vente lie´e entre les
produits 1 et 2 aux prix individuels p1 et p2, et vend le bundle au prix p, alors que
l’entrant ne peut re´pliquer cette offre s’il ne peut vendre que le produit 1. Ainsi,
le re´gulateur peut conside´rer un pourcentage de la marge effectue´e sur le bundle
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dans le test de ciseaux tarifaires, base´ sur le prix du produit non-reproductible
par l’entrant (p2). Le test REO est ainsi:
p− p2 + β(p2 − c2) ≥ a+ c1. (1.8)
En re´sume´, plusieurs ajustements sont the´oriquement possibles pour passer
d’un test EEO a` un test REO ex-ante. Ils sont liste´s dans la Table 1.2. Il convient
Parame`tre Proble`me spe´cifique
Couˆts Economies d’e´chelle
Economies d’envergure
Couˆts spe´cifiques des en-
trants
Charge d’acce`s Mix d’acce`s
Prix Vente lie´e
Table 1.2: Proble`mes spe´cifiques dans les tests ex-ante d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires
de noter que ces ajustements ne sont pas automatiques et que les re´gulateurs
doivent arbitrer entre de´savantage a` court terme duˆ aux pertes d’efficacite´ lie´es
aux ajustements du test EEO et avantage a` long terme duˆ a` l’introduction d’une
concurrence pe´renne et l’efficacite´ apporte´e par les entrants.
1.2.2.3 Comparaison des pratiques des re´gulateurs
Apre`s avoir de´fini les ajustements the´oriques possibles pour que les re´gulateurs
mode´lisent un test REO, nous analysons les pratiques de certains re´gulateurs
europe´ens, afin de donner des exemples concrets a` ces ajustements au test EEO.
Les de´cisions et lignes directrices e´tudie´es dans cette analyse comparative sont
liste´es dans la Table 1.3.
Les ajustements effectue´s sur le parame`tre de couˆt du test de ciseaux tarifaires
sont reproduits dans la Table 1.4. Les ajustements effectue´s sur le parame`tre
de la charge d’acce`s du test de ciseaux tarifaires sont reproduits dans la Table
1.5. Enfin, les ajustements effectue´s sur le parame`tre de prix du test de ciseaux
tarifaires sont reproduits dans la Table 1.6.
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1.2.2.4 Discussion
Les re´gulateurs ajustent donc, pour beaucoup, leurs tests afin de mode´liser des
REO. Alors que certains ajustements, tel que celui tenant compte des e´conomies
d’e´chelle, font relativement consensus, d’autres ont des applications bien diffe´rentes.
De plus, certains ajustements re´pandus posent de forts proble`mes. Ainsi, le mix
de produit d’acce`s est un ajustement re´pandu, mais il induit automatiquement
un proble`me d’endoge´ne´ite´ dans la re´gulation en place lorsqu’il est de´termine´
sur le mix actuel du marche´, et non sur le mix souhaite´ par le re´gulateur qui
maximiserait sa fonction d’objectif.
Ce chapitre de recherche montre que des travaux the´oriques et empiriques sont
ne´cessaires a` la bonne utilisation des tests de ciseaux tarifaires par les autorite´s
de re´gulation ex-ante. Le caracte`re meˆme de leur utilisation par ces autorite´s
peut eˆtre questionne´.
1.2.
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Marche´
Ge´ographique
Autorite´ Anne´e Document Marche´
Europe EC (Commission
Europe´enne)
2010 European Recommendation 2010/572/EU on regulated access to NGAN Lignes directrices
Europe ERG (Euro-
pean Regulators
Group)
2003 ERG Common Position on the approach to Appropriate remedies in the new
regulatory framework
Lignes directrices
2009 Report on the Discussion on the application of margin squeeze tests to bundles Rapport
Austriche RTR 2008 RTR Communications Report 2008 Guidelines
2010 Margin Squeeze U¨berpru¨fungen in der sektorspezifischen ex ante-Regulierung
fu¨r Telekommunikationsma¨rkte Kritische Punkte und neue Herausforderun-
gen
Lignes directrices
Belgique BIPT 2007 De´cision e´tablissant des lignes directrices relatives a` l’e´valuation des effets de
ciseaux tarifaires
Lignes directrices
2009 De´cision concernant le test de ciseaux tarifaires des lignes loue´es Ethernet Lignes loue´es
France ARCEP 2006 Notice du test d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires te´le´phonie fixe Te´le´phonie fixe
Allemagne BNetzA 2007 Notes on margin squeezes as defined by section 28(2) para 2 TKG Lignes directrices
Irlande ComReg 2011 Response to Consultation Document No. 10/76 and decisions amending price
control obligations and withdrawing and further specifying transparency obli-
gations
Terminaison d’appel
2012 Further specification to the price control obligation and an amendment to the
transparency obligation, D06/12
Acce`s de gros broad-
band
Italie AGCOM 2010 Delibera 499/10/CONS and Appendix Lignes directrices
(Re´seaux fixes)
Pays-Bas OPTA 2001 OPTA and NMa Price Squeeze Guidelines (OPTA/EGM/2000/200494, NMa
/2201/12)
Lignes directrices
(Re´seaux fixes)
Pologne UKE 2009 UKE and TPSA Agreement concluded on 22 October 2009, and Annex 9 Acce`s de gros broad-
band
Portugal Anacom 2007 Determination on the method to assess margin squeezes in Broadband offers
provided by the PT Group
Acce`s de gros broad-
band
Espagne CMT 2007 Resolucio´n MTZ 2006/1486 Lignes directrices
2008a Resolucio´n AEM 2008/215 Lignes directrices
2008b Voto Particular de Marcel Coderch e Inmaculada Lo´pez en su condicio´n de
Consejeros de la CMT en relacio´n a la Resolucio´n AEM 2008/215
Grande-
Bretagne
Ofcom 2004 Direction Setting the Margin between IPStream and ATM interconnection
Prices (BT IPStream)
Internet Broadband
Etats-Unis FCC 2005 In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of the
Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(FCC 04–290)
Lignes directrices
Table 1.3: De´cisions et Lignes directrices analyse´es
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Re´fe´rence Economies d’e´chelle Economies d’envergure Couˆts spe´cifiques des entrants
Commission Europe´enne [2010] Oui. Oui.
European Regulators Group [2003] Part de marche´ de la firme en place re´duite
a` 20-25%.
Une approche est de calculer les couˆts de
la firme en place en annulant ses e´conomies
d’envergure (α = 1).
Autriche (RTR, 2010) Pas pour les marche´s non-NGAN. Utilisation des couˆts e´vitables (test mono-
produit) et LRAIC (test combinatoire).
Belgique (BIPT, 2007) Part de marche´ de la firme en place re´duite
a` 25%.
Utilisation des LRIC (ou FAC) et tests
combinatoires.
Oui.
Belgique (BIPT, 2009) Part de marche´ de la firme en place re´duite
a` 20-25%.
France (ARCEP, 2006) Oui (mode`le bottom-up).
Allemagne (BNetzA, 2007) Non (analyse de long terme). Non (analyse de long terme). Non (analyse de long terme).
Irlande (ComReg, 2011) Utilisation de LRAIC+.
Irlande (ComReg, 2012) Part de marche´ de la firme en place re´duite
a` 25% (pour le second test). Demande de
la firme en place re´duite a` une moyenne
ponde´re´e (51k, 88k et 91k lignes LLU).
Pays-Bas (OPTA, 2001) Non (test EEO). Non (test EEO).
Portugal (Anacom, 2007) Non.
Grande-Bretagne (Ofcom, 2004) Demande de la firme en place re´duite a` 1,7
- 2,5 millions de consommateurs (pe´riode
de 5 ans).
Utilisation des FAC.
Table 1.4: Ajustements des couˆts dans les tests de ciseaux tarifaires
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Re´fe´rence Mix d’acce`s
France (ARCEP, 2006) Oui: local exchange 80%, tandem exchange 20% (mode`le bottom-
up).
Irlande (ComReg, 2011) Oui: moyenne ponde´re´e pour l’interconnexion au niveaux local,
single tandem, et double tandem (respectivement 66%, 24%, et
10%).
Italie (AGCOM, 2010) Oui: moyenne base´e sur donne´es nationales et mises a` jour
fre´quemment.
Espagne (CMT, 2007) Oui.
Espagne (CMT, 2008a) Oui: moyenne base´e sur donne´es nationales et mises a` jour tous
les 6 mois (LLU 73.8%, GigADSL 8.7%, ADSL-IP 17.5%).
Table 1.5: Ajustements des charges d’acce`s dans les tests de ciseaux tarifaires
Re´fe´rence Vente lie´e
Austriche (RTR, 2010) Un test agre´ge´.
Allemagne (BNetzA, 2007) Traitement au cas-par-cas.
Italie (AGCOM, 2010) Un test agre´ge´.
Pologne (UKE, 2009) Test par produit, prix implicite net des couˆts incre´mentaux (β =
1).
Espagne (CMT, 2007) Pas directement pris en compte dans les tests: test de re´plicabilite´
additionnel.
Table 1.6: Ajustements des prix dans les tests de ciseaux tarifaires
1.3 Politique de la concurrence dans le secteur
des TIC
1.3.1 Vente lie´e et couˆts de changement
1.3.1.1 Introduction
Dans certains marche´s de te´le´communications mobiles, les ope´rateurs ont de´veloppe´
des services de paiement sur mobile tre`s profitables. Par exemple, au Kenya,
l’ope´rateur de te´le´communications Safaricom est devenu un leader du marche´
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bancaire en introduisant son service de paiement sur mobile. Dans ce pays, le
marche´ des te´le´coms est tre`s concurrentiel, mais le marche´ du paiement sur mo-
bile reste monopolistique, duˆ a` d’important couˆts fixes (de´veloppement du re´seau
d’agence). De plus, les consommateurs restent fide`les a` un ope´rateur de services
de paiement sur mobile, car il est couˆteux et pe´nible de re´silier son contrat.
D’autres exemples de firmes en position dominante sur un marche´ avec des
couˆts de changement importants pour les consommateurs, et en concurrence sur
un marche´ distinct, peuvent eˆtre tire´s de l’industrie bancaire. Ce chapitre de the`se
analyse la strate´gie tarifaire d’un ope´rateur qui est simultane´ment en position
de monopole sur un marche´ sur lequel les consommateurs subissent des couˆts a`
re´silier leur contrat, et en concurrence sur un second marche´. Je montre qu’une
entreprise dans cette configuration peut avoir inte´reˆt a` pratiquer la vente lie´e afin
de transfe´rer les couˆts de changement auxquels font face les consommateurs du
marche´ en monopole vers le marche´ concurrentiel.
1.3.1.2 Mode`le
Dans le mode`le, base´ sur Choi [2004] et Klemperer [1987], la firme 1 est active
sur deux marche´s: l’un en monopole (le marche´ A), et l’autre en concurrence
(marche´ B), sur lequel est active la firme 2. Sur le marche´ B les deux firmes
se font concurrence a` la Hotelling. Les consommateurs ont une valorisation de
V pour le bien du marche´ A, et de r pour le bien du marche´ B. Je suppose
que r est grand donc le marche´ B est couvert. Les consommateurs ont un couˆt
de transport t par unite´ de transport sur le marche´ B et sont localise´s de fac¸on
homoge`ne. De plus, si un consommateur de´cide de ne plus acheter le bien du
marche´ A, il lui en couˆte s en frais administratifs (s n’est re´cupe´re´ par aucune
firme). Le jeu comporte deux pe´riodes, et le facteur d’escompte est e´gal a` 1.
Lorsque la firme 1 ne pratique pas la vente lie´e, il est facile de prouver que les
profits des firmes sur les deux pe´riodes sont:{
Π1 = π
t1
1 + π
t2
1 = t
2 + 2tV,
Π2 = π
t1
2 + π
t2
2 = t
2.
(1.9)
De plus, lorsque la firme 1 pratique la vente lie´e est que s = 0, il est facile de
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montrer que les profits sont:{
Π¯1 = π¯
t1
1 + π¯
t2
1 = t
2 + 2tV
3
+ V
2
9
,
Π¯2 = π¯
t1
2 + π¯
t2
2 = t
2 − 2tV
3
+ V
2
9
.
(1.10)
J’analyse les incitations pour la firme 1 a` pratiquer la vente lie´e. Pour ce faire,
je pose certaines hypothe`ses de simplification (tous les consommateurs ont des
pre´fe´rence, c-a`-d leur localisation sur la ligne d’Hotelling, inde´pendantes d’une
pe´riode a` l’autre) et des hypothe`ses pour que la vente lie´e ne soit pas profitable
a` la firme 1 per se (V < 3t, voir e´quations (1.9) et (1.10)).
1.3.1.3 Analyse et re´sultats
D’apre`s le mode`le, les profits de firmes dans la seconde pe´riode du jeu lorsque la
firme 1 pratique la vent lie´e sont:{
π¯t21 =
1
18
(3t+ V + sσ)2,
π¯t22 =
1
18
(3t− V − sσ)2. (1.11)
Il est ensuite possible de montrer que les prix et quantite´s a` l’e´quilibre dans
la premie`re pe´riode sont{
P¯ t1∗ = c+ t+ V
3
+ s
6
[ s
t
− 3 + s2+3st−2sV+6tV
7s2+54t2
],
p¯t1∗2 = c+ t− V3 + s6 [ st − 1− s
2+3st−2sV+6tV
7s2+54t2
],
(1.12)
et {
q¯t1∗1 =
3t
4
+ t[V (7s+18t)−9t(s+3t)]
2(7s2+54t2)
,
q¯t1∗2 =
t
4
− t[V (7s+18t)−9t(s+3t)]
2(7s2+54t2)
.
(1.13)
Et l’on peut en de´duire le profit total de la firme 1 lorsqu’elle pratique la vente
lie´e:
Π¯1 = t
2 + 2tV
3
+ V
2
9
+ s( 5s
32
− t
6
+ 5V
24
)
+ s
7s2+54t2
( stV
6
− 17s2t
24
− 7st2
16
− 29t2V
4
+ 7sV
2
72
+ 5tV
2
2
)
− st2
(7s2+54t2)2
( s
3
16
− 9s2t
4
+ 13s
2V
4
+ sV
2
4
+ 9tV 2).
(1.14)
En comparant ce profit avec celui re´alise´ si elle ne pratique pas la vente lie´e
pour diffe´rentes valeurs de V et de s, on obtient la Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Incitation pour la Firme 1 a` pratiquer la vente lie´e quand t = 1
la Figure 1.2 indique que la vente lie´e est profitable a` la firme 1 pour des couˆts
de changement s relativement e´leve´s et des valorisations du bien en monopole V
relativement basses.
L’intuition du re´sultat est la suivante. Premie`rement, une valorisation V
e´leve´e entraˆıne une perte de profit importante sur le marche´ en monopole, ou`
l’output est re´duit avec la vente lie´e. Deuxie`mement, un couˆt de changement
e´leve´ permet a` la firme pratiquant la vente lie´e d’extraire un surplus important
de ses consommateurs captifs dans la seconde pe´riode. Cet arbitrage donne le
re´sultat e´nonce´ ci-dessus.
1.3.1.4 Discussion
Ce chapitre de the`se introduit une nouvelle explication rationnelle a` la pratique
de la vente lie´e: la vente lie´e peut eˆtre profitablement utilise´e afin de transfe´rer
des couˆts de changement des consommateurs d’un marche´ en monopole vers un
marche´ concurrentiel. Lorsque la valorisation des consommateurs (ou plutoˆt la
marge effectue´e par la firme) sur le marche´ en monopole est faible et que les couˆts
de changement sont e´leve´s, il peut eˆtre profitable de pratiquer la vente lie´e. Par
ailleurs, la vente lie´e de´croˆıt le bien-eˆtre social dans ce cadre, puisqu’elle constitue
un e´cart par rapport au “first-best”.
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1.3.2 Politique de la concurrence dans le secteur du livre
e´lectronique
1.3.2.1 Introduction
A la suite de l’introduction de la liseuse Kindle par Amazon en 2007, le marche´
du livre e´lectronique a connu une progression rapide, en atteignant 4 milliard
de dollars US en 2011. Dans cette pe´riode, le prix des livres e´lectroniques ont
connu une e´volution inte´ressante. En effet, peu apre`s l’entre´e d’Apple en tant
que revendeur avec sa liseuse iPad sur le marche´ en 2010, les prix des livres
e´lectroniques ont augmente´. Ceci a attire´ l’attention des autorite´s de concurrence
en Europe et aux Etats-Unis.
Alors qu’Amazon utilisait un contrat de gros classique avec les e´diteurs de
livres, dans lequel il e´tait stipule´ qu’il achetait les livres a` un prix de gros et
qu’il les revendait au prix qu’il souhaitait, Apple a introduit un nouveau type de
contrat en entrant sur le marche´. Ce nouveau contrat, appele´ “agency”, laisse
les e´diteurs de livres fixer le prix final paye´ par les consommateurs. Apple, en
contrepartie, conserve un pourcentage des revenus provenant de la vente. Apre`s
l’introduction de ce type de contrat, les e´diteurs ont fait pression, avec succe`s,
sur Amazon afin qu’il adopte un contrat similaire.
Dans ce chapitre de the`se, j’e´tudie les deux types d’organisation contractuelle
(“de gros”, ou “agency”) et leurs effets sur les prix des de´tails. De plus, j’analyse
l’impact de la vente des liseuses, biens d’acce`s ne´cessaires pour consommer des
livres e´lectroniques, sur le prix de de´tail.
1.3.2.2 Mode`le sans liseuse
Un e´diteur en monopole vend ses produits a` un distributeur en monopole, qui
lui vend aux consommateurs finaux. La demande pour le produit final, D(·),est
doublement diffe´rentiable et de´croˆıt avec le prix p. p(·) est la fonction de demande
inverse. L’e´diteur fait face a` un couˆt marginal constant c > 0 de production,
qui correspond par exemple aux royalties qu’il doit reverser a` l’auteur du livre.
MR(q) repre´sente le revenu marginal.
Contrat de gros. Avec le contrat de gros, l’e´diteur choisit en premier un prix
de gros w auquel il vend ses livres au distributeur. Ensuite, ce dernier fixe le prix
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pw paye´ par les consommateurs.
Contrat agency. Avec le contrat agency, le distributeur annonce en premier la
part des revenus de l’e´diteur qu’il conservera, α ∈ [0, 1]. Dans un second temps,
l’e´diteur fixe le prix de de´tail du livre e´lectronique, pa.
Pour analyser l’e´quilibre du contrat de gros, il suffit de prendre la “courbe
de revenu marginal de la courbe de revenu marginal”, MMR(q) ≡ MR(q) +
qMR′(q). L’e´quilibre est simplement obtenu a` l’intersection de cette courbe et
de la courbe de couˆt marginal, comme dans la Figure 1.3. Dans ce cas, on fait
face au proble`me classique de double-marginalisation.
Figure 1.3: Equilibre avec le contrat de gros
Pour analyser l’e´quilibre du contrat agency, il faut d’abord remarquer que
chaque α candidat induit une rotation vers le bas des courbes p(q) etMR(q). Les
intersections entre (1 − α)MR(q) et c, pour diffe´rents α, comme dans la partie
en bas a` gauche de la Figure 1.4, de´finissent la courbe ISC(q) ≡ (1 − α(q))p(q)
(Input Supply Curve). Ensuite, il suffit de prendre la courbe “Marginal Input
Supply Curve”, (MISC(q) ≡ ISC(q) + qISC ′(q)) et son intersection avec la
courbe de revenu marginal afin de de´terminer l’e´quilibre, comme indique´ dans la
Figure 1.4.
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Ce qu’on peut de´duire de cette analyse graphique, et qui est confirme´ par
une analyse the´orique, est que, de manie`re ge´ne´rale, le prix de de´tail a` l’e´quilibre
avec un contrat agency est plus faible que le prix de de´tail a` l’e´quilibre avec un
contrat de gros. En effet, la distorsion de double-marginalisation avec le contrat
de gros est ge´ne´ralement plus importante que celle due au fait que l’e´diteur subisse
l’inte´gralite´ des couˆts et ne conserve qu’une proportion des profits avec le contrat
agency. L’inverse est cependant vrai dans certains cas, par exemple lorsque la
convexite´ de la fonction de demande inverse est e´leve´e, et que le couˆt marginal
n’est pas trop faible. Enfin, une fonction de demande a` e´lasticite´ constante induira
des prix de de´tail e´gaux avec les deux types de contrat.
1.3.2.3 Mode`le avec liseuses
Une des caracte´ristiques du marche´ du livre e´lectronique est que les distributeurs
de livres, tels que Amazon ou Apple, sont e´galement les principaux vendeurs de
liseuses ou tablettes, ces produits permettant spe´cifiquement l’utilisation (l’achat
et la lecture) d’un livre e´lectronique. Ces produits agissent donc comme des
biens d’acce`s pour l’achat des livres e´lectroniques. Enfin, les consommateurs ont
e´galement un valorisation positive pour ce bien d’acce`s seul, puisqu’il permet
d’aller sur internet, ou d’utiliser des livres e´lectroniques gratuits du domaine
public par exemple.
Par conse´quent, si on inte`gre ces biens d’acce`s dans l’analyse, on remarque
qu’avec les contrats de gros le distributeur fixe en fait un tarif binoˆme, ou` la
part fixe correspond au prix de la liseuse et la part variable au prix d’un livre
e´lectronique. Si on compare les prix d’e´quilibre pour des w et α exoge`nes dans
les deux types de contrat, on observe qu’une augmentation du prix du livre
e´lectronique, comme celle observe´e par les autorite´s antitrust ame´ricaines, est
ge´ne´ralement concordante a` une diminution du prix des liseuses, comme indique´
sur la Figure 1.5.
Ainsi, l’effet d’imposer un type de contrat sur le bien-eˆtre social ou le surplus
des consommateurs ne peut se mesurer en observant simplement le prix des livres
e´lectroniques, et une analyse du marche´ des liseuses devrait eˆtre mene´e par les
autorite´s antitrust en charge.
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Figure 1.5: Comparaison des prix des ebooks (gauche) et des liseuses (droite)
dans les contrats de gros et agency (c = 0.07, and K = 0.2)
1.3.2.4 Discussion
Ce chapitre analyse donc un marche´ re´cent sujet a` un important cas antitrust. Il
montre que l’augmentation de prix du livre e´lectronique apre`s le changement de
business model de contrat de gros a` contrat agency peut simplement eˆtre explique´
par les caracte´ristiques de la fonction de demande. De plus, l’effet global de ce
changement de contrat en terme de bien-eˆtre social ou de surplus des consomma-
teurs devrait eˆtre analyse´ en prenant en compte le marche´ des liseuses, en plus
de celui du livre e´lectronique.
1.4 L’interaction entre re´gulation et politique
de la concurrence: le cas de l’effet de ciseaux
tarifaires
1.4.1 Ciseaux tarifaires et pre´servation du monopole dans
les industries re´gule´es
1.4.1.1 Introduction
La politique de la concurrence concernant la pratique des effets de ciseaux tari-
faires a connu de nombreuses e´volutions ces dernie`res anne´es. En effet, plusieurs
cas antitrust, tre`s me´diatise´s, lie´s a` cette pratique, ont eu lieu aux Etats-Unis et
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en Europe depuis le de´but des anne´es 2000. Ainsi, en Europe, les autorite´s de
concurrence internationale ont condamne´ les ope´rateurs de te´le´communications
Deutsche Telekom (en 2003) et Telefonica (en 2007) a` de lourdes amendes pour
pratique de ciseaux tarifaires. Ces condamnations ont par la suite e´te´ confirme´es
par diffe´rentes cours de justice europe´ennes. A contrario, aux Etats-Unis, la
Cour Supreˆme a rejete´ la plainte contre un ope´rateur de te´le´communications
pour ciseaux tarifaires, en expliquant que cette pratique n’e´tait pas conside´re´e
comme anticoncurrentielle dans le droit ame´ricain, lorsqu’il n’y a ni pre´dation, ni
refus de transaction ayant amene´ un obligation de transaction.
Les diffe´rences prononce´es entre les fac¸ons de traiter les pratiques de ciseaux
tarifaires des deux coˆte´s de l’Atlantique trouvent leurs sources dans le fait que ces
pratiques sont encore mal comprises au sens e´conomique. Par exemple, il n’est
pas clair pourquoi une firme verticalement inte´gre´e et re´gule´e sur son marche´
amont pourrait pratiquer le squeeze pour e´vincer un concurrent aval plus efficace
qu’elle.
Dans ce chapitre, j’explique pourquoi une firme dont la charge d’acce`s a` la
ressource amont est re´gule´e peut avoir inte´reˆt a` fixer un prix de de´tail bas afin
d’e´vincer un concurrent du marche´. La logique est celle du levier de´fensif (voir
Carlton and Waldman [2002]), qui consiste a` e´vincer un concurrent aval qui pour-
rait, a` terme, pe´ne´trer le marche´ amont et ainsi menacer le monopole de la firme
en place sur ce marche´.
1.4.1.2 Mode`le
La firme en place I est verticalement inte´gre´e, et posse`de des couˆts marginaux
aval cI et amont uI . Un entrant potentiel E posse`de des couˆts marginaux aval
cE < cI et amont uE < uI , mais doit, pour pe´ne´trer ces marche´s, payer des couˆts
fixes. Ces couˆts fixes sont f sur le marche´ aval et F sur le marche´ amont. S’il
ne rentre que sur le marche´ aval, E doit acheter le produit amont a` I. Les deux
firmes se font concurrence en prix, et leurs produits sont homoge`nes.
Une autorite´ inde´pendante re´gule le marche´ amont, et fixe la charge d’acce`s
a au produit amont de I pour tout le jeu, avec a > uI . Les consommateurs sont
repre´sente´s via un fonction de demande D(p).
Le timing est le suivant. Dans la premie`re pe´riode, les firmes fixent leurs prix,
puis E de´cide de rentrer sur le marche´ aval ou non, avant que les consommateurs
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ne fassent leur choix. Dans la seconde pe´riode, les firmes fixent leurs prix, puis
E de´cide (i) de rentrer ou non sur le marche´ amont s’il e´tait rentre´ sur le marche´
aval, ou (ii) de rentrer sur les deux marche´s ou sur le marche´ aval seulement s’il
n’e´tait pas rentre´. Enfin, les consommateurs font leur choix.
1.4.1.3 Analyse et re´sultats
L’analyse du mode`le se fait a` rebours. Dans la seconde pe´riode, on voit que, s’il
est entre´ sur le marche´ aval dans la premie`re pe´riode, E investira sur le marche´
amont si et seulement si F ≤ (uI + cI − (uE + cE))D(uI + cI). De plus, s’il
n’est pas entre´ sur le marche´ dans la premie`re pe´riode, E restera en dehors de
tous les marche´s si son profit attendu πV IE (.) e´value´ au prix uI + cI est tel que
πV IE (uI + cI)− F − f < 0.
Dans la premie`re pe´riode, il est possible de de´terminer que, pour certains
parame`tres, soit E entre sur le marche´ aval (et investira sur le marche´ amont
dans la deuxie`me pe´riode), soit E n’entre pas sur le marche´ aval (et restera en
dehors de tous les marche´s dans la deuxie`me pe´riode). Le choix entre ces deux
e´quilibres de sous-jeu est de´termine´ par le prix fixe´ par I dans la premie`re pe´riode.
Ainsi, il est possible, si certaines conditions sont ve´rifie´es, que I fixe un prix
squeezant, c-a`-d tel que pI < a + cI , dans la premie`re pe´riode, afin de s’assurer
une position de monopole (amont et aval) dans la deuxie`me pe´riode.
1.4.1.4 Discussion
Dans ce chapitre, j’ai explique´ comment la pratique de ciseaux tarifaires pouvait
e´merger d’une strate´gie rationnelle dans un marche´ re´gule´. La logique e´conomique
de l’abus est proche de celle de la pre´dation: fixer un prix de de´tail faible afin
d’e´vincer ou de bloquer un concurrent. Mais les relations verticales entre les
firmes posent la question du caracte`re rationnel de ce type de comportement. Ici,
je montre que ce type d’abus e´merge si la firme en place souhaite se de´fendre
face a` une menace, sur le long-terme, d’entre´e sur le marche´ amont monopolise´
et re´gule´. Cette explication rationnelle qui donne naissance a` un effet de ciseaux
tarifaires dans un marche´ re´gule´ peut e´galement donner naissance a` un refus de
transaction dans un marche´ non-re´gule´ (voir Chen [2013]).
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1.4.2 L’interaction entre ciseaux tarifaires et re´gulation
de l’acce`s
1.4.2.1 Introduction
L’interaction entre re´gulation ex-ante et politique de la concurrence ex-post, par-
ticulie`rement pour les abus de position dominante, est un sujet critique parmi les
e´conomistes. Plus pre´cise´ment, comprendre les impacts de la re´gulation ex-ante
sur les incitations a` mener des abus de position dominante est un sujet important.
Dans ce chapitre, j’e´tudie le lien entre re´gulation de la charge d’acce`s d’une firme
en place, verticalement inte´gre´e et en situation de monopole sur le marche´ amont,
et ses incitations a` mener des ciseaux tarifaires afin d’e´vincer un concurrent du
marche´ aval.
En effet, lorsque que l’autorite´ de re´gulation inde´pendante augmente la charge
d’acce`s que l’entrant aval doit payer a` la firme en place inte´gre´e pour son pro-
duit de gros, cela augmente le profit de gros de la firme en place, donc re´duit
ses incitations a` e´vincer du marche´ aval son concurrent. Mais, cela augmente
e´galement le couˆt marginal perc¸u de l’entrant, et, ainsi, diminue le couˆt pour la
firme inte´gre´e de pratiquer des ciseaux tarifaires.
Cet arbitrage a de´ja` e´te´ e´tudie´ dans la litte´rature par Biglaiser and DeGraba
[2001] dans un mode`le avec des biens diffe´rencie´s et une concurrence par les prix
en tarifs binoˆmes. Je montre ici que leur re´sultat, qui est qu’une augmentation
de la charge d’acce`s re´duit toujours les incitations au squeeze, n’est pas robuste
a` une autre mode´lisation.
1.4.2.2 Mode`le
La firme en place I est verticalement inte´gre´e, et posse`de des couˆts marginaux
aval cI et amont cu. Un entrant aval E posse`de un couˆt marginal constant cE < cI ,
et doit acheter le produit de gros de I au prix fixe´ par le re´gulateur. Le facteur
d’escompte de la firme en place est δ ≥ 0.
Une autorite´ inde´pendante re´gule le marche´ amont, et fixe la charge d’acce`s
a au produit amont de I pour tout le jeu, avec a > cu. Les consommateurs sont
repre´sente´s via un fonction de demande D(p).
Suivant le concept de la “long purse” (voir Motta [2004], p. 413), l’entrant ne
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peut pas subir de grosses pertes lors de la premie`re pe´riode du jeu, contrairement
a` la firme en place. Ainsi, la firme en place peut fixer un prix bas, afin de forcer
l’entrant a` faire de grosses pertes ou de ne pas vendre son produit, et ainsi de
l’obliger a` quitter le marche´. En re´sume´, j’assume que si E ne vend pas ou fait
un profit e´gal ou infe´rieur a` −γ ≤ 0 dans la premie`re pe´riode, il doit quitter le
marche´, et I se retrouve en position de monopole dans la deuxie`me pe´riode.
Le timing est le suivant. Dans la premie`re pe´riode, les firmes fixent leurs prix,
puis les consommateurs font leur choix. Si E ne vend pas ou fait un profit infe´rieur
ou e´gal a` −γ ≤ 0, il quitte le marche´. Dans la seconde pe´riode, les firmes fixent
leurs prix (E seulement s’il est toujours sur le marche´), puis les consommateurs
font leur choix.
1.4.2.3 Analyse et re´sultats
Dans un premier temps, ce mode`le permet de comparer les profits de I lorsqu’il
pratique des ciseaux tarifaires ou non. Lorsqu’il ne pratique pas de ciseaux tar-
ifaires, son profit est ΠNS = (1 + δ)πNS, avec πNS ≡ (a − cu)D(a + cI). Par
contre, lorsqu’il pratique les ciseaux tarifaires, son profit est ΠS = πS+δπmI , avec
πS ≡ (pˆ− (cu+ cI))D(pˆ) ≤ πNS, et πmI le profit de monopole. Le profit lors de la
pratique du squeeze de´pend du prix squeezant pˆ, de´fini par (pˆ− (a+ cE))D(pˆ) =
−γ. Ce prix existe, est unique, et est infe´rieur a` a+ cE.
Dans un second temps, ce mode`le permet d’analyser les incitations a` en-
treprendre des ciseaux tarifaires, et leur relation avec la charge d’acce`s. Dans la
version comple`te du chapitre, il est de´montre´ que les incitations, qui de´pendent
du taux ∂pˆ/∂a auquel une augmentation de la charge d’acce`s est transmise au
prix squeezant, peuvent diminuer ou augmenter avec la charge d’acce`s.
1.4.2.4 Discussion
Ce chapitre permet donc de remettre en question un re´sultat e´tabli de la litte´rature,
en montrant qu’il n’est pas robuste a` une nouvelle mode´lisation. Le re´sultat prin-
cipal de ce chapitre, qui est que les incitations a` pratiquer des effets de ciseaux
tarifaires peuvent augmenter ou diminuer en la charge d’acce`s re´gule´e, est base´
sur un mode`le de concurrence homoge`ne, avec un minimum d’hypothe`ses sur la
demande.
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Ce re´sultat est robuste lorsqu’on conside`re d’autres prix d’e´quilibre que celui
se´lectionne´ (il existe un continuum de prix d’e´quilibre dans ce mode`le), que
l’entrant doit faire un profit positif dans la premie`re pe´riode pour survivre, que
les contraintes financie`res de l’entrant de´pendent de la charge d’acce`s, que la
charge d’acce`s re´gule´e est modifie´e d’une pe´riode a` l’autre, et que l’entrant peut
s’affranchir de sa de´pendance a` la firme en place en construisant son propre re´seau
amont.
1.5 Conclusion
Dans cette the`se sur articles, j’ai analyse´ diffe´rentes proble´matiques lie´es a` la
re´gulation et la politique de la concurrence dans le secteur des TIC. La premie`re
partie de recherche porte sur deux questions lie´es a` la re´gulation ex-ante dans le
secteur des te´le´communications: l’e´chelle de l’investissement, et les tests d’effet de
ciseaux tarifaires effectue´s par les re´gulateurs de te´le´communications en Europe.
La deuxie`me partie de recherche porte sur deux questions lie´es a` la politique
de la concurrence dans le secteur des TIC: la pratique de la vente lie´e dans
certains marche´s de te´le´communications, et l’organisation industrielle du secteur
du livre e´lectronique. Enfin, la troisie`me et dernie`re partie de recherche porte
sur l’interaction entre re´gulation ex-ante et politique de la concurrence ex-post,
en abordant le cas d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires dans une industrie re´gule´e. Deux
questions sont traite´es: Pourquoi une firme peut-elle pratiquer un effet de ciseaux
tarifaires de manie`re rationnelle? Et comment e´volue l’incitation a` entreprendre
des ciseaux tarifaires avec la charge d’acce`s re´gule´e?
En conclusion de cette the`se, je mets en avant certains proble`mes lie´s au
secteur des TIC. Ainsi, la re´gulation ex-ante dans le secteur des te´le´communications
pourrait plus se baser sur des analyses e´conomiques concre`tes, et la politique de
la concurrence dans le secteur des TIC pourrait plus re´gulie`rement prendre en
compte les spe´cificite´s de ce secteur. Enfin, l’application de la politique de la
concurrence ex-post dans un marche´ re´gule´ ex-ante devrait se faire en s’assurant
qu’il n’existe pas de conflit entre les deux actions, et que les externalite´s induites
par les re´gulations sont bien internalise´es.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
2.1 Regulation and competition policy in the
ICT sector
The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector embraces a com-
bination of manufacturing and services industries that “capture, transmit and
display data and information electronically,” according to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).1 The concerned manufactur-
ing industries are those whose products are related to information processing and
communication, or which use electronic processing. Products of the concerned
services industries are intended “to enable the function of information processing
and communication by electronic means,” according to the OECD report.
The ICT sector is of particular interest to an industrial organization economist.
First, it is in constant evolution, as there are many innovations in the ICT sector.
Hence, it is not a static field of study. For instance, the upcoming of the internet
in the past 20 years has provided a deep and furnished new area of analysis for
economists. Second, the industrial organization in this sector is often particularly
complex. One can observe many oligopolistic structures, with vertical relation,
innovation and investment strategies, etc. The ICT sector is also often charac-
terized by specificities one does not commonly observe in other sectors, such as
network effects (see Rohlfs [1974]).
Third, the ICT sector impacts many other sectors, and therefore contributes
1“Measuring the Information Economy,” OECD, 2002.
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significantly to economic growth. Indeed, all industries are using ICT products or
services such as telecommunications equipments and services. In this regard, the
ICT sector is a central piece of the economy at large. Jorgenson [2001] explains
that the development of information technologies impacts growth via two different
channels in the U.S., as it creates a temporary shock on growth, and also leads
to permanent improvements in growth prospects. Oliner and Sichel [2000] show
that both the use and the production of ICT-related services and products have
significantly and positively impacted economic growth in the U.S. in the late
1990s. But the link between ICT and growth is not specific to the U.S. Colecchia
and Schreyer [2002] find that ICT contributed significantly to economic growth
in the late 1990s in every country they analyzed (Australia, Canada, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United-Kingdom, and the U.S.).
At the core of the ICT industry, telecommunications infrastructures play an
important role in contributing to economic growth. Using a panel of 21 OECD
countries over 20 years, Ro¨ller and Waverman [2001] demonstrate that telecom-
munications infrastructure investments had a significant and positive impact on
economic growth when reaching a critical mass level. More recently, Czernich
et al. [2011] study 31 OECD countries and show that broadband penetration
has had a positive and significant impact on economic growth over the period
1998-2010.
Finally, the ICT sector is at a crossroad between ex-ante and ex-post reg-
ulations, and both types of regulation typically play an important role in the
telecommunications industry (see Laffont and Tirole [2001]). Therefore, it is not
only interesting to study the impact of these two types of regulation in this sector,
but also to analyze the interplay between both forms of regulation, each of them
having its own particularities.
The telecommunications industry, the network ground for the ICT sector, has
had a particular economic history in the past decades. As other network industries
in other sectors (such as energy, or utilities), it experienced a rapid growth due
to national investment plans settling down large state-owned incumbent firms.
Then, many countries decided to liberalize (fully or partially) their telecom-
munications industry. At the European level, early decisions for fixed telecom-
munications concerned the liberalization of cable TV networks in 1995, or the
unbundling of the local loop which became mandatory at the European level in
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2000.
Parallel to this liberalization of the industry, specific regulatory rules have
been implemented, both at the national level by National Regulatory Author-
ities (NRAs) and at the international level. These rules aim at maintaining a
level-playing field in the industry, in order to introduce competition while supply-
ing firms with sufficient margins to ensure investments, national specific regimes
through Universal Service Obligations (USOs), or to avoid inefficient duplication
of natural monopoly infrastructures.
Besides these specific regulatory rules, the ICT sector, as any other economic
sector, is also subject to competition policy. Whereas the industry-specific reg-
ulations impact the sector ex-ante, competition policy plays a role ex-post in
prohibiting abuse of a dominant position.1 These ex-post rules are mainly en-
forced through an authorization and/or punishment system, defining what are
the legal rules of competition.
In this thesis, I address these specificities of the ICT sector by studying some
aspects of regulation in the telecommunications industry, some firms’ strategies
which have been investigated by competition authorities in the ICT sector, and
some firms’ conducts which have been investigated by competition authorities in
ex-ante regulated telecommunications markets. I characterize several features of
ex-ante and ex-post regulation, and show that some of the main advantages of ex-
ante regulation correspond to some of the main weaknesses of ex-post competition
policy, and vice-versa.
2.1.1 Regulation in the ICT sector
As other network industries, the ICT sector, and the telecommunications industry
in particular, has been liberalized in many countries over the past decades. The
liberalization process has moved the industry from a fully regulated monopoly to
a partially regulated market, with an incumbent generally facing (less) partially
regulated entrants. Overviews of the liberalization and deregulation processes
can be found in Waverman and Sirel [1997] for Europe, Harris and Kraft [1997]
and Crandall [2000] for the U.S., and Spiller and Cardilli [1997] for some other
1Note that competition policy also plays a role ex-ante, for instance in merger review.
However, we will focus on its ex-post role in this thesis.
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countries (Australia, Chile, Guatemala, and New Zealand).
The main goal of the liberalization process was to introduce competition in
monopolized and regulated markets. Indeed, competition is generally thought to
foster innovation and growth, as explained by Aghion et al. [2005]. The authors
argue that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and
innovation. On the one hand, more competition may foster innovation and growth
when it induces a larger decrease in a firm’s pre-innovation rents than in its post-
innovation rents. This is particularly true in sectors where firms are competing
at similar technology levels and the incremental profit from innovation is large.
On the other hand, when innovations are made by laggard firms and therefore
competition mainly affects post-innovation rents, the ‘Schumpeterian effect’ of
competition dominates.
In this regard, liberalized ICT industries are thought to perform better than
non-liberalized ones in contributing to growth in the sector. Besides, regulatory
authorities might be captured by political or private institutions, and, hence,
regulated industries might perform poorly when compared to liberalized ones.
Indeed, as Levy and Spiller [1994] explain, the sector’s economic performance is
affected by interactions between political institutions and regulatory processes or
economic conditions, hence giving room for administrative manipulation.
This impact of liberalization and deregulation on growth has been empirically
verified by Olley and Pakes [1996], who find an increase in the rate of aggregate
productivity growth of the U.S. telecommunications equipment industry after
deregulation. The authors explain that this productivity increase was primarily
due to capital reallocation towards more productive plants. Similarly, Li and
Xu [2004] find that full privatization, which gave private owners control rights,
contributed substantially to growth in the telecommunications sector. Indeed,
full privatization increased competitive pressure and, hence, raised both factor
inputs and total factor productivity.
This increase in productivity after liberalization may also be explained by
former regulation-induced inefficiencies. To analyze these inefficiencies, Hausman
[1997] and Prieger [2002] estimate the effects of regulation of new telecommuni-
cations services. They find a negative impact of regulation of new services on
welfare, mostly due to delays for regulatory approvals (firms also face direct costs
from preparing approval plans, and these plans might reveal some information to
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competitors).
However, the liberalization process did not aim at introducing competition in
all market segments. Instead, as highlighted by Curien and Gensollen [1989], it
generally aimed at introducing competition in a previously monopolized market,
while avoiding inefficient duplication of natural monopolies. Therefore, the indus-
try may perform better as a whole when competition is introduced in some market
segments only, and regulation of the natural monopoly market is maintained.
Additionally, privately controlled firms issued from the liberalization process
do not behave strategically like state-owned firms. Bortolotti et al. [2011] study
more than 90 publicly traded firms in the European Union from 1994 to 2005
and show that privately controlled firms rely on leverage more than state con-
trolled firms.1 This drastically impacts market outcomes, as leverage positively
influences regulated retail prices when firms are privately controlled (Bortolotti
et al. [2011]), as well as regulated wholesale prices and incumbent market shares
(Cambini and Rondi [2012]).
Besides, regulation is in general a efficient way to solve market failures as,
for instance, to promote interconnection between networks (see, e.g., Armstrong
[1998] and Laffont, Rey and Tirole [1998]). A complete overview of the theory of
regulation is given in greater details in Armstrong and Sappington [2007], while
Le´veˆque [2009] provides a clear examination of regulation of externalities, natural
monopoly, and collective goods with concrete examples.
One example of regulation in the telecommunications industry is the regula-
tion of access pricing (see, e.g., Armstrong [2001, 2002], and Vogelsang [2003]).
In fixed telecommunications networks, the last mile of the physical network is
generally considered as a natural monopoly, as it might be too costly to dupli-
cate. However, competition can be introduced in other market segments, such
as service provision to final consumers. Hence, many regulatory authorities have
enforced access regulation rules for incumbent firms to rent the last mile of their
fixed telecommunications network (the “local loop”) to their competitors in the
retail market. In Europe, for example, unbundled access of the local loop is
mandatory since December 2000 and the regulation No 2887/2000 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council.
However, regulation also has some drawbacks, especially due to its poten-
1Cambini and Spiegel [2012] provide a theoretical justification of this result.
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tially negative impact on investment (see, e.g., Valletti [2003]; and the reviews by
Guthrie [2006], and Cambini and Jiang [2009]). Also, the interplay between reg-
ulated and non-regulated networks can be difficult to dealt with for a regulatory
authority (Hausman, Sidak and Singer [2001]). This is particularly true in broad-
band markets where DSL networks are regulated in order to favor entry, whereas
cable networks are not. For instance, in OECD countries, competition between
DSL and cable networks (inter-platform competition) brings higher broadband
penetration rates than intra-platform competition on the DSL network (Bouck-
aert, van Dijk and Verboven [2010]).1 Finally, some anticompetitive conducts
might arise when a regulated firm integrates into a non-regulated segment (see,
e.g., Rubinfeld and Singer [2001]).
2.1.2 Competition policy in the ICT sector
The ICT sector, as any economic sector, is subject to competition policy (or
antitrust). There is a long history of competition policy and its relation with
economic theory. Posner [1976] and Bork [1978] were among the first to intro-
duce economic and industrial organization models to justify or dismiss antitrust
regulations in the U.S. Their work mainly aimed at demonstrating with simple
economic models why many strategic conducts which were thought to be anticom-
petitive are not rational unless they had a positive impact on welfare. Ever since,
a major part of the IO competition policy literature has aimed at introducing
different real-world assumptions in these simple models, in order to rationalize
anticompetitive strategic conducts.
The theory of competition policy is developed in greater details by Rey [2003],
and Motta [2004]. Both authors provide detailed reviews of all aspects of com-
1Distaso, Lupi and Manenti [2006] study European countries and find similar results. Also
studying European countries, Ho¨ﬄer [2007] finds that inter-platform competition increases
broadband penetration but that the total effect on social welfare may be negative when in-
corporating fixed costs in the analysis. Using micro-data for the United-Kingdom, Nardotto,
Valletti and Verboven [2012] show that intra-platform competition does not impact broadband
penetration, in contrast to inter-platform competition, and that both types of competition pos-
itively impacts service quality. Note that, however, Gruber and Koutroumpis [2013] find an
opposite result estimating the impact of inter- and intra-platform competition on broadband
penetration in a larger dataset of 167 markets over 11 years. They explain their result by the
fact that bypass of the incumbents’ networks is costly, and that this cost is passed through to
final consumers.
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petition policy, and in particular of all the anticompetitive conducts a dominant
firm can undertake.
Two main approaches driving competition policy are used by different au-
thorities all over the world: the form-based and the effect-based approaches. The
former bases competition policy decisions on simple and clearly-defined tests and
rules that authorities, firms, and organizations can easily apply. The latter bases
decisions on the current effects on welfare or consumer surplus that (allegedly)
anticompetitive conducts may have. An economic approach to competition pol-
icy law in Europe is given by Gual et al. [2006]. The authors argue for a move
toward more effect-based decisions in competition policy.
Both approaches have advantages and drawbacks. While the form-based ap-
proach allows for an homogeneous understanding of rules across the whole indus-
try, it can also favor false positive (type-I) errors when the rules are ‘too tough’
such that they prevent firms to compete fiercely. By contrast, the effect-based
approach reduces the scope for false positive errors, but allows for a wider range
of conducts and strategies. Furthermore, implementation of an effect-based ap-
proach may necessitate a closer analysis from regulatory authorities, which are
resource-constrained, and hence, may favor false negative (type-II) errors.
The differences between these two approaches can help to explain the dif-
ferences between authorities when studying pricing conducts such as predation
or margin squeeze. For instance, as we will argue in Chapter 7, if predation
were defined according to an economics-based definition (and not a form-based
one), margin squeeze cases in regulated markets could generally be analyzed as
predatory conducts.
Furthermore, the ICT sector has a lot of specificities when compared to other
sectors. For instance, markets in the telecommunications industry are often or-
ganized according to vertical structures. Besides, there are strong asymmetries
between former state-monopolies and new entrants. These vertical structures and
asymmetries may facilitate anticompetitive conducts from dominant firms, with
the goal to exclude competitors or to earn supra-competitive profits (see, e.g., In-
derst and Valletti [2011], or Bourreau et al. [2011]). Some aspects of competition
policy are dedicated to the analysis of these vertical relationships with dominant
firms (see, e.g., Rey and Tirole [2007], Rey and Verge´ [2008], or Riordan [2008]
for detailed reviews).
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2.1.3 The interplay between regulation and competition
policy in the ICT sector
When ex-ante regulation and ex-post competition policy are applied in the same
market, the interplay between them may induce specific conducts from firms and
may necessitate an ad-hoc analysis. More precisely, the interactions between both
forms of regulation may be complicated.
As a simple example, let us consider the AT&T break-up in 1982 in the U.S.,
known as the Bell doctrine. At that time, AT&T was divided into several compa-
nies because sectoral regulation, which required the incumbent to allow entrants
to access its network at a given price, was potentially a source of anticompeti-
tive conducts. Indeed, even if a vertically-integrated incumbent prefers to serve
a more efficient downstream competitor rather than to serve the retail market
itself if the wholesale price is high enough, it may prefer to set up anticompeti-
tive conducts to foreclose the market when the wholesale price is regulated and
does not allow it to earn supra-competitive profits (see Joskow and Noll [1999]).
In this case, the anticompetitive conduct might have appeared because the mar-
ket was regulated, whereas it would have not occurred if the market had stayed
unregulated.
This complicated interplay might be explained by several factors. As Perrot
[2002] points out, sectoral regulatory and competition authorities have different
objectives, tools, and procedures. Besides, they also differ according to the in-
formation they can acquire, the timing of their interventions, their commitment
ability, how much they have to rely on past decisions, and the risk of regulatory
capture (see also Chone´ [2006]).
In a theoretical paper, Aubert and Pouyet [2004] model the relationship be-
tween both authorities in an industry where a dominant firm faces a potentially
collusive competitive fringe. They show that when the dominant firm’s and its
competitors’ goods are complementary, ex-post regulation from a competition
authority might outperform ex-ante regulation. However, the results are ambigu-
ous when goods are substitutes, and ex-ante regulation may be better when they
are strong substitutes because of the distortionary taxation used to finance the
subsidy paid to the regulated firm.
Hence, the optimal organization between ex-ante and ex-post regulations
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might be hard to determine.1 In Europe, the European Commission regulates
the telecommunications industry with the view that sectoral regulation aims at
building a competitive framework, whereas competition policy ensures that the
resulting competitive equilibrium is maintained. To this end, sectoral regulation
in the telecommunications industry should migrate from supervising all markets
to concentrate on specific issues at the wholesale level only, thereby leaving retail
markets unregulated and competitive. This point of view allows for the compe-
tition authorities’ intervention in ex-ante regulated markets.
By contrast, the U.S. view is much more restrictive, and antitrust laws are
rarely applied in markets with sectoral regulation, notably because the Supreme
Court claims that this is not the role of antitrust to set (ex-ante) sectoral reg-
ulations that would necessitate a deep analysis and a continuous control of the
industry.
This difference is striking in recent competition policy cases, such as those on
margin squeeze conducts. Indeed, the European Commission recently adopted
several decisions, declaring as anticompetitive some pricing conducts from telecom-
munications incumbents, such as in the cases Commission of the European Com-
munities v. Deutsche Telekom (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), and
Commission of the European Communities v. Telefonica (Case COMP/38.784).
By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to enforce ex-post rules in an
ex-ante regulated market in the case Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine
Communications, Inc. (Case 129 S. Ct. 1109). We will study issues related to
margin squeeze in more details in this thesis, and provide a summary of the case
law in Chapter 7.
More generally, in the telecommunications industry, some authors study the
differences between both types of regulation, or the relation between them. As an
example, Heimler [2010] study the interplay of ex-ante and ex-post interventions
in the case of a margin squeeze abuse, asking whether a margin squeeze is a
regulatory or an antitrust abuse. He argues in favor of the “European” point of
view, explaining that a margin squeeze in a regulated market should be considered
1For instance, Hiriart, Martimort and Pouyet [2004] consider a game with adverse selection
incentive problem with a firm engaging in activities that are potentially risky for the environ-
ment, an ex-ante regulatory authority, and an ex-post judge which can evaluate values from
damage. They show that the first-best level of care can be implemented ex-ante only when this
level is observable by the regulatory bodies.
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as abusive by competition authorities, because sectoral regulatory authorities
might not have enough tools to prevent margin squeeze and to promote investment
simultaneously.
2.2 Research questions and results
In this section, we briefly review the research questions and results of this the-
sis. For each part of the thesis, we will focus on issues related to regulation in
the telecommunications industry, competition policy in the ICT sector, and the
interplay between regulation and competition policy in network industries. We
do not claim to bring a broad picture, but instead to address specific problems
which are good illustrations of more general issues.
2.2.1 Regulation in the telecommunications industry
The first two research chapters of this thesis address issues related to regulation
in the telecommunications industry.
2.2.1.1 Dynamic entry and investment in new infrastructures: Em-
pirical evidence from the telecommunications industry
The relationship between competition and innovation or investment has attracted
a lot of attention from economists. A standard prediction in the theoretical
literature is that, starting from a non-competitive situation, intensifying com-
petition may undermine innovation or investment incentives.1 This result has
strong policy implications for regulated industries (like telecommunications, en-
ergy, transportation, etc.): it means that regulators may face a trade-off between
stimulating competition and providing industry players with incentives to invest
(in infrastructures, the design of new services, etc.).
The telecommunications industry provides a vivid example of this regulatory
trade-off. In this industry, alternative operators compete in two different ways
with incumbent operators: on the basis of services, when they rent access to the
incumbents’ networks, and on the basis of facilities, when they build their own
1See, for instance, Aghion et al. [2005] who find an inverted-U relationship between com-
petition and innovation.
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facilities to provide services to end customers. Facility-based competition is gen-
erally considered as the only means to achieve sustainable competition, because it
provides more possibilities for service and product innovations than service-based
competition, and it could lead to a (partial) deregulation of the sector. However,
facility-based competition is difficult to develop rapidly because of the high sunk
costs that new entrants have to bear. This is why, in many European countries,
regulators have set the terms of access to incumbents’ infrastructure with the view
of favoring service-based competition and allowing entrants to enter the market
rapidly.
In the telecommunications industry, the ladder of investment approach claims
that service-based competition (when entrants lease access to incumbents’ facili-
ties) can serve as a “stepping stone”for facility-based entry (when entrants build
their own infrastructures to provide services). In Chapter 3, we build an empiri-
cal model considering a complete ladder of investment, composed of three rungs:
bitstream access, local loop unbundling and new access facilities.1 Using data
from the European Commission “Broadband access in the EU” reports covering
15 European member states for 17 semesters, we test the ladder hypothesis. We
find no empirical support for this hypothesis, that is, for the migration from local
loop unbundling to new access infrastructures, and weak empirical support for
the transition from bitstream access lines to local loop unbundling. These results
are robust when we take into account the number of access rungs, the develop-
ment of broadband cable, the regulatory performance, and the evolution of local
loop unbundling prices.
2.2.1.2 Ex-ante margin squeeze tests in the telecommunications in-
dustry: What is a Reasonably Efficient Operator?
As they generally have to pursue multiple objectives while using a limited num-
ber of tools, ex-ante regulatory authorities often build complex models in order
to regulate telecommunications markets. For example, European regulatory au-
thorities commonly test ex-ante whether or not the margin set between the access
charge (which may be regulated) and the incumbents’ retail prices is higher than
the incumbent’s downstream cost.
1Chapter 3 is adapted from a joint paper with Maya Bacache and Marc Bourreau (Bacache,
Bourreau and Gaudin [2013]).
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Implementing a margin squeeze test may serve different regulatory purposes,
such as the regulation of the access charge for instance. In this view, the Euro-
pean Commission, which acts as an ex-ante and ex-post regulatory authority, has
introduced some guidelines in order to define more precisely such ex-ante tests.
However, these guidelines provide a large degree of flexibility when it comes to
their actual implementation.
In Chapter 4, we study the implementation of ‘reasonably efficient operator’
margin squeeze tests by National Regulatory Authorities in European telecom-
munications markets.1 We provide a theoretical framework in which we show
how regulatory authorities deal with the asymmetries between entrants and in-
cumbents by adjusting the ‘equally efficient operator’ margin squeeze test used in
competition policy. Using this framework, we build a benchmark of implementa-
tion choices by inspecting authorities’ guidelines, market analyses and decisions.
We find that some implementation choices are very similar across authorities’
decisions, whereas some others are dealt with a strong heterogeneity.
2.2.2 Competition policy in the ICT sector
Chapters 5 and 6 address different issues related to competition policy in the ICT
sector.
2.2.2.1 Bundling with switching costs
Bundling –the strategy of selling several products or services together– has at-
tracted a lot of research in the past 20 years. There is a long competition policy
debate about product bundling and other similar strategies, such as tying. For
instance, in the U.S., product bundling had been forbidden for a long time, be-
cause of its possible anticompetitive and exclusionary effects. However, in the
1970s, economists from the Chicago school such as Posner [1976] demonstrated
that bundling was not a rational strategy unless it was welfare-improving (be-
cause of cost reductions, for instance). Since this view emerged, many economists
have built models in order to show that, under some assumptions, bundling can
be a profitable exclusionary strategy (see, e.g, Whinston [1990]), in contrast to
what the Chicago school predicts.
1Chapter 4 is a joint paper with Claudia Saavedra (Gaudin and Saavedra [2012]).
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In parallel, a whole line of the literature on bundling has developed to explain
why this selling strategy can also be profitable without competitors’ exclusion
(see, e.g., Carbajo, de Meza and Seidmann [1990]). Overall, the multiplicity
of anticompetitive and fair justifications for bundling makes it a tedious task
for competition authorities when analyzing bundling strategies, as they have to
understand precisely the economic mechanisms at stake to assess whether this
conduct is legal or not.
In Chapter 5, we introduce a new rationale for pure bundling, solely based
on the presence of switching costs.1 We develop a two-period model in which a
firm might set up asymmetric switching costs by bundling its products together.
When the switching costs are high and the consumers’ valuation for the monopoly
product is low, bundling is a dominant strategy. Indeed, in this case, the bundling
firm can exploit locked-in consumers in the competitive market while incurring
only small losses in the monopoly market. However, total welfare decreases with
bundling.
2.2.2.2 On the antitrust economics of the electronic books industry
The electronic book (ebook) market has grown rapidly in the past couple of years.
Amazon, the online giant book seller currently sells more ebooks than print books.
However, since the launch of the iPad by Apple in 2010, Amazon’s supremacy in
the ebook market has been challenged by this new competitor.
Recently, U.S. and European competition authorities have investigated pos-
sible anticompetitive conducts in the ebook market following the introduction of
the iPad. When Apple entered the market, it introduced a new type of contract
with the main book editors: the agency contract. According to this contract,
the editors are able to set the retail price of ebooks, and Apple earns a share of
revenues. This is very different from the model that was used by Amazon, which
was buying ebooks at a wholesale price and setting its own retail price. In this
regard, U.S. and European competition authorities recently agreed that Apple
and the major editors colluded on the type of contracts they used, and decided
to take some actions against this collusive behavior.
In Chapter 6,2 we explain that the recent antitrust investigations in the ebook
1Chapter 5 is adapted from the paper by Gaudin [2012].
2Chapter 6 is a joint paper with Alexander White (Gaudin and White [2013]).
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markets, both in the United States and the European Union, failed to take into
account an important feature of these markets; namely that access to ebooks is
only available after the purchase of a reader device. Interestingly, in this market,
ebook resellers (i.e., Amazon and Apple) also sell devices to read ebooks. We
demonstrate that this specific market structure plays an important role on the
difference between ebook prices when agency or wholesale contracts are used.
2.2.3 The interplay between regulation and competition
policy: the case of margin squeeze
The last two research chapters of this thesis analyze the interplay between regula-
tion and competition policy in regulated industries, for a specific conduct: margin
squeeze.
2.2.3.1 Margin squeeze and monopoly maintenance in regulated in-
dustries
For economists, it might be puzzling at first when a vertically-integrated firm
refuses to sell its monopoly upstream input to a more efficient downstream com-
petitor. Indeed, the Chicago school argument states that, as there is only one
monopoly profit to be earned, the vertically-integrated firm should serve its
downstream competitor and extract all additional surplus through the upstream
input price. However, several vertically-integrated incumbents have been con-
demned for, or accused of undertaking margin squeeze strategies to foreclose
downstream competitors. For the theory to match precisely with competition
policy, economists should be able to explain why such conducts of foreclosure are
rational.
Interestingly, in many of recent margin squeeze cases, the upstream market
was ex-ante regulated by a sectoral authority (a detailed review of these cases
is provided in Chapter 7). Hence, one could wonder what is the role of ex-ante
regulation in characterizing anticompetitive conducts into margin squeeze cases?
Also, one might wonder whether or not authorities should consider margin squeeze
as an anticompetitive conduct in an ex-ante regulated market.
In Chapter 7 we study margin squeeze as an entry-deterrence strategy.1 We
1Chapter 7 is adapted from the paper by Gaudin [2013a].
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show that a vertically-integrated incumbent might undertake a margin squeeze in
order to deter a more efficient entrant when the access charge is regulated above
cost, following the vertical dynamic defensive leverage argument. We also explain
why a margin squeeze should be considered as a stand-alone anticompetitive
abuse, when the access charge is ex-ante regulated.
2.2.3.2 The interplay between margin squeeze and regulation
When studying margin squeeze conducts in ex-ante regulated markets, one should
wonder what is the impact of the regulated access charge on the vertically-
integrated incumbent’s incentive to undertake a margin squeeze. Indeed, since
the Bell doctrine, economists know that regulation can induce anticompetitive
conducts that would not take place in a non-regulated market. Biglaiser and De-
Graba [2001] study the impact of the access on the incentive to engage in a margin
squeeze strategy. using a specific market model, they find that the incentive to
undertake a margin squeeze always decreases in the access charge.
In Chapter 8, we show that this result is not robust to alternative modeling
assumptions. We analyze the impact of access regulation on a firm’s incentive to
abuse of its dominant position.1 We study the incentive for a vertically-integrated
incumbent whose access charge is regulated to undertake a margin squeeze in or-
der to eliminate a downstream competitor. An increase in the access charge has
two opposite effects: it increases the incumbent’s upstream profit under fair com-
petition, and also lowers the cost of abusing of its dominant position. We show
that, when the discount factor is low enough, the latter effect may dominate, and
an increase in the access charge can then increase the incumbent’s incentive to
undertake a margin squeeze. Hence, a regulatory authority should carefully mon-
itor possible anticompetitive conducts when raising the regulated access charge.
Our general results extend the previous findings on the interplay between the
incentive to engage in a margin squeeze and access regulation.
1Chapter 8 is adapted from the paper by Gaudin [2013b].
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2.3 Thesis plan
The reminder of this thesis is as follows. In Part III we will study issues related
to regulation in the telecommunications industry in Europe. More precisely, we
will estimate the impact the “ladder of investment” regulatory approach in the
fixed broadband market in Chapter 3, and we will review the adjustments made
by regulatory authorities on their ex-ante margin squeeze tests in Chapter 4.
In Part IV we will study issues related to competition policy in the ICT sector.
In Chapter 5 we will explain why bundling can be a profitable strategy in market
with switching costs, such as the mobile telephony market, and we will study the
associated welfare effects. In Chapter 6 we will bring a new perspective to the
on-going antitrust cases in the electronic book markets in the U.S. and in Europe.
In Part V, we will study the interplay between regulation and competition pol-
icy in the telecommunications industry, by analyzing the case of margin squeeze.
We will explain why margin squeeze can be a rational exclusionary strategy in
ex-ante regulated markets in Chapter 7, and we will analyze the impact of ex-
ante access regulation on the incentive for an incumbent to undertake a margin
squeeze in Chapter 8. Furthermore, we will explain in Chapter 7 why margin
squeeze in regulated markets should be considered as an anticompetitive conduct
and should be dealt with by competition authorities ex-post.
Finally, in Part VI, we will conclude this thesis. We will provide a clear
summary of the research questions and analyses addressed in this thesis, and we
will formulate some directions for future research as well.
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Part III
Regulation in the
telecommunications industry
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In this first research part of this thesis, we analyze research questions rela-
tive to ex-ante regulation in the telecommunications industry. In this industry in
which investments in new technologies play an important role, regulatory author-
ities generally face a static vs. dynamic efficiency trade-off. Indeed, regulatory
authorities may simultaneously want to increase competition by allowing new es-
tablished firms to access the incumbent’s bottleneck input in order to enhance
consumer surplus and welfare in the short-term (static efficiency), while main-
taining sufficient incentives to invest for the incumbent, the entrants, or both, in
the long-run (dynamic efficiency).
In Chapter 3 we provide an empirical test of the ladder of investment hy-
pothesis, which builds on a widespread regulation in European fixed telecom-
munications markets. This regulation aims at resolving the static vs. dynamic
efficiency trade-off by providing a special type of one-way access regulation to
entrants within a given technology infrastructure (Digital Subscriber Line, DSL).
The main goal of this regulatory approach is to favor entrants’ investments in
the long run. We demonstrate that the ladder of investment hypothesis is not
satisfied. In other words, the overall impact of the ladder of investment on en-
trants’ investments in the long run, which aggregates the replacement effect and
the ladder of investment effect, is not statistically different from zero. However,
this regulatory approach allows entrants to invest progressively within a given
technology infrastructure owned by the incumbent (namely DSL), up to the local
loop.
In Chapter 4 we study when and how regulatory authorities do use ex-ante
margin squeeze tests in order to set access rules to telecommunications incum-
bents in Europe. We build a theoretical framework that allows us to bench-
mark regulatory authorities’ choices in modeling ‘Reasonably Efficient Operators’
(REOs) in margin squeeze tests. We find that further guidance at the European
level might be needed for harmonization between countries, as some implemen-
tation choices are very similar across authorities’ decisions, whereas some others
are dealt with a lot of heterogeneity. Indeed, some regulatory authorities encour-
age entry in the short run through their implementation choices, whereas some
others are more conservative as they model REO tests that are more favorable to
incumbents, often with a view to support their long-run investment incentives.
Overall, in Part III we demonstrate that ex-ante regulatory intervention in
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telecommunications markets in Europe may be challenging in that it might be
complicated because of the unforeseeable nature of regulatory rules and their out-
comes. Indeed, a regulation applied without proper economic analysis might turn
to be inefficient (as the ladder of investment for instance), and vague regulatory
rules (as rules defined by the European Commission for margin squeeze tests)
might induce very different outcomes when they allow for large implementation
possibilities.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Entry and Investment
in New Infrastructures:
Empirical Evidence from the
Telecommunications Industry
3.1 Introduction
In network industries (like telecoms, energy, transportation, etc.), regulators often
face a trade-off between stimulating competition and providing industry players
with incentives to invest (in infrastructures, the design of new services, etc.). For
example, in the telecommunications industry, there has been a heated debate as
to whether the development of service-based competition may come at the cost of
delaying facility-based entry.1 A standard view is that, if entrants start renting
access to the incumbent’s infrastructure at favorable conditions, the entrants
have an additional opportunity cost for investing in new access infrastructures,
and hence, service-based competition can indeed delay facility-based entry.2
The “ladder-of-investment” approach (Cave [2006]) proposes to solve this
1Service-based competition takes place when entrants rent access to the incumbents’ net-
works (via local loop unbundling, for example), whereas there is facility-based competition when
the entrants build their own infrastructures to provide services to end customers. See Section
3.2 for more details on the industry background.
2See, for instance, Crandall, Ingraham and Singer [2004].
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dilemma. This approach argues that access regulation is not only pro-competitive
because it reduces barriers to service-based entry, but that it is also an indirect
device to promote facility-based entry. The idea is that, by setting low access
prices, the regulator encourages service-based entry in the short term. Then,
once entrants have gained a customer base and acquired market experience, they
can climb up the ladder-of-investment and invest in their own facilities.1 Hence,
according to this approach and in contrast with the standard view, service-based
competition could serve as a stepping stone for facility-based entry, which we
refer to as the “ladder-of-investment hypothesis.”2
Though most European countries regulate access to the incumbents’ local
networks with the ladder-of-investment approach in mind,3 the effectiveness of
this approach has never been evaluated. In this paper, we build an econometric
model to test the ladder-of-investment hypothesis. The total number of facility-
based lines that are owned by new entrants is our dependent variable, and the
total number of service-based (unbundled) lines in previous periods is our main
explanatory variable. We estimate our model using data from the European
Commission’s (EC) “Broadband access in the EU” reports on the number of lines
that are owned or used by incumbent and entrant fixed-broadband operators in
15 European member states (EU15) over eight years (Jul. 2002 - Jul. 2010).
We find no evidence in support of the ladder-of-investment hypothesis: that is,
no effect of the past number of service-based (unbundled) lines on the number of
1See Bourreau, Dog˘an and Manant [2010] for a critical review of the ladder-of-investment
approach. See also Bourreau and Drouard [2010], who study the effect of a phase of experience
acquisition on an entrant’s investment incentives.
2Note that the ladder-of-investment approach is very similar to the stepping-stone hypoth-
esis that has been hotly debated in the United States (e.g., see Rosston and Noll [2002]).
3For example, according to the French telecommunications regulatory authority (Autorite´
de re´gulation des communications e´lectroniques et des postes, ARCEP) “the development of
competition in France since 1998 is a good illustration of the theory of the ladder of invest-
ment” (see ARCEP [2007], p. 36). The European Regulatory Group (ERG) also argues that
there has been a positive relationship between the implementation of the ladder of investment
approach and the pace of development of the broadband market: “[the ladder of investment]
explains recent developments in European broadband markets quite well and can serve as a
good regulatory model” (ERG [2005], p. 1). As a final example, the European Commission
(EC) cited the ladder approach in a decision on squeeze tests conducted by the Italian telecom-
munications regulatory authority (Autorita` per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, AGCOM):
“AGCOM’s approach [...] may fail to take sufficient account of alternative operators’ financial
leeway to climb up the ladder of investment throughout the national territory” (Commission
decision concerning Case IT/2010/1103: Margin squeeze test guidelines, 6 August 2010).
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new access lines owned by entrants. We also consider an alternative specification
of the ladder-of-investment hypothesis, with a “short” ladder composed of only
two access rungs (bitstream access and local loop unbundling). The idea is that
new entrants may invest up to the local loop unbundling rung, but may be unable
to replicate the last local loop rung. We find weak empirical support for the
ladder-of-investment hypothesis for this short ladder. In the end, our results
suggest that the ladder-of-investment approach might be an ineffective instrument
to stimulate investment in the telecommunications industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we provide some
institutional details and a literature review. In Section 3.3, we describe our test
of the ladder-of-investment hypothesis, the econometric specification, and the
data, and we provide the estimation results. We present some robustness tests in
Section 3.4. Finally, in Section 3.5, we conclude.
3.2 Institutional details and literature review
In this section, we begin by providing some details on the institutional context
in the telecommunications industry, and we then review the relevant literature.
3.2.1 Institutional context
The ladder-of-investment approach aims at providing new entrants with a transi-
tory entry assistance, while incentivizing them to build their own access networks
in the medium or long run. The regulator begins by giving the entrants an initial
“lift up” on the investment ladder by ensuring access to the incumbent’s infras-
tructure at reasonable terms (which leads to service-based competition).1 Then,
through the regulation of access prices, the regulator makes sure that the entrants
climb up to the next rung. The process continues until the entrants reach the top
of the ladder (i.e., until they by-pass all parts of the incumbent’s infrastructure),
at which point facility-based competition begins.
Figure 3.1 shows the ladder-of-investment for broadband. An entrant starts
to compete on the basis of services under different levels of access (up to the
1Here, the “incumbents”refer to the historical fixed-line operators or former monopolies
(e.g., France Telecom in France, or Telecom Italia in Italy), and therefore, there is only one
incumbent operator in each European country. The “entrants”are the incumbent’s competitors.
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Figure 3.1: The ladder-of-investment and the levels of access
Local Loop Unbundling rung), and eventually invests in an access network with
a technology that is compatible with the investment ladder (i.e., fibre, Wireless
Local Loop, or Power Line Communications).
In what follows, we begin by describing the levels of access that are available
to new entrants at the first rungs of the investment ladder. Then, we present the
different access technologies that they can use when they have reached the top of
the ladder.
3.2.1.1 The different levels of access under service-based competition
With the ladder-of-investment approach, different levels of access are available on
the incumbent’s network. The lowest rungs of the ladder, the resale and bitstream
access (BA) wholesale offers, allow entrants to enter with limited investment. The
highest access rung, local loop unbundling (LLU), requires more investment but
also offers more possibilities in terms of innovation and product differentiation.
Resale occurs when entrants purchase the broadband Digital Subscriber Line
(DSL) service of the incumbent on a wholesale basis, and commercialize it to
customers under their brand names. Bitstream access occurs when the incumbent
gives access to its broadband network to third parties. In this case, entrants need
to invest in a data network of their own.
Finally, local loop unbundling occurs when the incumbent rents access to its
physical copper lines (i.e., the “last mile”) to new entrants. With LLU, entrants
have to build a core network down to the local exchanges of the incumbent, and
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to install their own broadband equipment (the Digital Subscriber Line Access
Multiplexers, DSLAMs) in the incumbent’s local exchanges. There are two forms
of LLU: “full” unbundling, when the entrant rents the entire copper line, and
“shared” unbundling, when it rents only the upper bandwidth of the line. In this
paper, as full and shared LLU access correspond to the same investment rung,
we ignore this distinction.
Table 3.1 shows the share of these three levels of access in the EU15 countries
in July 2002 and July 2010. As the table shows, entrants have migrated from
bitstream access and resale to LLU between July 2002 and July 2010. While LLU
has been mandated by the European Regulation 2887/2000,1 note that no such
obligation exists for bitstream access and resale. In each European country, the
National Regulatory Authority (NRA) has to decide, based on a market analysis,
whether or not to regulate bitstream access and resale. Some European countries
have decided to regulate these wholesale offers, but not all.
LLU (%) Bitstream access (%) Resale (%)
Jul. 2002 28.3 31.0 40.7
Jul. 2010 76.8 14.2 9.0
Table 3.1: Share of LLU, bitstream access and resale in the EU15 countries (with
respect to the number of subscriber DSL lines served by new entrants). Source:
EC COCOM Reports.
3.2.1.2 The development of alternative broadband infrastructures
Instead of leasing access to the incumbent’s network, an entrant can also build its
own local infrastructure, which leads to facility-based competition. Facility-based
competition is generally considered as the only means to achieve sustainable com-
petition, because it provides more possibilities for service and product innovations
than does service-based competition, and it could lead to a (partial) deregulation
of the sector.2
1See: Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, Official Jour-
nal of the European Communities, December 2000, the 30th, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:336:0004:0008:EN:PDF.
2In this vein, Distaso, Lupi and Manenti [2006] provide empirical evidence that facility-based
competition has been the main driver of broadband adoption in 14 European countries, from
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Different access network technologies exist such as cable modem, optical fi-
bre (fibre to the home, fibre to the building...), power line communication (PLC),
wireless local loop (WLL), and satellite.1 Though the share of the different broad-
band technologies might differ from one country to another, we can see from Table
3.2 below that cable is the main technology that is used by entrants to provide
broadband services in the EU15 countries.
Cable (%) Fibre (%) WLL (%) Satellite (%) PLC (%)
Jul. 2002 93.5 4.4 0.3 1.7 0.1
Jul. 2010 91.5 7.0 1.1 0.3 0.01
Table 3.2: Share of alternative broadband technologies in the EU15 countries
(with respect to the total number of subscriber lines operated by entrants with
an alternative access technology). Source: EC COCOM reports.
Since our focus is the ladder-of-investment approach, we only consider the
access technologies that an entrant can use when it has reached the last (LLU)
rung: fibre, WLL and PLC.2 Cable modem and satellite correspond to completely
different access technologies, with different network architectures, and hence, they
are not compatible with the ladder-of-investment approach.3 If we exclude cable
2000 to 2004. Similarly, Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven [2012] demonstrate that local loop
unbundling had no positive impact on broadband adoption in the U.K. between 2005 and 2009,
in contrast to facility-based competition from cable operators. However, a different conclusion
is reached by Gruber and Koutroumpis [2013], who study a large dataset of 167 broadband
markets over 11 years, and find that facility-based competition has delayed broadband adoption.
Ho¨ﬄer [2007] also shows that for the period 2000-2004 in western Europe, the costs that were
associated with the inefficient duplication of existing infrastructures outweighed the benefits of
increased broadband penetration.
1In addition to these technologies, one could include mobile broadband technologies, such
as 3G. However, as our focus is on the fixed broadband market, we do not take into account
mobile broadband technologies.
2An entrant can use any technology when it invests in a network from the outset, without
climbing the investment ladder.
3Several elements in the architectures of DSL and cable DOCSIS (Data Over Cable Service
Interface Specification) networks cause these two broadband access technologies to be incom-
patible. For example, a DSL access network is based on ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode)
transmission standards at the layer 2 in the OSI model, whereas a cable network uses Eth-
ernet or IP-based forwarding for connections between the network interface of cable modem
termination systems and wider area networks. By contrast, fibre access networks, for instance,
are based on ATM transmission standards, and, hence, are compatible with the architecture
of DSL networks. Finally, note that the assumption that we make (i.e., to ignore cable as an
investment option on the ladder) is in line with the positions of regulators: When they have set
up a ladder-of-investment, they never argue that cable is an option for the entrants that climb
that ladder.
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modem and satellite, Table 3.3 shows that optical fibre and WLL are the two main
ladder-compatible access technologies, whereas PLC is hardly used by entrants.
Fibre (%) WLL (%) PLC (%)
Jul. 2002 91.1 6.4 2.5
Jul. 2010 85.3 13.6 1.1
Table 3.3: Share of fibre, WLL and PLC in the EU15 countries (with respect to
the total number of fibre, WLL and PLC subscriber lines operated by entrants).
Source: EC COCOM reports.
Table 3.2 showed that cable modem—an access technology which is not com-
patible with the ladder-of-investment—remains the most important alternative
broadband technology to DSL over the years. This can be interpreted as weak
evidence of the inefficiency of the ladder-of-investment approach. Indeed, even
though this approach has been implemented by European NRAs to help new
entrants to invest in their own infrastructures, most of the investment has been
made by cable operators, which are different players, by upgrading their cable
television networks to provide broadband internet services. As the development
of cable modem might have an important impact on the efficiency of the ladder-
of-investment approach, we will use cable modem as a control variable for a
robustness test in Section 3.4.
3.2.2 Literature review
The present paper is related to the economic literature on the relationship between
access regulation and investment.1
The theoretical literature suggests that there is a trade-off for regulators be-
tween setting a low access price to achieve static efficiency and investment in-
centives. This has been highlighted in asymmetric settings where a vertically-
integrated incumbent may face a service-based entrant (e.g., see Bourreau and
Dog˘an [2006], Foros [2004], and Gans and King [2004]), and in symmetric settings
where two (or more) network operators have to decide on an investment (e.g., see
Gans [2001], Cambini and Valletti [2004], and Valletti and Cambini [2005]). How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, there is no existing theoretical literature in
1See Valletti [2003], Guthrie [2006], and Cambini and Jiang [2009] for a survey.
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support of the ladder-of-investment hypothesis that access-based competition can
favor investment.
Our paper belongs to the empirical literature on the relation between access
regulation and investment.1 A first series of papers studies the impact of access
prices on investment in alternative infrastructures. Using US data, Crandall,
Ingraham and Singer [2004] find a positive relation between the access price and
the ratio of facility-based lines to service-based lines. Waverman et al. [2007]
use European data over the period 2002-2006 and estimate that a 10% reduction
in the price of local loop unbundling causes a 18% fall in subscriber share of
alternative infrastructures (including cable). However, these two papers do not
test the ladder-of-investment hypothesis, which is the focus of our paper.
Grajek and Ro¨ller [2012] analyze the relationship between regulation and in-
vestment in the telecoms industry. They study a large data set, at the firm level,
which covers 70 fixed-line operators in 20 European countries over a 10-year pe-
riod, and differentiate incumbents’ investments from entrants’ investments. The
specificity of their paper is that they use a regulatory index (the Plaut index, a
former version of the Polynomics index) and account for the possible endogeneity
of regulation.
Grajek and Ro¨ller find a negative relation between access regulation and in-
dividual investments of both incumbents and entrants, despite the fact that total
investment by entrants increases. However, they do not test directly the ladder of
investment hypothesis, since they cannot distinguish investments in new telecom-
munications infrastructures from other forms of investment. Our paper studies
specifically the number of lines in new infrastructures, and hence, we can provide
a more direct test of the ladder-of-investment hypothesis.
Some papers have proposed tests of the ladder-of-investment hypothesis, but
mainly qualitatively. Hausman and Sidak [2005] propose a case-based review of
the unbundling experience in five countries and find no stylized facts in line with
the ladder-of-investment hypothesis. Crandall and Sidak [2007] observe that new
entrants seem to be stuck at the lowest rung of the ladder in Mexico. Distaso,
Lupi and Manenti [2009] analyze graphically the relation between access prices
and the development of alternative broadband infrastructures, and conclude that
European national regulatory authorities have adopted policies that are consistent
1See Cambini and Jiang [2009] for a survey of this empirical literature.
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with the ladder-of-investment approach. Our paper differs from these qualitative
studies, as we perform an econometric analysis to test the ladder-of-investment
hypothesis.
Closer to our paper, Hazlett and Bazelon [2005] use US data from 1999 to
2004, and study the impact of the share of past UNE-P lines (unbundled network
elements platforms) in one period of time on the share of facility-based lines owned
by new entrants in later periods. They reject the ladder-of-investment hypothesis.
However, their econometric analysis is fragile, since their only control variable is
the unemployment rate.
Wallsten and Hausladen [2009] study the impact of the number unbundled
and bitstream access lines per capita on investment in next generation access
networks in Europe, from July 2002 to July 2007. They find a negative regula-
tion between unbundled lines and investment in fibre access networks, both for
entrants’ and incumbents’ investments. However, they estimate only the contem-
poraneous effects of local loop unbundling, and hence, they cannot capture the
investment dynamics.
3.3 Empirical evidence
In this section we begin by presenting our test of the ladder-of-investment hy-
pothesis. Then, we describe our data and provide the estimation results.
3.3.1 Testing the ladder-of-investment approach
According to the standard view, a regulatory framework that favors service-based
entry (e.g., via LLU) introduces an opportunity cost for entrants of investing later
on in new lines, due to the profits that the entrants currently enjoy under service-
based competition. This effect corresponds to the “replacement effect” that has
been introduced in the innovation literature.1 Due to this opportunity cost, the
more favourable are the conditions for service-based entry, the more LLU lines
there are, and the less new lines there will be.
On the contrary, the “ladder-of-investment approach” claims that a phase
1See Arrow [1962]. A monopolist has less incentive to innovate than does a new entrant,
because the former replaces “itself.”
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of service-based competition fosters facility-based investments by entrants in the
long run. The idea is that operating in the market with LLU provides the entrants
with market experience, which, in turn, increases their incentives to roll out new
lines in the future; one can think of lower costs of investing in new lines (supply
side), or a higher demand for new lines because consumers become progressively
aware of the entrant’s existence (demand side). We refer to this positive effect of
service-based competition on investment, via market experience, as the “ladder-
of-investment effect.”
Therefore, there are two conflicting effects at play when service-based compe-
tition develops: the replacement effect emphasized by the standard view, and the
ladder-of-investment effect. The “ladder-of-investment hypothesis” is that the
ladder-of-investment effect dominates the replacement effect: Overall, a higher
number of LLU lines causes a higher number of new lines.
We wish to test the ladder-of-investment hypothesis. Ideally, we would have
two different groups of countries: one “treated” group where LLU (here, the
treatment) has been implemented, and a “control” group of countries where LLU
has not been implemented. We would then test the ladder-of-investment hypoth-
esis by comparing the number of new lines in the “treated group” to that in the
“control group,” everything else equal. If the number of new lines is greater with
the “treatment,” the ladder-of-investment hypothesis would be supported.
Unfortunately, all European countries have implemented LLU, since LLU has
been mandatory at the European level since a 2000 Regulation. Hence, we cannot
conduct this “ideal test.” However, some European countries have been more
proactive in developing service-based competition than have others, and therefore,
LLU is more developed in some countries than in others. If we interpret the
development of LLU as the consequence of the intensity of the “treatment” (here,
a policy that is conducive to service-based entry), we can test whether in the
countries that have received more of the treatment new lines are more developed.
That is, we can test whether in countries with a larger number of LLU lines there
are more new lines afterwards.
We therefore estimate the impact of the past stock of LLU lines on the stock
of new lines with the following model:
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log(Newlines)i,t = β0 + β1 log(Newlines)i,t−1 + β2 log(LLUlines)i,t−2
+ βxcontrolsi,t + εi + ηt + ui,t, (3.1)
where Newlinesi,t denotes the number (stock) of entrants’ broadband lines in
country i and semester t that are based on fibre, WLL, or PLC access technolo-
gies;1 LLUlinesi,t is the number (stock) of entrants’ lines that are based on local
loop unbundling, and controls is a set of control variables that account for the
changes in demand and costs of telecommunication services. Since broadband
penetration may depend heavily on specific demand or institutional factors that
can vary throughout the period, we also include country fixed effects (εi) and
time fixed effects (ηt).
As entrants decide on the increment of investment, not on the total stock of
investment, we control for the level of new lines that are owned by entrants in
the previous period, Newlinesi,t−1. Besides, if entrants invest in LLU lines and
then switch later to new lines, we expect to see a reduction in the investment in
LLUlines just before the investment takes place. Therefore, we use the t− 2 lag
for the number of LLUlines, instead of the t− 1 lag.2
We wish to test the ladder-of-investment hypothesis, according to which service-
based competition acts as a stepping stone to facility-based entry. To test this
hypothesis, we evaluate whether, overall, more service-based entry leads to more
facility-based entry later on; that is, whether β2 > 0.
3.3.2 The data
Most of our data are extracted from the annual European Commission’s “Broad-
band access in the EU” reports, and cover 15 European countries over the period
July 2002-July 2010, on a semi-annual basis. The data allow us to distinguish
between incumbents’ and entrants’ lines, but we do not have the number of lines
at the entrant firm level.3 Besides, some values are missing for France (semesters
1WLL stands for Wireless Local Loop, and PLC stands for Power Line Communications.
As we explained in Section 3.2, we exclude cable lines and satellite connections.
2We tested our model with additional lags for LLUlines, and obtained similar results.
3We also do not have any information on the number of entrants per country.
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15, 16, and 17), Finland (semester 15), Ireland (semester 17), the Netherlands
(semester 17), and the United-Kingdom (semester 17). Hence, the dataset, which
is composed of 248 observations over 17 semesters, is a slightly unbalanced panel
with randomly missing data. However, due to the very low number of randomly
missing observations, we can consider our dataset as a balanced set.
3.3.2.1 Main variables
The main variables that are used in the main analysis are the following (see also
Table 3.8 in Appendix 3.6 for summary statistics):1
• log(Newlines) represents the number of broadband lines that belong to
new entrants and that are neither DSL- nor cable-based, but are deployed
using a new access technology (fibre, WLL, or PLC), in logarithms.2
• log(LLUlines) represents the number of unbundled lines that are operated
by new entrants via full local loop unbundling (LLU) or shared LLU, in
logarithms.
• log(BAlines) represents the number of bitstream access (BA) lines that are
used by new entrants to deliver broadband services, in logarithms.
• The control variable incmob represents the market share of the incumbent
in the mobile telephony market.3 This variable is used as a proxy for the
incumbent’s market power in telecommunications markets.4 Indeed, an
incumbent operator with market power might try to retard entrants’ in-
vestment in alternative access infrastructure, resulting in a low number of
new lines for entrants.5
1In Section 3.4, we will introduce additional variables to conduct some robustness checks.
2As the variables that represent a number of subscribers (i.e., Newlines, LLUlines, and
BAlines) can take values of zero, log(Newlines) is actually computed as log(Newlines+ 1).
3Note that the British incumbent operator did not own any mobile operations for the period
under study. Similarly, the Irish incumbent sold its mobile operations in 2001 and re-entered
the mobile market in 2005 through an acquisition.
4We also tried to use other variables to control for market power, and in particular the
Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (HHI) for the broadband market. Our results remained un-
changed. Note however that the HHI for the broadband market could be an endogenous variable.
5See Bourreau and Dog˘an [2006] for a theoretical argument along this line.
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• We use as control variables for changes in demand for broadband services the
half-year gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in constant euros in loga-
rithm, log(GDPpercapita), the country population in logarithm, log(Pop),
and the mobile penetration rate, mobpenrate.1
• Finally, the population density in a given country, density, is included to
control for changes in the cost of building a network.2 Indeed, it costs
less to build an access infrastructure in an area with a higher density of
population.3
3.3.2.2 Time series plots
Time-series plots for the complete ladder, withNewlines, LLUlines, and Cablelines
operated by entrants, for each country, are reported in Figure 3.2 in Appendix
3.6.4
1Source for the GDP per capita: OECD. For population: OECD (except for France, source:
INSEE; see the footnote on Table 3.8 in Appendix 3.6). For mobile penetration: ICT Eye -
ITU.
2Source: OECD Factbook 2009 for population (except for France, source: INSEE), and
Eurostat for the size of the country (except for France, source: CIA World Factbook).
3Due to lack of appropriate data, we cannot control directly for the cost of fibre. However,
we believe that our analysis does not suffer from a huge omitted variable problem. Indeed,
the cost of a fibre infrastructure in a given country typically depends on the cost of fibre
equipment and on factors that determine infrastructure costs in that country. The cost of fibre
equipment (fibre cables, optical routers, etc.) is roughly the same in all European countries,
and therefore is captured through the time fixed effects in our estimations. As for factors that
affect infrastructure costs, we control for population density in each country (which is often
used as a proxy for infrastructure costs). Finally, note that the cost of a fibre network is not
huge, relative to the cost of a mobile network. For example, in France, it would cost between 5
and 10 billion Euros to build a national mobile network, and 8-10 billion Euros to cover 60-70%
of France with fibre (DATAR [2010]; Maurey [2002]).
4The specific patterns that we observe for Denmark, the Netherlands, and Portugal can
be explained by some industry facts that are unrelated to the ladder-of-investment. First, we
observe a fast decrease in the number of LLU lines in Denmark (in 2009) and in the Netherlands
(in 2007), followed by a growth in LLU lines. In both countries, the decrease in the number of
LLU lines is explained by the acquisition of an entrant by the incumbent operator. Second, in
Portugal, we observe an important increase in cable lines followed by a decrease in LLU lines
and a take-up in new access lines. This is explained by the fact that, in 2007, the incumbent,
which owned at that time a local copper network and a cable network, had to sell its entire
cable activity to competitors. This justifies the important increase in cable lines that are
controlled by entrants. At that time, therefore, facility-based competition between cable and
the incumbent’s copper network suddenly emerged. As a response, LLU entrants either exited
the market or started to replace their LLU-based offers by investing in new lines in order to
remain competitive.
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On most plots, we observe a continuous growth in LLUlines, whereas the
number of Newlines remains small and relatively stable. Therefore, we do not
observe any clear evidence for the ladder-of-investment hypothesis; that is, there
is no (overall) positive relation between the number of past LLU lines and the
number of new lines.
Three countries do not follow this general pattern: Denmark, Ireland, and
Sweden. In these countries, we observe a growth in LLUlines as well as a growth
in Newlines. Nevertheless, we do not believe that this provides evidence for
the ladder-of-investment hypothesis, mainly because these countries have well-
developed cable infrastructures, and, therefore, inter-platform competition (be-
tween DSL and cable infrastructures) might drive investment in Newlines.1,2
3.3.3 Estimation results
We estimate our results using the linear generalized method of moments (GMM)
(see Arellano and Bond [1991], Arellano and Bover [1995], and Blundell and Bond
[1998]), notably because our dependent variable (Newlinesi,t) is dynamic, and,
therefore, we suspect the presence of autocorrelation within individuals and of
heteroskedasticity. Moreover, our independent variables are not strictly exoge-
nous. The GMM allows us to use internal instruments, which are all lags of the
instrumented variable and of external instruments.3
Following Bond [2002], we use the difference-GMM estimator, rather than the
system-GMM estimator, because there is little persistence in our model, and we
want to keep a small number of instruments. The difference-GMM estimator
transforms all regressors by differencing them, and uses the Generalized Method
of Moments to estimate the coefficients. Hence, we can interpret the coefficient
β2 in model (1) as the effect of the number of unbundled lines on the number of
1In Section 3.4, we will take cable into account as a robustness check.
2Moreover, in Ireland, the growth in LLUlines starts after the growth in Newlines has
already begun. This is not consistent with the ladder-of-investment hypothesis, which claims
that the development of LLU fosters investment in Newlines.
3The OLS and IV estimation results are reported in Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.6. We first
run an OLS estimation. We find that the coefficient of log(LLUlines)t−2 is not statistically
different from zero. Hence, we find no evidence of a ladder of investment effect with this OLS
estimation. Similar to the OLS estimation, we find no statistically significant effect of the
number of local loop unbundling lines on investment in new access lines for the IV estimation:
the coefficient log(LLUlines)t−2 is still not statistically significant.
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new lines, or the impact of the increase in unbundled lines on the increase in the
number of new lines.
As we suspect LLUlines to be endogenous, we instrument this variable with
BAlines.1 Indeed, if we follow a strict rung-by-rung ladder-of-investment ap-
proach, we can consider that the number of unbundled lines (LLUlines) depends
on the number of past bitstream access lines (BAlines).2
We consider the number of bitstream access lines to be the best instrument.3
Indeed, entrant operators do not switch directly from bitstream access to their
own access infrastructure, so BAlines does not directly impact Newlines. If
an entrant operates at the bitstream access level and plans to invest in its own
new lines, it would typically start by investing in local loop unbundling. This
investment pattern corresponds to the “step-by-step” approach of the ladder-of-
investment that has been proposed by Cave [2006]. The underlying reason is
that investing in an access network (the new lines) means investing in the “last
mile” of a telecommunications network. Before rolling out its access network
infrastructure, an entrant has to reach this last mile—and this is what local loop
unbundling typically allows for.4
1In the difference-GMM, the instrumental variables are therefore (i) the number of BAlines,
(ii) all lags of Newlines (starting from the 1-period lag), and (iii) all lags of LLUlines (starting
from the 2-period lag).
2We also ran OLS and IV regressions (the estimation results are available upon request
from the authors), and performed a Hausman test to compare the estimates and to determine
whether the difference in coefficients was statistically significant. In a first stage, we regressed
log(LLUlines) on all exogenous variables, including the lagged values of log(BAlines), and
predicted the residuals. In a second step, we regressed log(Newlines) on log(LLUlines), other
exogenous variables (excluding log(BAlines)), and the residuals of the first-stage estimation.
The Hausman test is equivalent to a t-test on the coefficient of the residuals. The coefficient
of the residuals was equal to −0.546 and the t-test was equal to −2.75; hence, we rejected the
hypothesis at the 1% level. We can conclude that log(LLUlines) is not exogenous.
3As a robustness check, we considered an alternative and more extensive instrument, which
is the sum of service-based lines that were opened through bitstream access and resale. Indeed,
it could be argued that new entrants could earn some market experience through resale, and
then climb directly to the LLU rung. When we use this more extensive instrument, our results
are not affected. However, we consider that the number of bitstream access lines represents the
best instrument for the number of unbundled lines, as we follow the rung-by-rung approach of
the ladder-of-investment.
4Telecommunications operators confirmed to us that this was the usual investment pattern
that is observed in Europe. We also found some empirical evidence that this is indeed the
pattern in France. In this country, the main entrant investing in fibre (excluding the cable
network operator) is the company SFR. From SFR’s website, we found the cities where SFR
has invested in fibre (as of November, 2011). For all of these cities, we then checked whether
SFR was using local loop unbundling, or bitstream access. We found that it was using LLU
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Finally, there is no endogeneity problem concerning our control variables, as
log(Pop), density, or log(GDPpercapita) are most likely not correlated with el-
ements in the error terms that would determine simultaneously log(Newlines).1
Moreover, incmob and mobpenrate are control variables that relate to the mo-
bile telephony market, and the development of the mobile telephony and fixed
broadband markets can be considered as independent during the time period of
our study.2
Our estimation results are reported in Table 3.4. We find that the coefficient
of log(LLUlines)t−2 is not statistically different from zero. Hence, we reject the
ladder hypothesis at the 10% level.
Regarding the different tests that are performed in our estimation, first note
that we did not introduce country fixed effects in the GMM estimations, since
the first differences performed under the GMM would eliminate them. Besides,
we kept time fixed effects because they were sometimes individually significant,
even if they did not pass the F-test for collective significance. We report the
autoregressive tests AR(1) and AR(2) for the null hypothesis of no first —or
second— order serial correlation, respectively. We observe that the residuals in
first differences (AR(1)) are correlated, but there is no serial correlation in second
differences (AR(2)). Finally, the Hansen parameter tests for over-identification.3
in all of them and BA in none of them. In other words, we do not observe any switch from
bitstream access to fibre for SFR, whereas SFR uses bitstream access (and not LLU) in a
significant proportion of French cities.
1We use log(Pop) as a control variable, but we do not address the question of the partial
effect of population on new lines. The correlation between some of the explanatory variables
could lead to a high variance in the coefficient of log(Pop). Some of the independent variables
(e.g., log(Pop) and log(GPDpercapita)) are highly correlated; hence one cannot interpret the
partial effect of each of them, though they are collectively significant.
2However, with the development of smartphones, it might be that factors that influence the
penetration of mobile phones also affect the demand for broadband services. As a robustness
check, we therefore ran our estimations for the period before the launch of the first iPhone in
Europe (2002-2007). Our qualitative results were not modified.
3Note that this test is not robust to a large number of instruments, and always equals
one, thus making us suspect the presence of an excessive number of instruments. We used
the “collapse” option in xtabond2 (Stata) in order to reduce the number of instruments. As a
robustness check, we also reduced the number of lags and dropped time dummy variables. In
these alternative estimations, the Hansen parameter has a p-value ranging between 0.9 and 1.
Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments are valid.
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3.3.4 An alternative specification: a short ladder-of-investment
Cave [2006] argues that with a ladder-of-investment in place, entrants will pro-
gressively climb up to the last replicable rung. This last replicable rung can be
the local loop, in which case entrants end up building their own facilities, which
results in a pure form of facility-based competition. The last replicable rung could
also be at a lower level —for example at the local exchange level, in which case
entrants still rely on the incumbent’s network (see Cave [2010]). We refer to this
restricted form of ladder as the short ladder.
In the previous subsections, we tested the ladder of investment hypothesis
for the complete ladder, which is composed of three rungs: bitstream access,
local loop unbundling, and new lines.1 The short ladder is composed of only two
rungs: bitstream access and local loop unbundling. Note that at the last rung
of the short ladder (i.e., local loop unbundling), the entrants still rely on the
incumbent’s infrastructure (i.e., the local loop) to provide their services.
3.3.4.1 Time series plots for the short ladder
As for the complete ladder, we provide time series plots for the short ladder in
Figure 3.3 in Appendix 3.6, with the number of LLUlines and BAlines that are
operated by entrants in each EU15 country.
We observe three main patterns across European countries: The first pattern is
characterized by a continuous growth in LLUlines, while the number of bitstream
access lines remains small and stable, in which case there is no clear correlation
between investment in LLUlines and investment in BAlines. This pattern is
observed in Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
The second pattern is characterized by a fast take-up of bitstream access lines.
In Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United-Kingdom, the devel-
opment of bitstream access may have acted as a starting point for competition,
and it was followed by important investments at the LLU level. This suggests
that a ladder-of-investment effect might have been operational between bitstream
access and LLU in these countries. By contrast, in Belgium and Ireland, we ob-
1We could also consider a four-rung ladder that is composed of resale, bitstream access,
local loop unbundling, and new lines. However, adding resale lines does not modify our results.
Besides, the number of bitstream access lines is not determined by the number of resale lines,
since new entrants can enter directly at the bitstream access rung.
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serve a fast take-up of bitstream access, but only a small subsequent growth in
the number of LLUlines. For these two countries, there seems to be only a weak
correlation between investment in LLUlines and investment in BAlines.
Finally, in Denmark, Finland, and France, we observe a third pattern: A
steady growth in LLUlines, which seems to accelerate just after the development
of bitstream access. This seems also consistent with the ladder-of-investment
hypothesis for the short ladder.
3.3.4.2 The ladder-of-investment hypothesis for the short ladder
We estimate the following model for the short ladder, which is similar to our main
model (3.1):
log(LLUlines)i,t = β
′
0 + β
′
1 log(LLUlines)i,t−1 + β
′
2 log(BAlines)i,t−2
+ β′xcontrolsi,t + εi + ηt + ui,t. (3.2)
For the same reasons as in the previous subsection, we use the difference-
GMM estimator.1 The estimation results are reproduced in Table 3.4. In the
short-ladder regression, time fixed effects do not pass the F-test for collective
significance and are not individually significant; so we do not keep them in this
regression.2
Contrary to our results for the complete ladder, for the short ladder we observe
that the development of BAlines favors the development of LLUlines afterwards.
Indeed, the coefficient of log(BAlines)t−2 is positive and significant at the 10%
level. In other words, according to our estimation, an increase of bitstream ac-
cess lines leads to an increase of local loop unbundling lines one year later. We
1The system GMM estimates give a non-significant coefficient for log(BAlines). The system
GMM estimator makes an additional assumption that can be tested using a difference-in-Hansen
test of exogeneity. The difference-in-Hansen test checks the over-identification of the additional
instruments of the level equation. This test equals one in the case of too many instruments.
When we try to reduce the number of instruments (by reducing lags, or by using the collapse
option in Stata), the difference-in-Hansen test gives a small p-value. Hence, we reject the hy-
pothesis that the additional subset of instruments that are used in the system GMM estimation
are exogenous. Thus, we keep the difference GMM estimation.
2The institutional context may explain this result: The European Regulation 2887/2000
on unbundled access to the local loop imposed mandatory LLU for all member states. Hence,
once a European country has transposed the European regulation, we expect no specific time
effect: The time path of the number of unbundled lines in each country has no reason to vary
significantly.
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Complete Ladder Short Ladder
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff
log(Newlines)t log(LLUlines)t
log(Newlines)t−1 0.552***
(3.78)
log(LLUlines)t−1 0.613***
(4.80)
log(LLUlines)t−2 -0.0931
(-0.91)
log(BAlines)t−2 0.0515*
(2.10)
incmobt -0.489 1.453
(-0.26) (1.03)
log(GDPpercapita)t -1.802 0.220
(-0.76) (0.38)
mobpenratet -0.00549 0.0126
(-0.31) (1.72)
densityt 0.0484 0.0602
(0.63) (1.46)
log(Pop)t 8.817 -4.637
(0.60) (-0.58)
N 171 207
Arellano−Bond test AR(1) -2.08 -2.12
(p− value) (0.038) (0.034)
Arellano−Bond test AR(2) -0.30 -1.17
(p− value) (0.761) (0.242)
Hansen J − test (p− value) (1.000) (1.000)
F − test (time) 3.90
(p− value) (0.0089)
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Statistical significance levels: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Instrumented variable: log(LLUlines)t−2, Instrument variable: log(BAlines)t−4.
Time fixed effects included in the complete ladder specification.
Table 3.4: Main results
therefore find an empirical support for the ladder-of-investment hypothesis for
the short ladder.
74 2. Dynamic Entry and Investment in New Infrastructures
To sum up, we found no support for the ladder-of-investment hypothesis for
the complete ladder, but some support for the short ladder between BAlines and
LLUlines. Hence, new entrants climb the ladder up to the local loop unbundling
rung; but being on the ladder does not increase their incentives to build a last-mile
network.
3.4 Robustness
In this section we perform some additional estimations in order to test the ro-
bustness of our findings, both for the complete and short ladders, with respect to
the “migration effect,” the number of rungs, the development of cable modem,
regulatory performance, and the evolution of local loop unbundling prices (see
Table 3.8 in Appendix 3.6 for the summary statistics of the additional variables
that we use in this section).
3.4.1 Taking into account the migration effect
The estimate of β2 in model (3.1) may be biased downward due to what we
call the “migration effect”: Some consumers may indeed switch from a LLUline
subscription that is provided by an entrant to a Newline subscription that is
provided by the same or another entrant. This consumer switching induces a
migration (or waterbed) effect: The stock of LLU lines goes down, while the stock
of new lines goes up, which generates a negative relationship between LLUlines
and Newlines. One concern is then that, though the ladder hypothesis would
be valid, we could observe a negative relationship (i.e., β2 < 0) or no significant
relationship, due to the negative migration effect.
Note that the migration effect is limited to a certain type of consumers. In-
deed, this effect only exists for consumers who switch from one of the entrants’
LLU-based offers to one of their new lines offers. By contrast, it does not concern
new consumers who were not served at all in the previous period, nor those who
were served by the incumbent or by competitors using other broadband tech-
nologies (e.g., cable). Moreover, the broadband market is a growing market, and
we observe an increasing number of LLU lines over time in the time-series plots,
which mitigates the migration effect. Actually, in the plots we do not observe a
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strong decrease in the number of LLUlines that are linked to an increase in the
number of Newlines.
One solution to eliminate or mitigate the migration effect is to take a first
difference for the number of Newlines on the left-hand-side of model (3.1). The
intuition is that the migration effect is driven by the fact that there is a transfer
of a stock of lines from LLU to Newlines. By taking into account the variation
of Newlines instead of the stock, we eliminate this transferred stock, and hence,
we also eliminate or mitigate the migration effect.
Therefore, in order to test the robustness of our results to the migration effect,
we modified model (3.1) as follows:
∆(log(Newlines))i,t = β0 + β1 log(Newlines)i,t−2 + β2 log(LLUlines)i,t−2
+ βxcontrolsi,t + εi + ηt + ui,t. (3.3)
In model (3.3), we estimate the impact of the stock of LLU lines on the flow
of new lines. As for model (3.1), we use the stock of Newlines at period t − 2
as a RHS variable, in order to correct for dynamic effects due to the diffusion of
Newlines. We also implemented the same modifications to model (3.2) for the
short ladder.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.5 below. We find no evidence
in support of the ladder-of-investment hypothesis; that is, no significant positive
effect of past LLUlines on the flow of Newlines for the complete ladder. By
contrast, we observe a positive impact of past BAlines on the flow of LLUlines,
at the 10% level, which indicates a weak evidence for the ladder-of-investment
hypothesis for the short ladder. Therefore, our results and conclusion seem robust
to the migration effect.
Note that we also observe a negative impact of the level of past Newlines
on the flow of Newlines, showing that the growth in Newlines is concave. We
observe the same pattern for the short ladder and the growth in LLUlines.
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Complete Ladder Short Ladder
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff
∆ log(Newlines)t ∆ log(LLUlines)t
log(Newlines)t−2 -0.262***
(-4.49)
log(LLUlines)t−2 -0.188 -0.211***
(-1.61) (-6.13)
log(BAlines)t−2 0.0319*
(1.85)
incmobt 0.876 2.221
(0.56) (1.69)
log(GDPpercapita)t -1.161 0.00170
(-0.51) (0.00)
mobpenratet -0.00184 0.000989
(-0.12) (0.21)
densityt -0.00835 0.0509
(-0.15) (0.96)
log(Pop)t 11.68 -12.61
(0.89) (-0.84)
N 171 207
Arellano−Bond test AR(1) -2.41 -1.52
(p− value) (0.016) (0.129)
Arellano−Bond test AR(2) 0.74 -0.98
(p− value) (0.461) (0.329)
Hansen J − test (p− value) (1.000) (1.000)
F − test (time) 49.86 65.09
(p− value) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Statistical significance levels: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Instrumented variable: log(LLUlines)t−2, Instrument variable: log(BAlines)t−4.
Time fixed effects included in both specifications.
Table 3.5: Main results for the first-difference model
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3.4.2 Controlling for the number of rungs
According to the analysis of the ladder-of-investment approach by the European
Regulators Group (ERG [2005]), we should expect a positive effect of the number
of levels of access on the number of facility-based lines.1 There are two arguments
for requiring access at multiple levels. First, new entrants might have different
business models (for example, there might be both pure service-based entrants
and entrants with investment plans). Second, the optimal level of access might
differ according to the geographical area.
To control for the number of rungs, we introduce the variable access, which is
the sum of three dummy variables. Each dummy variable in this sum represents
a given level of access (local loop unbundling, bitstream access, and resale), and
it is equal to 1 if the number of lines through this type of access represents more
than 7% of the total number of DSL lines in a given country at a given period of
time, and to 0 otherwise.2
Introducing the variable access does not affect our main result. Besides, it
has no effect on the number of new lines rolled out by new entrants (see Table
3.6).
3.4.3 Controlling for cable
Cable modem is a technology that uses cable television lines to provide broad-
band services. We test whether our results remain valid if we account for the
development of cable modem.3
As there are huge disparities between European countries in broadband ca-
ble lines, we create a dummy variable, Cable, which classifies countries into two
groups according to the development of broadband cable modem lines. The vari-
able Cable equals one if the country is above the median in cable modem use,
and to zero otherwise.4
1For example, ERG [2005] writes that “the complementary use of several access products
may mean that both forms of access should be made available over a longer period.”
2We also performed our analysis with other threshold values for each type of access, ranging
from 5% to 15% of DSL lines. The qualitative results remained the same.
3Cardona et al. [2009] provide some empirical evidence that DSL and cable networks are
indeed part of the same market.
4We performed the same test using a mean split, and obtained similar results.
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With the Cable dummy variable, we are able to separate our dataset in two
subsamples (countries with low and high penetration of cable). This allows us
to estimate all coefficients for the two subsamples. From a theory viewpoint, we
could indeed expect the development of cable to affect not only the number of
Newlines per se, but also the relation between our other control variables and
entrants’ investments.1
The estimation results for the difference-GMM regressions for both subsamples
are reproduced in Table 3.6. Our main conclusion remains valid: We still reject
the ladder-of-investment hypothesis at the 10% level. Interestingly, in countries
with a high penetration of cable, our GMM estimation indicates that the number
of LLU lines affects negatively and significantly the number of new lines that are
owned by entrants. This suggests that the ladder-of-investment approach may be
less effective when there is strong inter-platform competition (i.e., between the
DSL and cable platforms).
Finally, we find no evidence for the ladder-of-investment hypothesis for the
short ladder in low-cable countries. This means that in countries where the
competition from cable networks is limited, bitstream access does not act as a
stepping stone for entrants’ investment in local loop unbundled lines.
3.4.4 Controlling for the quality of the implementation of
the ladder
One could argue that, if we do not find any evidence for the ladder of invest-
ment hypothesis (i.e., no positive relation between the number of access lines
and the number of infrastructure lines owned by entrants), this might be because
the ladder-of-investment approach has been imperfectly implemented on average.
If we assume that a more “efficient” regulator could implement a more “effec-
tive” ladder-of-investment, the intensity of regulation might affect the relation
between service-based competition and facility-based competition. That is, we
might expect a more positive relation for more “efficient” regulators.
1We also ran an estimation using the cable market share as a level variable. This did not
qualitatively affect our results.
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Rungs Cable: country split
Complete ladder Short ladder Complete ladder Short ladder
Low High Low High
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff
log(Newlines)t log(LLUlines)t log(Newlines)t log(Newlines)t log(LLUlines)t log(LLUlines)t
log(Newlines)t−1 0.555*** 0.553 0.341*
(3.88) (1.06) (2.33)
log(LLUlines)t−1 0.611*** 0.779*** 0.541***
(4.61) (14.27) (3.08)
log(LLUlines)t−2 -0.0876 0.144 -0.343**
(-0.86) (0.78) (-2.55)
log(BAlines)t−2 0.0501* -0.00198 0.105*
(2.09) (-0.19) (2.35)
accesst−2 -0.118 0.0283
(-0.64) (0.35)
incmobt -0.473 1.494 -3.786 -13.77** 2.316 0.398
(-0.26) (1.07) (-0.71) (-3.02) (1.86) (0.19)
log(GDPpercapita)t -1.874 0.229 -4.868 -3.983** 2.361* -1.148
(-0.79) (0.39) (-0.44) (-2.42) (1.99) (-1.23)
mobpenratet -0.00574 0.0125 0.00937 0.0157 0.0101* 0.0162
(-0.32) (1.73) (0.22) (0.88) (1.96) (1.66)
densityt 0.0634 0.0562 -0.207 0.172** 0.00427 -0.00576
(0.70) (1.33) (-0.72) (2.62) (0.21) (-0.14)
log(Pop)t 6.953 -4.597 44.60 -19.49 -5.264 -8.611
(0.55) (-0.57) (0.96) (-1.63) (-0.96) (0.58)
N 171 207 77 94 98 109
Arellano−Bond test AR(1) -2.08 -2.01 -1.63 -1.83 -1.45 -1.76
(p− value) (0.037) (0.045) (0.103) (0.068) (0.146) (0.078)
Arellano−Bond test AR(2) -0.40 -1.19 0.22 -0.21 -1.00 -0.28
(p− value) (0.687) (0.235) (0.823) (0.836) (0.316) (0.780)
Hansen J − test (p− value) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
F − test (time) 5.99 0.99 3.16
(p− value) (0.0011) (0.5035) (0.0759)
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Statistical significance levels: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Instrumented variable: log(LLUlines)t−2,
Instrument variable: log(BAlines)t−4. Time fixed effects included in the complete ladder specifications. “Low Cable” and “High Cable” countries
distinguished by Cable dummy variable. “Low Cable” countries: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg. “High Cable”
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United-Kingdom.
Table 3.6: Robustness specifications (1): Rungs and Cable
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3.4.4.1 The effect of regulatory intensity
To control for regulatory intensity, we add the variable Polynomics, which is a
telecommunications regulation index that has been constructed by Polynomics
(see Zenha¨usen et al. [2012]).1 A higher value of the index is associated with a
higher regulatory intensity or density.2 Since the Polynomics index is available
on an annual basis for the period 1997-2010, our dataset is reduced to an annual
dataset, in which one period corresponds to two periods in the previous semi-
annual dataset.
We use the Polynomics variable as an interaction term for our main explana-
tory variable. Indeed, we wish to test whether a more intense regulator (i.e.,
with a higher index value) leads to a more positive relation between access and
investment. When we include the joint variable Polynomics× log(LLUlines) to
our list of explanatory variables, we find no significant effect of regulatory per-
formance.3 Our results regarding the complete ladder remain unchanged, and we
find no evidence for the ladder-of-investment hypothesis for the short ladder.
3.4.4.2 The effect of local loop unbundling prices
Another way to account for the effectiveness of the implementation of the ladder-
of-investment is to use the evolution of the price of local loop unbundling. Indeed,
according to the ladder of investment approach, the regulator should increase the
price of LLU to incentivize the entrants to invest in their own access networks.
Therefore, in countries where the LLU price goes up, we expect more invest-
ment in new lines, and hence, a more positive relation between service-based
1We built the Polynomics index from the Polynomics Regulation Index 2012 Dataset, follow-
ing the tutorial by Zenha¨usen et al. [2012]. As is true for all regulatory indexes, the Polynomics
index has weaknesses; and in particular, it captures only formal aspects of regulation. Thus,
it should be interpreted with some caution. However, a previous version of this index (the
Plaut Economics index; see Zenha¨usen et al. [2007]) has been used as a measure of regulatory
intensity in other studies (for example, by Grajek and Ro¨ller [2012]), and we therefore use it
for our robustness check.
2That is, the Polynomics index aims at measuring how much regulation is implemented
(e.g., the number of regulatory remedies), not whether it is effective, which can be done by
linking regulatory density to market outcomes.
3The estimation results are reproduced in Table 3.7. Note that each period t still represents
a semester, but since the Polynomics index is available on an annual basis only, our database
for the Polynomics regression is on an annual basis too. Therefore, for example, we lag the
Newlines variable 2 periods rather than 1 period.
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competition and investments in new lines.
We use data on the monthly fee for LLU from the European Commission
Implementation Reports,1 for eight years (2002-2009), on an annual basis. The
theory suggests that an increase of the LLU monthly fee increases the entrants’
incentives to build their own facilities. However, since we observe only 15 LLU
price increases compared to 90 LLU price decreases over the period, this test is
not easy to perform.
Hence, for each period, we compute the average evolution of prices across all
of the countries in our sample. In a given country, at a specific period, if the
LLU price decreases less than does the cross-country average, we consider that
the regulator in this country is enforcing the ladder approach relatively more.
To implement our test, we introduce the dummy variable δ, which classifies
countries into two groups according to whether the increase in the LLU monthly
fee is higher or lower than average.2 In other words, for each country i, we
have δi,t = 1 if the price increase of LLU is higher than the average; that is, if
P (LLU)i,t − P (LLU)i,t−2 > 115
15∑
j=1
[P (LLU)j,t − P (LLU)j,t−2], where P (LLU)i,t
denotes the monthly fee for local loop unbundling in constant euros that an
entrant has to pay in country i at semester t. We have δi,t = 0 otherwise.
We use this dummy variable as an interaction term for LLUlines. Since we
expect that there is a lag between the date at which the fee becomes relatively
higher and the date at which an entrant starts to invest, we estimate the impact of
a relative monthly fee increase on log(Newlines) two periods afterwards (which
corresponds to one year).
The estimation results are provided in Table 3.7. With this interaction term,
we still find no significant and positive impact of unbundled lines on investment
in alternative infrastructures by entrants.
1European Commission Implementation Reports No. 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15.
2We also tested a simplified specification by using a dummy variable that equals one if
the LLU monthly fee increases. However, prices could decrease not only because the regulator
applies the ladder-of-investment approach, but also for other macroeconomic reasons. Using
the shift in prices in a specific country relative to the average allows us to take into account
those unobserved factors.
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Polynomics LLU Tariffs
Complete Ladder Short Ladder Complete Ladder
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff
log(Newlines)t log(LLUlines)t log(Newlines)t
log(Newlines)t−2 0.368*** 0.381**
(3.48) (2.59)
log(LLUlines)t−2 0.0676 0.408***
(0.40) (4.23)
log(BAlines)t−2 -0.0609
(-0.78)
Polynomicst−2 × log(LLUlines)t−2 0.0508
(0.23)
Polynomicst−2 × log(BAlines)t−2 0.226
(1.53)
δt−2 × log(LLUlines)t−2 -0.0208
(-0.99)
incmobt -0.391 1.342 0.322
(0.16) (0.59) (0.12)
log(GDPpercapita)t -1.660 -0.276 -2.651
(-0.93) (-0.35) (-1.14)
mobpenratet -0.00884 0.0202** -0.00452
(-0.44) (2.55) (-0.25)
densityt 0.0952 0.00453 0.103
(0.83) (0.06) (0.76)
log(Pop)t 4.801 0.738 0.281
(0.26) (0.05) (0.01)
N 83 105 83
Arellano−Bond test AR(2) -1.70 -2.00 -1.36
(p− value) (0.089) (0.046) (0.175)
Hansen J − test (p− value) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
F − test (time) 1.46 1.40
(p− value) (0.2629) (0.2813)
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Statistical significance levels: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Instrumented variable: log(LLUlines)t−2, Instrument variable: log(BAlines)t−4. Time fixed effects included
in the complete ladder specifications.
Table 3.7: Robustness specifications (2): Polynomics and LLU Tariffs (annual data)
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3.4.5 Other robustness checks
As another robustness check, we split our sample in half by time periods, and re-
ran our regressions.1 For the complete ladder specification, we observe an overall
negative effect of past LLUlines onNewlines for the first half of the sample. This
suggests that, from 2002 to 2006, investments in Local Loop Unbundling had a
negative impact on investment in Next Generation Access Networks. However,
we observe no significant effect for the second half of the sample. All in all,
this robustness check confirms our main qualitative result, that is, that there is
no empirical evidence for the ladder-of-investment hypothesis for the complete
ladder.
Finally, we ran our main regressions with Newlines, LLUlines, and BAlines
expressed as the shares of lines over the total number of broadband lines, and al-
ternatively as per country GDP.We found no evidence for the ladder-of-investment
hypothesis for the complete ladder, as in our main model. However, we also found
no evidence for the ladder-of-investment hypothesis for the short ladder. Together
with our other robustness checks, this suggests that there is only weak evidence
for the ladder-of-investment hypothesis for the short ladder.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an empirical test of the ladder-of-investment
hypothesis, and tested if service-based competition can serve as a stepping-stone
for facility-based entry.
We built an empirical model that encompasses a complete ladder-of-investment,
which is composed of three rungs: Bitstream access, local loop unbundling and
new access network facilities. We tested the main hypothesis of the ladder-of-
investment approach: that service-based competition serves as a stepping stone to
facility-based competition. Using data from the European Commission’s “Broad-
band access in the EU” reports, we find no empirical evidence in support of the
ladder of investment hypothesis for the complete ladder. That is, we find no im-
pact of the number of unbundled lines on investment in new access infrastructures
1The estimation results for the additional robustness checks presented in Subsection 3.4.5
are available upon request.
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by new entrants in the following periods.
These results are robust when we take into account the migration effect, the
number of access rungs, the development of broadband cable, regulatory perfor-
mance, and the evolution of local loop unbundling rates.
We also studied an alternative specification, where new entrants climb a
“short” ladder-of-investment and permanently rely on the incumbent’s infras-
tructure when they have reached the last rung of the ladder. In contrast with our
results for the complete ladder, we find weak empirical support for the ladder-
of-investment hypothesis for the short ladder. In our main model, the number
of past bitstream access lines has a significant and positive effect on the number
of unbundled lines rolled out by new entrants, but this result is not robust to all
alternative specifications.
To summarize, our empirical results are consistent with the ladder of invest-
ment hypothesis only when we consider local loop unbundling as the last rung of
the ladder. The ladder-of-investment approach seems to work for the migration
from bitstream access to local loop unbundling, but does not work for the migra-
tion from local loop unbundling to a full access infrastructure. If the objective
of the ladder-of-investment approach is to encourage entrants to build their own
local access networks, our analysis casts some doubts on whether it is efficient in
this respect.
3.6 Appendix: Summary statistics, Plots, and
OLS and IV estimations
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. N Source
within between overall
Newlines 53144.64 53449.6 94500.58 106780.9 0 613000 248 European Commission(a)
LLUlines 910651.3 1354395 1279899 1835576 0 8878000 255 Ibid.
BAlines 274625.8 297115.9 406256.5 494070.9 0 2214000 252 Ibid.
incmob 0.3938 0.0455 0.1493 0.1515 0 0.6433 255 c© Informa Telecoms & Me-
dia 2011. All rights reserved.
GDPpercapita 14512.75 856.253 5418.561 5314.553 6680.015 31847.13 255 OECD
mobpenrate 108.8136 17.1315 12.1668 20.7893 64.49 159.56 255 ITU and NRAs(b)
density 159.3809 2.4057 126.5865 122.5582 17.0788 485.5785 255 OECD(c) and Eurostat(d)
Pop 2.60x107 497627.6 2.74x107 2.66x107 446000 8.28x107 255 OECD(b,c)
access 1.9529 0.5402 0.2181 0.5800 1 3 255 European Commission(a)
Cable 0.5333 0 0.5164 0.4999 0 1 255 Ibid.
Polynomics 0.5512 0.0326 0.0946 0.0974 0.2488 0.7515 135
Zenha¨usen et al. [2012]
P(LLU) 10.5604 1.6341 1.8180 2.4038 5.87 16.8 135 European Commission(e)
δ 0.6583 0.4432 0.1797 0.4763 0 1 120 Ibid.
(a) Communications Committee, Working Document, COCOM “Broadband access in the EU: situation at
1 July 2008” (for data from July 2002 to July 2005), COCOM “Broadband access in the EU: situation at 1
July 2009” (for data from January 2006 to July 2009), European Commission Implementation Report No.
15 (for data of January 2010) and COCOM “Broadband access in the EU: situation at 1 July 2010” Main
tables (for data of July 2010). (b) Missing variables have been extrapolated from third degree polynomial
interpolations. (c) Except for France (source: INSEE). The OECD Factbook 2009 does not take into
account overseas territories. (d) Except for France (source: CIA World Factbook). Eurostat does not take
into account overseas territories. (e) From European Commission Implementation Reports No. 8 (data from
2002), No. 9 (2003), No. 10 (Aug. 2004), No. 12 (Oct. 2005, Oct. 2006), No. 14 (Oct. 2007), and No.
15 (Oct. 2008, Oct. 2009); and Electronic Communications Market Indicators (Digital Agenda Scoreboard
2011 Methodological Note) (Oct. 2010).
Table 3.8: Summary statistics
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Figure 3.2: Time series plots for the complete ladder
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Figure 3.3: Time series plots for the short ladder
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Complete Ladder Short Ladder
OLS IV OLS
First stage
log(Newlines)t log(Newlines)t log(LLUlines)t−2 log(LLUlines)t
log(Newlines)t−1 0.685*** 0.484*** 0.0330
(13.27) (6.09) (0.73)
log(LLUlines)t−1 0.632***
(5.66)
log(LLUlines)t−2 0.0342 0.392
(0.50) (1.35)
log(BAlines)t−2 0.0453**
(2.42)
log(BAlines)t−4 0.103***
(4.77)
incmobt -1.075 -1.885 0.989 1.909*
(-0.53) (-0.83) (0.65) (1.82)
log(GDPpercapita)t -0.131 2.032 -6.010*** -0.847
(-0.06) (0.76) (-4.37) (-0.15)
mobpenratet -0.0160 -0.0111 0.0194* 0.0155*
(-0.97) (-0.63) (1.79) (1.79)
densityt 0.0582 0.0584 -0.0290 0.0430
(0.86) (0.73) (-0.54) (1.47)
log(Pop)t -0.155 7.089 6.600 -5.491
(-0.01) (0.44) (0.60) (-1.38)
constant -0.836 -143.5 -40.13 64.86
(-0.00) (-0.56) (-0.23) (1.33)
N 217 187 191 223
R2(within) 0.700 0.824 0.977
adj.R2 0.642 0.787 0.975
Wald χ2(19) 13566.12
(p− value) (0.0000)
F − test (country) 2.82 3.32 23.40 2.80
(p− value) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0008)
F − test (time) 0.71 0.67 2.57
(p− value) (0.7657) (0.7794) (0.0039)
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. Statistical significance levels: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Instrumented variable:
log(LLUlines)t−2, Instrument variable: log(BAlines)t−4. Time fixed effects included in complete ladder specifications.
Country fixed effects included in IV and OLS specifications, and corrected for in the first-difference GMM specification.
Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in the short ladder specification.
Table 3.9: Main results: OLS and IV
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Chapter 4
Ex-ante Margin Squeeze Tests in
the Telecommunications
Industry: What is a Reasonably
Efficient Operator?
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, competition authorities have dealt with high-profile margin squeeze
(or price squeeze) cases in the telecommunications industry. For instance, the Eu-
ropean Commission intervened in margin squeeze cases such as Deutsche Telekom
in 2003, or Telefo´nica in 2007.1 These cases have established the nature of a
margin squeeze in competition policy and have characterized it as a stand-alone
anticompetitive conduct: a margin squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated
firm, providing an essential input to downstream competitors, sets retail and in-
put prices that do not leave an economic space for efficient downstream firms to
make positive profits.
Margin squeeze analyses are also popular among European National Regula-
tory Authorities (NRAs) of the telecommunications industry. According to a 2009
1Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 - Deutsche Telekom AG, later confirmed by Case
T-271/03 before the European Court of First Instance and Case C-280/08 P before the European
Court of Justice; and Case COMP/38.784 - Wanadoo Espan˜a vs. Telefo´nica, confirmed by Case
T-398/07 before the General Court.
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survey by the European Regulators Group (ERG), twelve NRAs declared having
a procedure to conduct ex-ante margin squeeze analyses in at least one retail
market.1 As stated by the ERG, the purpose of ex-ante margin squeeze testing
in a regulatory framework is different than in competition policy, because “while
competition law is intended to prevent margin squeeze as an exclusionary abuse,
ex-ante regulation seeks the more ambitious goal of promoting competition.”
NRAs might conduct margin squeeze tests for three different reasons. Some
NRAs employ ex-ante margin squeeze tests as a regulatory tool to set downstream
price floors whenever the vertically integrated incumbent is dominant in both
the downstream and upstream markets.2 Alternatively, some NRAs use margin
squeeze tests in a competitive downstream market as a regulatory tool for the
upstream market as in a retail-minus mechanism. Finally, the tests are in some
cases implemented to analyze the replicability of the unregulated retail offers of
the incumbent on top of another access price control remedy.
Ex-ante margin squeeze tests will be a key tool in the regulation of next
generation access (NGA) networks. Indeed, the 2010 European Commission’s
Recommendation on regulated access to NGA networks highlights that margin
squeeze tests are appropriate when mandated access is not cost-oriented. Fur-
thermore, when Neelie Kroes, the Vice President of the European Commission
responsible for the Digital Agenda, announced in July 2012 the forthcoming Rec-
ommendation on non-discrimination, she stated that NRAs would have to analyze
the economic replicability of dominant firms’ offers through “a properly-specified
ex-ante ‘margin squeeze’ test.”3
Whereas competition authorities base the implementation of their margin
squeeze tests on case law, NRAs have relied on general guidelines rather than on
an explicit methodology. Only in 2010, the Commission’s NGA Recommendation
explicitly described a margin squeeze test based on a reasonably efficient operator
(REO) as an alternative to the equally efficient operator (EEO) test established
by competition case law. The Commission’s Recommendation states that in
1See ERG [2009]. The European Regulators Group, has been replaced by the Body of
European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) in 2009.
2When the test is implemented between two wholesale markets, a margin squeeze test is
also called a “noneviction test.”
3“Enhancing the broadband investment environment,” policy statement by Vice-President
Kroes, Brussels, 12 July 2012.
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order to maintain effective competition, NRAs may consider margin squeeze tests
according to costs and characteristics of a reasonably efficient operator that does
not exhibit the same economic conditions than the incumbent. The Commission
however does not define what “reasonably efficient” means; it only states that
NRAs should properly specify in advance the methodology they will follow to
implement such a test.1 Therefore, NRAs’ appreciation in conducting ex-ante
REO margin squeeze tests is large.
In practice, such tests have been implemented by European NRAs according
to different methodologies. NRAs can build a bottom-up hypothetical efficient
operator using parameters tuned from quantitative measures; they can use alter-
native operators’ actual costs and data; they can adjust the costs and economic
conditions of the incumbent to account for new entrants’ disadvantages;2 or they
can combine these three approaches.
This paper analyzes the third approach, whereby NRAs make adjustments to
margin squeeze tests based on the incumbents’ data in order to model a reasonably
efficient operator. This paper identifies the ex-ante specific issues related to
market asymmetries considered by NRAs, and provides a theoretical framework
that allows to translate these issues into practical test adjustments.
As a result, this article concludes that REO margin squeeze test are different
from EEO tests in three categories. The first category, usually considered as the
main differentiating factor between REO and EEO tests relates to downstream
cost disadvantages. Per unit downstream costs may be modified to take into
account possible economies of scale, economies of scope, as well as other specific
costs for the entrant. The other two categories are not formally associated to
REO tests but they also follow the same rationale: they take into account the
disadvantages of entrants in order to create a level playing field. The second
category deals with access charge adjustments. When several wholesale products
are available to entrants, several margin squeeze tests may be conducted according
1The forthcoming Recommendation on non-discrimination is expected to specify the rel-
evant parameters for the test. The parameters of the so-called “economic replicability test”
as proposed in the draft Recommendation are being vigorously debated given the particular
context of NGA networks and their uncertain profitability. In particular, the BEREC insists
on the introduction of a test based on REO parameters.
2This last approach has the practical benefit that NRAs can use incumbent’s data provided
in the framework of accounting separation and cost accounting remedies. Some NRAs call this
approach an “adjusted equally efficient operator” test or “similarly efficient operator” test.
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to the notion of efficient entry as determined by the regulator. Finally, the third
category explores possible price adjustments. Specifically, it covers adjustments
related to bundling practices that could compromise the competing capacity of
entrants.
Using this theoretical framework, this paper reviews the implementation of
margin squeeze tests by European NRAs. Along with documents from the Eu-
ropean Commission (EC) and the European Regulators Group (ERG), it also
reviews decisions and guidelines from the following NRAs: RTR (Austria), BIPT
(Belgium), ARCEP (France), BNetzA (Germany), ComReg (Ireland), AGCOM
(Italy), OPTA (the Netherlands), UKE (Poland), Anacom (Portugal), CMT
(Spain), and Ofcom (United Kingdom).
While this paper focuses on European regulatory authorities, the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) also refers to an hypothetical “reasonably
efficient competitor” regarding the current regulation in place for the narrowband
mass market and the business market.1 The FCC explains that a reasonably effi-
cient competitor should aim at providing all services to all consumers, as long as
this is supported by the market;2 but it also states that it would take into account
entrants’ disadvantages in providing multiple services, such as diseconomies of
scope.3 Nevertheless, because of the existing inter-platform competition in place
between telecommunications incumbents and cable operators, there is no access
regulation in the U.S. since the D.C. Court decision in United States Telecom As-
sociation v. FCC and the regulatory authority’s Triennal Review Order released
in 2003.4 Therefore, the FCC does not use margin squeeze tests as an ex-ante
regulatory tool in the U.S.
Hence, the benchmark analysis only focuses on European NRAs’ and institu-
tions’ decisions. The aim of this case review is to illustrate the test modelling
choices introduced in the theoretical section. The benchmark analysis does not
seek to study an exhaustive list of margin squeeze tests implemented by European
1More precisely, in the current framework one of the standards needed to require the un-
bundling of a network element is that the lack of access to this element raises barriers to entry
“that are likely to make entry into a market by a reasonably efficient competitor uneconomic,”
when taking into consideration alternative suppliers, access types, or bypass opportunities. See
FCC [2005], §51.317.
2FCC [2005], §25.
3FCC [2005], §24.
4See Bauer [2005] for an history of unbundling policy in the U.S.
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NRAs in the telecommunications industry, but only aims at providing illustrating
examples. However, this list is large enough to explore the main issues related to
REO ex-ante margin squeeze tests.
Whereas this paper provides a comparison between NRAs’ choices regarding
ex-ante margin squeeze tests, this analysis does not aim at advocating EEO or
REO tests, nor to endorse NRAs’ implementation of margin squeeze tests, and
whether or not these tests should be conducted regarding any particular regula-
tory context. Besides, this paper does not study the impact of ex-ante margin
squeeze tests on investment or innovation, and do not define what “reasonably
efficient” means. Its focus is rather to analyze the possible asymmetries between
entrants and incumbents currently considered by European NRAs and the result-
ing range of implemented adjustments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 a review of the
literature on the interplay between margin squeeze and regulation is provided.
Section 4.3 introduces the two versions of a margin squeeze tests: the EEO and
REO tests. A list of issues specific to ex-ante implementation of margin squeeze
tests is developed in Section 4.4, and review the NRAs’ conduct regarding these
issues in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature on margin squeeze and regula-
tion
The economic literature on margin squeeze is scarce and most of it deals with
margin squeeze from a competition law perspective. Some papers study margin
squeeze tests taking into account other regulatory obligations of the vertically in-
tegrated firm, but only a few discuss margin squeeze tests as an ex-ante regulatory
tool per se.
Bouckaert and Verboven [2004] consider the relevance and the scope of ex-
post margin squeeze tests in different regulatory environments. The authors
study three different environments: full regulation (the incumbent’s retail and
upstream prices are fixed by the regulatory authority), partial regulation (only
the incumbent’s upstream price is fixed by the regulatory authority), and no reg-
ulation. They show that margin squeezes could be observed because of the regu-
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latory authority’s choices in a fully regulated environment, because of a predatory
strategy from the incumbent in a partially regulated environment, or because of a
foreclosure strategy in a unregulated environment. However, they only study the
relevance of ex-post margin squeeze tests to monitor compliance with competition
laws in a regulated environment, and not margin squeeze tests as a regulatory
tool. They also discuss the appropriate aggregation level of margin squeeze tests
for multi-product firms in their partially regulated environment.
Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001] study an incumbent’s incentive to engage in a
margin squeeze in order to foreclose a downstream rival. More precisely, they
analyze the impact of the access charge level on the incentive to prey. In their
model, the incentive to undertake a margin squeeze always decreases in the access
charge.
Spector [2008] discusses how economic theory can provide some guidance for
the implementation of margin squeeze tests when it is analyzed in terms of other
well-known abuses of a dominant position (predatory pricing, excessive upstream
pricing, etc.). He further points out three major concerns to be taken into ac-
count at the retail level: product differentiation, the scope of squeeze tests when
considering multi-product firms (product-by-product vs. global tests), and the
case of new products. Some of these sources of concern are also found in this
paper benchmark analysis, which also reviews how NRAs deal with these issues.
Briglauer, Go¨tz and Schwarz [2010] also study margin squeeze in a regulatory
environment; they argue that a margin squeeze could be an indicator for market
deregulation. They develop a theoretical model that demonstrates that a margin
squeeze can result from regulation in combination with inter-modal competitive
pressure, and not from an anti-competitive foreclosure strategy from the incum-
bent. In this regard, they advocate that NRAs should deregulate markets where
inter-modal competition is strong enough, in order to avoid margin squeeze of
intra-modal new competitors.
Despite the limited economics literature on the interplay between margin
squeeze tests and regulation, the importance of margin squeeze tests in ex-ante
regulation is highlighted in several policy analyses. For example, Briglauer and
Vogelsang [2011] emphasize the relevance of considering an alternative whole-
sale access charge pricing formula to cost-orientation using forward-looking long
run incremental costs. They justify the use of a new regulatory wholesale price
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formula because the margin squeeze issue becomes particularly predominant in
contracting markets in the telecommunications industry. They explain that mar-
gin squeeze tests conducted ex-ante by NRAs are notably relevant and, hence,
need to be carefully implemented.
By contrast, Ergas, Ralph and Lanigan [2010] describe the difficulties associ-
ated with margin squeeze testing for NGA services. The authors consider some
critical issues for margin squeeze tests at the retail level. They express their
concern about bundling, retail discounts related to offers with long-term com-
mitments, low prices for new offers, nonlinear pricing and economies of scale. In
addition, concerning implementation in practice, they stress the major difficulties
that arise from retail product differentiation, wholesale product differentiation
and bypass, and the possible “two-sideness” of markets. They argue that the
number of false-positive test results can be high when these margin squeeze tests
are implemented ex-ante, and that the cost associated with these errors is likely
to be large. They conclude that margin squeeze tests should only be applied
ex-post in NGAN markets, in the context of competition law.
Regarding the implementation of margin squeeze tests, authors have debated
over the pertinence of EEO or REO tests in competition policy or regulatory
frameworks. Geradin and O’Donoghue [2005] argue that REO margin squeeze
tests are valid in a regulatory framework, where the regulatory authority promotes
the entry of less-efficient operators in the short-run, expecting that they will
become more efficient in the long-run. However, they state that REO standards
should not be applied ex-post, as competition law should promote competition
on the merits, which is consistent with the exclusion of less-efficient competitors.
Similarly, Heimler [2010] explains that a standard that is favorable to entrants
such as the REO test can only be applied by a regulatory authority, as it can
estimate the trade-off between higher short-run costs for consumers and long-run
benefits.
As one can see from this literature review, only few papers consider the in-
terplay between regulation and competition law for margin squeeze tests. The
economics of REO margin squeeze tests, which are widely used by European
NRAs to define some of their regulation policies, are yet to be formally analyzed.
The theoretical framework proposed in Section 4 thus constitutes a basis for fur-
ther economic analysis on the impact of REO margin squeeze tests as a regulatory
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tool.
4.3 Margin squeeze: From theory to practice
This section introduces the two different margin squeeze tests defined by the
European Commission and proposes a brief review of some implementation issues
that are common to both tests.
4.3.1 Two different tests to demonstrate a margin squeeze
The European Commission’s Recommendation 2010/572/EU on regulated access
to Next Generation Access networks provides two alternative definitions of ex-
ante margin squeeze test: the Equally Efficient Operator (EEO) test, and the
Reasonably Efficient Operator (REO) test.
The EEO test The first definition of a margin squeeze test in the NGA Rec-
ommendation is given as follows:
“Margin squeeze can be demonstrated by showing that the SMP
[Significant Market Power] operator’s own downstream operations could
not trade profitably on the basis of the upstream price charged to
its competitors by the upstream operating arm of the SMP operator
(‘equally efficient competitor’ test) [...]”
Whereas this definition is to be used in ex-ante margin squeeze tests, it is to
be noted that the EEO test has been formally designated as the adequate test to
apply by ex-post competition law.1 It provides legal certainty for dominant firms
as they have knowledge of their own costs and access charges in order to assess
the lawfulness of their own conduct. The EEO test is also consistent with the
objectives of competition policy, as it guarantees that downstream competitors
with lower costs would make a positive profit by buying the wholesale product
and competing against the incumbent in the retail market. Accordingly, more
efficient downstream competitors are not excluded from the market.
1See the cases Deutsche Telekom and Telefo´nica.
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In an ex-ante setting, the adoption of the EEO test depends on the objectives
of regulation at a certain state of development of competition in a given market.
For instance, the impact of regulation and the introduction of competition on the
incumbent’s and entrants’ investment and innovation might play an important
role. As formulated in 2009 by the European Regulators Group: “where there
are concerns about the incentives to invest and innovate, it is possible that a
regulator would more likely use the equally efficient operator test.”1
The REO test The NGA Recommendation also proposes an alternative to the
EEO, the REO test:2
“[...] Alternatively, a margin squeeze can also be demonstrated by
showing that the margin between the price charged to competitors
on the upstream market for access and the price which the down-
stream arm of the SMP operator charges in the downstream market
is insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient service provider in the
downstream market to obtain a normal profit (reasonably efficient
competitor test). In the specific context of ex-ante price controls aim-
ing to maintain effective competition between operators not benefiting
from the same economies of scale and scope and having different unit
network costs, a ‘reasonably efficient competitor test’ will normally
be more appropriate.”
As presented by the Commission, the REO test might be used ex-ante when
there are asymmetries between the SMP and other operators.3 This is typically
the case of a new entrant which faces an already installed incumbent with sig-
nificant market power in the downstream market. The adjustments of the REO
margin squeeze test allow to create a level playing field, which would promote
competition in the downstream market.
1ERG [2009], §55.
2Although the EEO and REO tests were first mentioned in the 1998 Notice on the appli-
cation on competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, the 2010
NGA Recommendation provides for the first time a clear difference between the two and an
explicit preference for the REO test in the context of ex-ante regulation.
3See also the Commission’s comments pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC in
decisions EL/2010/1113 and IT/2010/1103.
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However, it is not clear whether the Commission recommends adjusting for
asymmetries in the downstream market whenever this market is considered com-
petitive and exempted from regulation. In particular, in situations where the
upstream market power of the vertically integrated operator is already addressed
through other regulatory obligations, should a REO margin squeeze test be con-
ducted?1 The Commission has nevertheless indicated that margin squeeze tests
should not in any case be used to regulate competitive downstream markets, but
could be used to regulate SMP operators in upstream markets.2 Clearer guide-
lines and economic analysis are thus necessary to better frame and understand
the pertinence of REO adjustments, and more generally, the precise use of margin
squeeze tests.
4.3.2 A simple theoretical margin squeeze test
A direct transcription of the EEO test, as previously described, compares the
retail price p set by the incumbent with the sum of the wholesale access charge a
and the incumbent’s downstream cost c. There is no margin squeeze if the down-
stream branch of the incumbent covers its perceived upstream and downstream
unit costs:
p ≥ a+ c. (4.1)
This EEO imputation test guarantees that more efficient competitors are not
excluded from the market. An entrant with downstream cost cE ≤ c would
make positive profits buying the wholesale product and competing against the
incumbent.
By contrast, when conducting a REO test, NRAs have to adjust the imputa-
tion test defined by inequality (4.1) to take into account competitors’ asymmetric
conditions, that are for instance due to the presence of economies of scale and
scope. Therefore, a REO test can hardly be defined by a simple formula, as the
one expressed by inequality (4.1) for the EEO test. A theoretical framework,
1Indeed, the REO definition is ambiguous, as it refers to maintaining effective competition
between operators while opening the possibility for asymmetric adjustments in downstream
competitive markets. However, NRAs usually adjust their tests in order to compensate for
short-run disadvantages an efficient entrant could face, whereas the latter would not need such
adjustments in the long-run.
2See the Commission’s comments pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC in
decisions IT/2010/1103 and PL/2010/1098.
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which translates the various adjustments NRAs do to the EEO test in order to
model a REO, is presented in Section 4 of this paper. Before inspecting these
adjustments, a brief discussion of an important question in the implementation
of margin squeeze tests is provided below.
4.3.3 The not-so-simple implementation of margin squeeze
tests
The telecommunications industry is dynamic and marketing practices can be
complex as services evolve according to innovation and technological progress.
As Ergas, Ralph and Lanigan [2010] point out, there are several difficulties as-
sociated with the implementation of a simple margin squeeze test, as described
by inequality (4.1). To name a few, these include retail discounts with long-
term commitments offers, introductory low prices, learning-by-doing economics,
or nonlinear pricing.
In particular, a common issue to the implementation of EEO and REO tests
concerns the appropriate time frame for evaluating the profitability of a down-
stream operator. There are two possible approaches: a period-by-period ap-
proach, and a dynamic approach.
The period-by-period approach assesses periodically the profitability of an
activity within a given period of time, usually one year. With this approach, a
margin squeeze test is conducted for each of these periods.
Alternatively, the dynamic approach evaluates the profitability of an activity
over several years. Revenues and costs can be evaluated with the discounted cash
flow (DCF) method, generally used to test if the net present value of cash flows
is positive. Contrary to the period-by-period approach, the dynamic approach
does not specify how costs should be recovered in each period; it allows for initial
losses that are compensated by future high profits.1
As dynamic pricing (when price varies over time) is commonly observed in
the telecommunications industry when new products or services are introduced in
1In practice, when the squeeze test takes place ex-post, the period-by-period approach gen-
erally compares the revenues and costs of the activity based on historical information extracted
from the operator’s accounts. By contrast, ex-ante tests use the best currently available infor-
mation, based sometimes on short term forecasts. Note also that the test given by inequality
(4.1) could be modified when using a dynamic approach, in order to take into account the
evolution of costs, demand, and prices.
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the market, imputation tests using the dynamic approach seem to be preferable.
Indeed, a failure to pass the period-by-period imputation test might not indi-
cate a margin squeeze conduct, but rather a penetration pricing strategy (when
price increases over time). This is especially so when the product in question is
characterized by network externalities and consumers find greater value in the
product when the penetration rate is higher. Similarly, discounts and promotions
or learning-by-doing effects related to new services favor imputation tests using
the dynamic approach. As Spector [2008] puts it, “[l]ow introductory downstream
prices may have innocent motives because both producers and consumers in new
markets need to gain experience, and costs can usually be expected to decrease.”
However, there are shortcomings in the dynamic approach. For instance, an
imputation test may rely on unreasonable cost and demand forecasts. Besides, a
positive net present value for the incumbent could be the result of a successful
foreclosure strategy, as the dynamic approach would allow for the recoupment of
initial losses induced by a predatory strategy.1 Even so, all things considered,
the European Commission and NRAs acknowledge the relevance of the dynamic
approach in the telecommunications industry for EEO or REO tests, but they
claim caution and suggest using the period-by-period and the dynamic approaches
simultaneously whenever required.
The rest of the paper focuses on margin squeeze tests as conducted ex-ante by
European NRAs, and on the adjustments that these NRAs make to the EEO mar-
gin squeeze test described by inequality (4.1) to model a REO. The next section
builds a theoretical framework to take account of possible market asymmetries
between entrants and incumbents.
4.4 Specific issues for building a REO margin
squeeze test
This section reviews each specific issue to REO margin squeeze tests in detail.
For each of these issues, it is first explained what would be the nature of the
asymmetry between the incumbent and a new entrant. Then, an adjustment to
1As pointed out by the European Commission in its response to CMT [2007] guidelines,
SG-Greffe (2007) D/202782, or in its Telefo´nica decision.
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the simple imputation test described by inequality (4.1) is proposed.
Note that, when potential entrants are supposed to be more efficient than
the incumbent, because of technological progress the incumbent did not benefit
from when building its infrastructure for instance, a NRA may use a bottom-
up margin squeeze tests such that the modelled REO is more efficient than the
incumbent. However, in practice, all the reviewed cases are such that entrants
were less efficient than the incumbent in the downstream market, and, hence, this
section builds on the assumption that the modelled REO is less efficient than the
incumbent.
The margin squeeze test is composed of three parameters: costs, access charge
and retail price. Below, this paper analyzes possible adjustments that can be
made for these three parameters.
4.4.1 Cost adjustments
This subsection analyzes three different cost adjustments made by NRAs when
conducting their imputation tests: economies of scale, economies of scope, and
entrants’ specific costs.
4.4.1.1 Economies of scale
Firms in the telecommunications industry usually have to bear important fixed
costs in order to enter the market, namely to build their own networks or their
information systems. Because of these fixed costs, an increase in demand leads
to a decrease in the average cost of production. With identical cost functions,
firms with a higher demand will have a lower average cost than firms with a lower
demand. Therefore, a potential entrant might find it unprofitable to enter the
market when the incumbent already serves a high demand, and hence, benefits
from lower average costs.
Suppose that the average cost of production decreases with the firm’s demand
D, that is c = c(D) and ∂c(D)/∂D < 0. In markets recently opened to competi-
tion, the incumbent’s demand DI is higher than the entrants’ one, so the NRAs
usually have to scale back the incumbent’s market share to take into account
economies of scale. To adjust the simple imputation test for economies of scale,
an NRA may consider the average cost of the incumbent c, evaluated at D˜, the
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expected demand served by an efficient entrant. D˜ is evaluated by the regulatory
authority and c(D˜) > c(DI), as D˜ < DI . The imputation test hence becomes:
p ≥ a+ c(D˜). (4.2)
It is straightforward to see how the test (4.2) differs from the test (4.1): the
incumbent’s cost is evaluated at a lower demand than the one it is actually serving.
4.4.1.2 Multi-product incumbent: Economies of scope
When the incumbent is active in several markets whereas the entrant is active
in only one, the incumbent can benefit from a strategic cost advantage over the
entrant if there are economies of scope. This is the case when there are potential
cost-savings because of common costs that can be spread between two (or more)
incumbent’s products.1
Suppose that the incumbent sells two different retail products, product 1 and
product 2. Suppose further that for some reason the entrant can only produce
product 1. For instance, one could argue that as a new entrant it is not possible
to offer all of the incumbent’s product range that has experience in the market.
The NRA may consider that it is reasonably efficient that at the time of entry
only one product is offered, but that an efficient entrant will eventually produce
other products in the long run if there are economies of scope. Let the total
cost function of the incumbent be C(q1, q2), where the incumbent sells q1 units of
product 1 and q2 units of product 2. There are some economies of scope between
products 1 and 2 if:2
C(q1, 0) + C(0, q2) > C(q1, q2).
Denoted by c = c(q1|q2) is the incumbent’s average cost of selling q1 units of
product 1, when it already sells q2 units of product 2. The average cost of an
entrant that is as efficient as the incumbent in the first downstream market is
1When analyzing economies of scope, it is worthwhile to consider a multi-product incumbent
and entrants that cannot produce all of the incumbent’s products. If entrants can compete on
all of the incumbent’s portfolio, the relevant modifications to the simple imputation test are
described in the “Price adjustments” category.
2See, e.g., Panzar and Willig [1981].
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c(q1|0): its average cost equals the incumbent’s when the latter produces zero
units of product 2.
The common fixed costs of producing products 1 and 2 are denoted by F .1
It is assumed that no product-specific fixed costs and no difference in marginal
costs of producing one product according to the number of other products that
are sold.2 Hence, when q2 = 0, the incumbent’s downstream average cost equals:
c(q1|0) = c(q1|q2) + F
q1
.
Thus, when it produces a strictly positive q2, the incumbent’s additional cost for
products 1 is only marginal, as the common fixed cost is already borne. The
economies of scope advantage of the incumbent is therefore represented by the
common cost, F .
The entrant could be squeezed due to the incumbent’s economies of scope
advantage. An adjusted version of the imputation test (4.1) would be for the
NRA to take this cost difference into account in its margin squeeze test, by
choosing a downstream cost in the interval [c(qI |q2), c(q1|0)].
This is represented in the following test, where α is chosen by the regulatory
authority, with α ∈ [0, 1]:
p ≥ a+ c+ αF
q1
. (4.3)
First, consider the extreme case where α = 1: inequality (4.3) becomes p ≥
a + c + F/q1. The test favors entry of competitors which are as efficient as the
incumbent in the first market, taken in isolation. It requires the incumbent to set
product 1’s price as if it was not selling product 2 at all, and loses the advantage
from its economies of scope. Second, consider the other extreme case, where
α = 0. It favors the incumbent as it allows it to fully take advantage of its
economies of scope: product 1’s cost does not include any share of common costs.
1For instance, a fixed cost common to both products may be the billing information system,
or the rent paid by for the retail distribution infrastructures. Also, note that when there is a
fixed cost in producing product 1, an NRA could also adjust the squeeze test for economies of
scale.
2This analysis extends to including economies of scope at the marginal cost level, but to
keep it as simple as possible it only focuses on common fixed costs, as they are particularly
relevant in the industry. For example, difference in marginal costs may illustrate the ability of
a vendor to sell both products to one consumer more rapidly than each product to two different
consumers.
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4.4.1.3 Entrants’ specific costs
Entrants may have to bear specific costs relative to market entry or to inter-
connection to the incumbent’s essential facilities, such as equipment collocation
costs. When this is the case, the imputation test may be adjusted. Indeed, if the
test is not adjusted, it offers the incumbent a competitive advantage due to cost
asymmetries.
Suppose there is a per unit entrant’s specific cost, cS. If the NRA includes
this entrant specific cost into the margin squeeze analysis, the imputation test
becomes:
p ≥ a+ c+ cS. (4.4)
Finally, note that, in telecommunications markets, incumbents often enjoy
market power at the downstream level because they benefit from an incumbency
advantage such as brand loyalty. This incumbency advantage is generally tem-
porary and can be seen as an asymmetric consumer switching cost from the
incumbent to an entrant.1 In this case, the entrants’ specific cost cS can also be
seen as the short-run marketing effort efficient entrants have to make to overcome
this incumbency advantage, in order to attract the incumbent’s consumers.
Policy perspectives All three cost adjustments aim at allowing entry of op-
erators which are less efficient than the incumbent at the downstream level in
the short run. One reason an NRA might want to induce entry of a firm that is
less efficient than the incumbent is that its objective function is mostly based on
maximization of consumer surplus [see, e.g., Guthrie, 2006]. In this case, compe-
tition from a less efficient entrant can increase consumer surplus as compared to
no competition at all.
However, the main argument that is developed by NRAs to justify cost ad-
justments is a dynamic one. They argue that entrants may be less efficient in the
short run but will become at least as efficient as the incumbent in the long run.
In other words, cost asymmetries are generally thought to disappear in the long-
run. Hence, NRAs have to balance short-term efficiency losses against long-term
efficiency gains.2 In this regard, one of the most difficult task for NRAs when
1See, e.g., Carter and Wright [2003].
2Note however that these long-term efficiency gains may be achieved in other markets.
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adjusting for cost asymmetries with a view to obtain long-term efficiency gains
is to estimate the market perspectives ex-ante, in order to determine the number
of entrants that the NRA would like to see in the market in the long run.
4.4.2 Access charge adjustment: Wholesale product mix
The access charge that entrants have to pay to the incumbent in order to con-
nect to its infrastructure can also be adjusted when conducting an imputation
test. When several wholesale products are available to entrants, several impu-
tation tests can be conducted to detect a margin squeeze.1 These tests can be
implemented either on each of the wholesale products, or considering a wholesale
product mix.
Suppose n types of wholesale access products are available to entrants, with
wholesale charges ai, i = {1, ..., n}. The adjusted margin squeeze test that en-
compasses a wholesale product mix is:
p ≥
n∑
i=1
γi(ci + ai), (4.5)
where γ = (γ1, ..., γn) is a weighting vector, with
∑n
i=1 γi = 1 and γi ≥ 0, ∀i =
{1, ..., n}, and ci corresponds to the unit cost of the incumbent’s downstream
component associated with the access product of access charge ai.
The regulatory authority can choose to conduct several imputation tests si-
multaneously, using different weighting vectors, or to conduct an aggregated test,
taking into account a wholesale product mix, as described by inequality (4.5).
The adjustment that favors entry the most would be the one that states that
any wholesale product has to allow for economic space on its own, with respect
to the retail price. This would correspond to conducting n tests, with, for test
number i, a weighting vector composed of γi = 1 and γk = 0 if k 6= i.
Policy perspectives When a European NRA regulates several levels of access
to the incumbent’s network, it usually follows the ladder of investment regulatory
1Several wholesale access products might be available because the NRA implemented the
ladder of investment, for instance. In this case, a reasonably efficient operator would be expected
to climb the ladder, step by step. However, it might simultaneously use different wholesale
accesses in different geographical areas, investing more in its own network in high-density areas.
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approach.1 Thus, it implements a dynamic approach to access regulation with the
view that long-term efficiency arises from competition and from entrants’ invest-
ments at the Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) level or in their own infrastructures.
This dynamic component of regulation should thus translate into margin squeeze
tests.
In order to facilitate entry at all levels, NRAs may conduct one margin squeeze
test per access level in the first place. Hence, competitors can enter the market
at any access level that would be profitable in the short-run, and this level might
change between different geographical areas with different population densities for
instance. However, in the long-run, NRAs may prefer to induce entrants to invest
in their own network facilities, or up to the LLU level. In order to do so, they can
conduct a margin squeeze test adjusting for a wholesale mix of different access
levels which would give entrants some incentives to climb the ladder of investment.
Access charges at low levels of the ladder might demonstrate a margin squeeze,
whereas access charges at the top of the ladder do not.
One major issue NRAs have to deal with in this case is the endogeneity of the
entry and investment pattern. Surely, when NRAs want to give entrants some
incentives to invest up to a given access level, they modify their access charges
such that entrants find it more profitable to invest up to the chosen access level
than to remain in their current state. However, as it will be seen from NRAs’
decisions, the wholesale product mix used to set the level of access charges is
often evaluated according to past market figures. Hence, access regulation is
often endogenously determined with respect to entrants’ strategies.
By contrast, a NRA might prefer not to interfere in entrants’ business models
and to focus on developing competition, regardless it is service-based competition
(such as bitstream access, or LLU) or facility-based competition (where entrants
invest in their own infrastructures). In this case, it could conduct one test for
each access product, in order to ensure that no access charge leads to a margin
squeeze.
Finally, note that some NRAs also conduct margin squeeze test between reg-
ulated access level to ascertain to that there is enough economic space between
access levels for entrants to invest progressively in their own networks. Similarly,
1See Cave [2006] for an introduction to the ladder of investment approach, and Bacache,
Bourreau and Gaudin [2013] for an empirical test.
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some NRAs conduct margin squeeze tests between regulated and (lower) unregu-
lated access levels in order to verify that the incumbent does not distort entrants’
investment incentives and the establishment of a competitive wholesale market.
4.4.3 Price adjustment: Multi-product incumbent and bundling
When the incumbent is dominant in one retail market along with the upstream
market, it can leverage its retail market power in other retail markets through a
bundling strategy. The adoption of such a strategy may lead to market foreclo-
sure.1 Therefore, modifying margin squeeze tests in order to take such bundling
strategies into account might be necessary. As explained by Ergas, Ralph and
Lanigan [2010], an imputation test conducted on a bundle (for example, a fixed
telephony-broadband internet dual-play bundle) might highlight a regular com-
petitive strategy, whereas a test conducted on one of the bundle elements (for
example, fixed telephony) might demonstrate a margin squeeze.
Suppose that the incumbent produces several retail products and offers these
products to final consumers in a bundle at price p. Product i’s cost is denoted
by ci. Further assume for expositional simplicity that there are no economies of
scale or scope.2 Finally, single-product prices are not squeezing per se, so the
NRA may check that the bundle price p does not induce a margin squeeze.
The REO imputation test an NRA might set up is also determined by the
entrant’s ability to replicate the incumbent’s bundle offer. The two different cases
are analyzed below.
Multi-product entrant When the entrant competes directly with the incum-
bent by selling a bundle of products, the regulatory authority can decide to
conduct an aggregated test on the incumbent’s price:
p ≥ a+
n∑
i=1
ci. (4.6)
This imputation test is just a multi-product version of the basic test given by
inequality (4.1). This test is typically used when the bundle defines a relevant
1See, e.g., Carlton and Waldman [2002].
2One should refer to previous issues regarding the allocation of costs and access charges
when the incumbent is a multi-product firm.
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product market, on which entrants can compete with the incumbent.
Single-product entrant and price separability By contrast, when the en-
trant is active in one retail market only, the NRA might want to ensure that the
bundle sold by the multi-product incumbent does not squeeze the entrant. As
the incumbent’s bundle price aggregates prices of several products, it is difficult
for the NRA to conduct a margin squeeze test for one product only (i.e., the
product sold by the entrant). The question is then: how to allocate a price to
this product from the bundle price?
Suppose that the incumbent uses a mixed bundling strategy and sets three
prices: p1 and p2 for products 1 and 2, respectively, and p for the bundle.
1 Assume
that the entrant is only active in the market for product 1. In such market, one
would normally expect to have p1 + p2 ≥ p ≥ max[p1, p2]. Indeed, if the first
inequality did not hold, consumers would never buy the bundle.2 Whereas if
the second inequality did not hold, consumers would never buy any of the single
products (but only the bundle).
The NRA has to determine whether or not the bundle price, p, squeezes the
entrant and prevents him from competing in the market for product 1. That is,
the NRA needs to allocate a price pˆ1 to product 1 from the bundle price p. The
upper bound of pˆ1 is p − c2, which corresponds to the price of product 1 in the
bundle when the incumbent sets a margin equal to zero for product 2. The lower
bound of pˆ1 is p − p2, which is the remainder of the bundle price less the price
of product 2 when sold alone, assuming that the allocated price is above cost.
Therefore, with mixed bundling,3 the NRA chooses pˆ1 ∈ [p − p2, p − c2] in the
test:
pˆ1 ≥ a+ c1.
1There are two bundling strategies: pure bundling, and mixed bundling. Pure bundling
occurs when the consumers can only buy the bundle. By contrast, mixed bundling occurs when
consumers can buy each of the products separately, or together in the bundle.
2It is assumed that the consumers do not save any cost (e.g. shopping cost) when they buy
the bundle, as compared to the case where they buy one product (or both) separately.
3When the incumbent engages in pure bundling instead of mixed bundling, there is no
single-product price set by the incumbent. Nevertheless, the allocated price to product 2 in the
bundle can be defined by pˆ2 = p − pˆ1. As the allocated prices are assumed to be above costs,
pˆ2 ≥ c2, and, hence, pˆ1 ≤ p − c2. This also leads to pˆ1 ≥ u + c1, where u is the incumbent’s
upstream marginal cost; thus, pˆ1 ∈ [u+ c1, p− c2].
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Written differently, it chooses β ∈ [0, 1] and conducts the following test:
p− p2 + β(p2 − c2) ≥ a+ c1. (4.7)
Having a look at the two extreme cases helps at understanding this adjust-
ment. When β = 1, then pˆ1 = p− c2, and pˆ1 is high. This means that, for a given
bundle price p, the imputation test is easily satisfied. This favors the incumbent,
as the margin it earns on the sale of a bundle is completely allocated to the first
product (the one the NRA conducts the imputation test on).
By contrast, when β = 0, then pˆ1 = p − p2, and, thus, pˆ1 is low. In this
case, the allocated price pˆ1 compared to the access charge and the downstream
cost in the margin squeeze test is much lower than the bundle price p. Hence,
the imputation test is more difficult to pass. This latter test is the one preferred
by entrants, as the price allocation is such that the incumbent extracts the same
margin from product 2 in the bundle than from an independent sale at price p2.
Overall, an implicit price margin squeeze test favors the entrant compared
to an aggregated bundle test. Indeed, expression (4.7) can be rewritten as p¯ ≥
a+ c1 + c2 + (1− β)(p2 − c2) and compared to the aggregated bundle test (4.6).
This shows that, when β < 1, the margin of the single-product 2 is taken into
account when conducting the margin squeeze test price and the price floor for
the incumbent’s bundle is increased.
Policy perspectives If the regulatory authority aims at maximizing consumers
surplus in a static framework, it may adjust the price level in the margin squeeze
test whenever the incumbent sells a bundle of products that entrants are unable
to reproduce. Indeed, this type of adjustment may help to introduce competition
in the retail market, as it allows single-product entrants to compete with the in-
cumbent’s bundle. However, the effect on consumer surplus in the second market
(the one with the service entrants cannot reproduce) has to be evaluated as well
in order to draw a complete welfare (or consumer surplus) conclusion. Similarly,
a NRA may favor entrants by adjusting its test to allow for single-product entry
when it wants to refrain from any impact on firms’ business models.
By contrast, the main argument for price adjustments in a margin squeeze test
is a dynamic one. Indeed, when there are barriers to entry, multi-market entry
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is generally thought to be more difficult than single-market entry, as barriers to
entry are higher for multi-product entrants. Therefore, single-market entry is
sometimes considered as a stepping-stone for multi-market entry,1 and a price-
adjusted margin squeeze test that encourages single-market entry in the short-run
may help the NRA to promote long-term multi-market competition.
4.4.4 Summary of ex-ante REO specific issues
Table 4.1 below summarizes the REO specific issues that can arise in ex-ante
margin squeeze tests, classified in three categories.
Parameter Specific Issues
Costs Economies of scale
Economies of scope
Entrants’ specific costs
Access charge Wholesale product mix
Price Bundling
Table 4.1: Ex-ante specific issues for margin squeeze tests
Note that issues related to access charges and prices may not be seen as spe-
cific to ex-ante margin squeeze tests and have also been considered in competition
policy cases. However, these issues are particularly relevant in tests conducted
by NRAs, as they often reflect transitory asymmetries between incumbents and
entrants. Indeed, there might be several wholesale products because the NRA
implemented a specific regulatory approach (the ladder of investment, for exam-
ple), whereas, in the long run, only one wholesale product remains. Similarly, an
entrant might be unable to reproduce the incumbent’s bundle because it needs
some time to do so. This static vs. dynamic trade-off has to be evaluated by the
NRA in charge prior to the margin squeeze test modelling.
4.5 Benchmark analysis of economic issues
This section reviews NRAs’ choices regarding the specific issues that have been
previously considered. This benchmark analysis does not aim at being exhaustive,
1See, e.g., Carlton and Waldman [2002].
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but rather at introducing some illustrative examples of how European regulatory
authorities adjust their imputation tests in practice. All references to NRAs’
guidelines and cases that are reviewed in this benchmark analysis are provided
in the Appendix 4.7.1
4.5.1 Cost adjustments
As explained in the previous section, three different adjustments to be made to
EEO imputation tests on the cost parameter have been identified.
4.5.1.1 Economies of scale
As the European Commission advocates in its Recommendation 2010/572/EU
on regulated access to NGA networks, the BIPT and Ofcom clearly adjust their
modelled efficient operator to take into account the retail market share differences
between the incumbent and entrants.2 In its 2007 guidelines, the BIPT states that
the incumbent’s retail market share can be reduced to 25% for cost calculation if
important scale effects are observed. In its 2009 guidelines, it also explains that
its REO has a 20-25% market share, following ERG [2003]. In the BT IPStream
case, Ofcom “ has chosen to scale back BT’s volumes and has considered a range
of volumes over which to model the costs of a similarly efficient entrant,” because
“ [g]iven [BT’s] scale, its costs are considerably lower than those faced by smaller
scale operators.” Ofcom then details the size it gives to an efficient entrant: “[t]he
range of volumes is approximately 1.7m-2.5m subscribers by the end of the studied
period, i.e. in 5 years’ time.”
ComReg [2012] takes a dynamic approach for the economies of scale adjust-
ment.3 The Irish NRA sets price floors for bitstream rentals by reference to a REO
that would increase its market share over time as it “considers that it is logical to
1For some countries (e.g. U.K.), the NRA can also intervene as a Competition Authority in
the telecommunications industry. The present paper only analyzes the NRA ex-ante decisions
of such cases.
2ARCEP also states it would take market share into account when economies of scale exist:
“market share” is listed as a parameter of an hypothetical model presented in Brussels, June
19th, 2008. Presentation available at http://www.cullen-international.com/ressource/
138/0/helene-boi.pdf
3Note that ComReg, the Irish NRA, mixes both bottom-up and adjusted top-down ap-
proaches in its imputation tests. See, e.g., ComReg [2012], §B33, p. 55.
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use an REO as the hypothetical entrant, with a lower market share and therefore
lower economies of scale, to set the minimum price floors for bitstream.”1 The
cost model is computed on an assumed level of LLU take-up, which increases over
the market review period (three years). Each year average subscriber bases using
LLU for the REO are 51,000, 88,000, and 99,000, respectively.
ComReg [2012] also tests for margin squeeze between the regulated bitstream
service and an end-to-end wholesale access product lower in the chain. For this
second test, ComReg assumes that the hypothetical entrant would achieve a 25%
market share.
On the contrary, BNetzA [2007] does not adjust its tests for economies of
scale, as it aims toward a long-term analysis, where such cost asymmetries are
overcome: “[a]s such, it can generally be assumed that specific competitor costs
such as the realization of (temporary) lower economies of scale and scope than
the dominant company, collocation costs and any differences in the customer
structure have to be compensated in another way. [...] It can therefore be assumed
that (additional) competitor-specific costs are generally of a temporary nature.
Therefore, the (long-term) costs of the efficient competitor should generally not
be higher than those of the dominant undertaking.” This view is close to that
developed in ex-post competition policy.
Note that OPTA [2001] does not adjust its tests for cost asymmetries neither,
and focuses on the EEO standard used in competition policy, as its 2001 guidelines
were jointly set with the Dutch competition authority, Nma.2
RTR, the Austrian NRA, conducts margin squeeze tests as a retail-minus price
control.3 Doing do, it uses the cost of the incumbent operator in an EEO fashion.
However, the NRA leaves the door open for economies of scale adjustments in
NGA network markets (RTR, 2010). But it makes it clear that a prerequisite for
this adjustment would be that the NRA estimates market perspectives.
1ComReg [2012], §3.37.
2OPTA [2001], §28.
3The Austrian regulator (RTR) relies on margin squeeze tests when implementing its retail-
minus approach to access pricing (see the Telekom-Control Commission’s Official Decision M
1/10-92 of November 15, 2010, on wholesale access). This approach aims at securing a sufficient
margin for fixed-network entrants as compared to the incumbent, while maintaining competition
between fixed and mobile operators. The source of this retail-minus approach is explained in
Briglauer, Go¨tz and Schwarz [2011]: Increased competition from outside options may lead to a
margin squeeze in the regulated market.
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Similarly, Anacom [2007] makes no adjustment to the downstream costs of
the dominant operator when performing margin squeeze tests for broadband ac-
cess. Anacom also uses margin squeeze test as a retail-minus price control, and
it argues that, in this regard, the test should refer to the dominant operator’s
cost. (Anacom also double-checked the relevance of incumbent’s data by asking
entrants to provide their cost information.)1
4.5.1.2 Multi-product incumbent: Economies of scope
As for economies of scale, the European Commission, in its Recommendation
2010/572/EU on regulated access to NGAN, gives its preference to REO tests,
which take into account the differences between incumbents and entrants regard-
ing economies of scope. In practice, NRAs use different cost models to adjust
their imputation tests for economies of scope.
NRAs generally conduct their imputation tests using one of the following
cost models: Short Run Average Variable Costs (SRAVC), Long Run (Average)
Incremental Costs (LRIC), or Fully Allocated Costs (FAC).2 Average Variable
Cost allocation only takes into account short term variable cost, whereas a Long
Run Incremental Cost model also includes fixed costs (considered as variable
costs in the long run). In Fully Allocated Costs, variable costs are included as
well as fixed costs and a share of common costs. There is also a cost model,
which takes into account a share of common costs, called LRIC+, i.e., Long Run
Incremental Costs plus a mark-up for the recovery of common fixed costs. In
some circumstances, LRIC+ models are equivalent to FAC models. Finally, a
cost model that is less common is the Stand Alone Costs (SAC) model, which
includes all variable, fixed and common costs.
When looking at the test defined by inequality (4.3), a LRIC model would cor-
respond to α = 0, whereas a FAC model (or a LRIC+ model) would incorporate
a share of common costs, that is, α ∈ (0, 1), and a SAC model would correspond
to α = 1. There are several practices to allocate common costs between products
1See Anacom [2007], p. 4. Also related to the economies of scale, Anacom adopted hy-
potheses on firm’s demand for computing the average wholesale access cost for competitors. It
considered that “launching an ADSL offer aims for at the least 13 thousand users, a number
of customers which was reached, at the end of the first three years of the offer, by main other
service providers.”
2ITU’s 2009 “Guide de la comptabilite´ re´glementaire” resumes regulatory cost standards.
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for the FAC model. They can be proportional to products’ revenues, margins,
or, for example, to the number of products sold in each market (in this case the
share of common costs is α = q1/(q1 + q2)).
In its BT IPStream decision, Ofcom clearly details its cost allocation decision
and justifies it by the need to adjust for economies of scope. First, Ofcom states
that only long-run costs are relevant in their margin squeeze test, as “[a] cost
floor based on short-run measure of costs [...] would set a cost floor which a
firm could price down to in the short-term but which would not be sustainable
over a number of years where there are fixed costs to recover.”1 Second, Ofcom
reviews all available long-run cost models: LRIC, FAC or LRIC+.2 Third, the
NRA states that “the appropriate cost floor would be one that incorporates an
element for the recovery of common costs: e.g. FAC or LRIC+,” because “Of-
com’s benchmark of a similarly efficient entrant involves the same underlying cost
function as BT’s, but smaller economies of scope.”3 Finally, Ofcom conducted
its test using Fully Allocated Costs, because this was the cost model used by BT
in the cost information it provided to Ofcom.4,5
BIPT [2007] has a different approach from the one developed by Ofcom, as
it prefers to conduct its tests using a LRIC model (or on a FAC model if LRIC
information is not available).6 The BIPT advocates the use of this cost model
because it already adjusts its test for scale effects at the retail level (see above).
It states that if the economies of scale adjustment is too difficult to conduct,
the BIPT could use FAC or LRIC+ as a cost model, in order to adjust for
common costs.7 However, the BIPT does not justify its cost model choices as an
adjustment for economies of scope asymmetries. Lastly, the BIPT can conduct
some “combinatory tests” on several retail markets, in order to ensure that joint
costs are recovered.
ComReg [2011] has also decided to employ LRAIC+, as this cost model “in-
1Ofcom [2004], §2.27.
2Ofcom [2004], §2.28.
3Ofcom [2004], §2.32.
4Ofcom [2004], §2.35.
5CMT also states it uses “Fully Distributed Costs” (similar to Fully Allocated Costs), and
ARCEP states it uses Fully Distributed Costs or LRAIC for margin squeeze tests in the broad-
band sector, in presentations showed in Brussels, June 19th, 2008. CMT presentation available
at http://www.cullen-international.com/ressource/145/0/jordi-canadell.pdf
6BIPT [2007], §56 and 58.
7BIPT [2007], §65.
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cludes appropriate amounts of variable, fixed and common costs, which is the
calculus faced by any [alternative operator] when deciding to enter or expand.”
Hence, it would benefit consumers by promoting entry of alternative operators.
RTR [2010] explains that, in Austria, margin squeeze tests are conducted us-
ing avoidable cost for each product, simultaneously than an overall combinatory
test on all products using forward-looking LRAIC. Besides, some more compli-
cated adjustments might be introduced for margin squeeze tests in NGA network
markets (RTR, 2010).
Finally, BNetzA [2007] does not adjust its tests for economies of scope, as it
aims toward a long-term analysis, for which such cost asymmetries are overcome.
Similarly, OPTA [2001] focuses on the EEO standard.
4.5.1.3 Entrants’ specific costs
BIPT [2007] clearly includes entrants’ specific costs in its imputation tests.1 AR-
CEP [2006] also includes specific costs in its margin squeeze bottom-up model for
the fixed telephony market, taking into account, for instance, collocation costs.
As for previous cost parameters, BNetzA [2007] does not adjust its imputation
tests for entrants’ specific costs, as it states that in the long-run there should be
no cost difference between an efficient entrant and the incumbent.
All cost adjustments defined in this subsection are summarized in Table 4.2.
1BIPT [2007], §60 and 61.
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Reference Economies of scale Economies of scope Entrants’ specific costs
European Commission [2010] Yes. Yes.
European Regulators Group [2003] Incumbent’s market share reduced to 20-
25%.
One approach is to calculate the incum-
bent’s cost when disallowing economies of
scope (α = 1).
Austria (RTR, 2010) Not for non-NGAN markets. Use of avoidable costs (single-product test)
and LRAIC (combinatory test).
Belgium (BIPT, 2007) Incumbent’s market share reduced to 25%. Use of LRIC (or FAC) and combinatory
tests.
Yes.
Belgium (BIPT, 2009) Incumbent’s market share reduced to 20-
25%.
France (ARCEP, 2006) Yes (bottom-up model).
Germany (BNetzA, 2007) No (long-term analysis). No (long-term analysis). No (long-term analysis).
Ireland (ComReg, 2011) Use of LRAIC+.
Ireland (ComReg, 2012) Incumbent’s market share reduced to 25%
(for second test). Incumbent’s market
share reduced to a weighted average (51k,
88k and 91k LLU line share).
Netherlands (OPTA, 2001) No (EEO test). No (EEO test).
Portugal (Anacom, 2007) No.
United Kingdom (Ofcom, 2004) Incumbent’s demand reduced to 1.7-2.5
million subscribers (time period: 5 years).
Use of FAC.
Table 4.2: Cost adjustments for ex-ante margin squeeze tests
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4.5.2 Access charge adjustments: Wholesale product mix
Most NRAs conduct imputation tests using a wholesale product mix (see, e.g.,
ERG, 2009). When they use a mix of upstream access charges, they have to set
the share of each upstream product (i.e., to determine the weighting vector γ).
In the fixed calls telephony market, ARCEP [2006] takes into account a mix
composed of two different wholesale products: handover at the local exchange
(80%), and handover at the tandem exchange level (20%). Furthermore, the
wholesale mix is constructed as a mean of different rates which apply for peak
and off-peak interconnections, based on consumer call profiles.
ComReg [2011] also uses a weighted average of interconnection rates at local
(66%), tandem (24%), and double tandem (10%) levels. According to ComReg,
this weighted average is appropriate to protect alternative operators’ investments,
and it will be updated if competitive conditions justify it.1
Regarding broadband markets, AGCOM and CMT use wholesale product
mixes in their imputation tests. These NRAs define their wholesale mix weighting
vector by using the current mix of wholesale products used by new entrants.2
Setting the weighting vector introduces an endogeneity problem, as it aims
at reproducing the already existing usage pattern of the wholesale products. In
this regard, two CMT members developed an interesting point of view stressing
some possible drawbacks to the upstream product mix in CMT [2008b]. In this
document, the authors explain their disagreement with the wholesale product mix
established by CMT [2008a]. They state that this input mix does not require each
wholesale product to be profitable on its own. Conducting imputation tests for
each of the three upstream products, they show that potential competitors which
would like to use a different basket of wholesale products than the one taken into
account in CMT [2008a] imputation test might be squeezed out of the market.
Finally, note that RTR address the wholesale product mix issue in a different
way. It focuses on evaluating the margin between the bitstream access and retail
prices, and simultaneously, between the LLU and the bitstream prices. Therefore
1ComReg [2011], §4.48.
2See AGCOM [2010] for Italy, and CMT [2008a], p. 9, for Spain. See also the European
Commission response to the 2010 AGCOM draft measure for Italy: European Commission, SG-
Greffe (2010) D/12083. A similar analysis is conducted by the Dutch NRA; see the Commis-
sion’s comments pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC in decisions NL/2012/1407
and NL/2012/1407.
120 3. Ex-ante Margin Squeeze Tests in the Telecom Industry: What is a REO?
it ensures that there is no margin squeeze at any level, and that entrants are able
to compete at the bitstream wholesale level (see RTR, 2008, p. 77).
All access charge adjustments analyzed in this subsection are summarized in
Table 4.3.
Reference Wholesale product mix
France (ARCEP, 2006) Yes: local exchange 80%, tandem exchange 20% (bottom-up
model).
Ireland (ComReg, 2011) Yes: weighted average level of interconnection at local, single tan-
dem, and double tandem levels (respectively 66%, 24%, and 10%).
Italy (AGCOM, 2010) Yes: balance based on historical data at a national level and up-
dated periodically.
Spain (CMT, 2007) Yes.
Spain (CMT, 2008a) Yes: balance based on historical data and updated every six
months (LLU 73.8%, GigADSL 8.7%, ADSL-IP 17.5%).
Table 4.3: Access charge adjustments for ex-ante margin squeeze tests
4.5.3 Price adjustments: Multi-product incumbent and
bundling
As explained in ERG [2009], bundling is a key issue in implementing margin
squeeze tests. Regarding the price adjustments that can be made in order to take
bundles into account, AGCOM [2010] guidelines explain that margin squeeze
tests on bundles will be conducted using an aggregated test, thus replicating
the incumbent’s retail offer.1 Similarly, RTR [2010] conducts its margin squeeze
tests at the aggregated level only when the bundle is considered as replicable by
entrants. These tests thus consider the whole bundle as a single product per se.
2
BNetzA [2007] states that, since bundle replicability is the central issue, a
case-by-case analysis is necessary to decide whether a per product or a per bas-
1See, AGCOM [2010], Annex 1, p. 63.
2Similarly, the Dutch NRA conducts margin squeeze tests on bundled products by compar-
ing the aggregated bundle price to total costs, including fully allocated costs of the unregulated
wholesale product when it is relevant. See the Commission’s comments pursuant to Article 7(3)
of Directive 2002/21/EC in decisions NL/2012/1407 and NL/2012/1407.
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ket/bundle margin squeeze test should be conducted. More precisely, the German
NRA states that margin squeeze tests could be conducted at an aggregate level
only if “the practicability of a margin squeeze test is not called into question”
and if “the bundles to be taken as a reference can also be offered by all efficient
competitors in that particular combination.”1
CMT [2007] does not exactly adjust its margin squeeze tests in order to take
into account bundling; it conducts separated replicability tests for bundles. In-
deed, for CMT’s margin squeeze imputation tests, the “unit of reference is a
specific offer/service- not the whole market.”2 The replicability test for bundles
is conducted only if the incumbent is also dominant in one of the retail markets.
If the incumbent practices mixed bundling, a first aggregated test is carried out.
If the first test passes, an implicit pricing test is carried as described in expression
(4.7), setting the implicit price to the lowest bound. If the first aggregated test
is negative, the bundling offer is banned.
Bundles are also adjusted by the UKE in the ex-ante margin squeeze tests
within the framework of the 2009 agreement concluded between the Polish NRA
and the incumbent operator. The price of the bundle offer is tested by exclud-
ing other unregulated elements of the bundle at incremental cost level. This
corresponds to β = 1 in inequality (4.7).
All price adjustments studied in this subsection are summarized in Table 4.4.
Reference Bundling
Austria (RTR, 2010) One aggregated test.
Germany (BNetzA, 2007) Case-by-case basis.
Italy (AGCOM, 2010) One aggregated test.
Poland (UKE, 2009) Per product, implicit price net of incremental costs (β = 1).
Spain (CMT, 2007) Not directly taken into account in imputation test: additional
replicability test.
Table 4.4: Price adjustments for ex-ante margin squeeze tests
1See BNetzA presentation on margin squeeze tests, Brussels, June 19th, 2008. Presentation
available at http://www.cullen-international.com/ressource/149/0/michael-schi.pdf.
2See CMT presentation on margin squeeze tests, Brussels, June 19th, 2008.
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4.5.4 Synthesis of European practices
Overall, in the decisions and guidelines reviewed in this paper, NRAs have ad-
justed their margin squeeze tests in various ways over all three test parameters
to model a REO. For adjustments over the cost parameter, most of the reviewed
NRAs were concerned with issues related to economies of scale. Some of them
have decided not to adjust their tests for it and followed the EEO approach,
whereas some others have scaled back the incumbent’s market share. In doing
so, some of the NRAs have followed the European Regulatory Group guidelines,
setting a 20-25% market share for the incumbent. On the contrary, NRAs have
seemed to be less preoccupied by common cost recoupment than by economies of
scale; maybe because of the difficulties associated in allocating common costs to
different products. Finally, few NRAs have clearly added entrants’ specific cost
in their margin squeeze tests.
Adjustments on the access charge parameter of the margin squeeze test have
almost been a consensus in the analyzed documents. In cases where there was
more than one regulated access level, most NRAs have performed their margin
squeeze tests by introducing a wholesale product mix based on the current state
of the market. By contrast, an example of an NRA which tests each wholesale
access separately is the Austrian regulatory authority, RTR. It is to be noted that
the endogeneity induced by a mix determined on the current state of the market
may be problematic to implement a regulatory approach, such as the ladder of
investment.
Finally, the analyzed NRAs’ documents on decisions related to conducting
margin squeeze tests on bundled products have shown an important heterogeneity.
Indeed, some NRAs have conducted REO margin squeeze tests by considering the
bundle as a single-product, whereas some others have favored per-product tests.
This heterogeneity can be explained by geographical market specificities, and
whether or not the bundle product is replicable by entrants and constitutes a
relevant product market.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper identified the main economic issues that are specific to the implemen-
tation of REO ex-ante margin squeeze tests by European National Regulatory
Authorities. The margin squeeze tests might be adjusted to correct for market
disadvantages, and the adjustments can be found on all test parameters, namely
the downstream price, the access charge, and the downstream costs. This paper
transposed these issues into practical test adjustments, so as to define precisely
how NRAs could build a Reasonably Efficient Operator based on the incumbent’s
parameters. It further presented basic policy perspectives on the impact of such
adjustments.
This paper also provided a review of current practices implemented by Na-
tional Regulatory Authorities in European telecommunications markets. This
review was conducted in the light of the test adjustments that had been defined.
Some adjustments were found to be very similar across the authorities’ decisions,
whereas some others are dealt with quite heterogeneously. If European policy-
makers aim at consolidating the telecommunications market, this calls for greater
coordination among NRAs for REO margin squeeze test modelling.
As an extension of this work, it could be relevant to perform a systematic
cross-country analysis on NRAs practices and to investigate the impact of REO
ex-ante margin squeeze tests on investment and innovation. For instance, it would
be interesting to know whether overcoming asymmetries via margin squeeze test
adjustments in a REO framework has a positive or a negative impact on entrants’
and incumbents’ investments in Next Generation Access Networks.
4.7 Appendix: Reviewed decisions and guide-
lines
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Geographical
market
Authority Year Document Market
Europe EC (European
Commission)
2010 European Recommendation 2010/572/EU on regulated access to NGAN Guidelines
Europe ERG (Euro-
pean Regulators
Group)
2003 ERG Common Position on the approach to Appropriate remedies in the new
regulatory framework
Guidelines
2009 Report on the Discussion on the application of margin squeeze tests to bundles Report
Austria RTR 2008 RTR Communications Report 2008 Guidelines
2010 Margin Squeeze U¨berpru¨fungen in der sektorspezifischen ex ante-Regulierung
fu¨r Telekommunikationsma¨rkte Kritische Punkte und neue Herausforderun-
gen
Guidelines
Belgium BIPT 2007 De´cision e´tablissant des lignes directrices relatives a` l’e´valuation des effets de
ciseaux tarifaires
Guidelines
2009 De´cision concernant le test de ciseaux tarifaires des lignes loue´es Ethernet Leased lines
France ARCEP 2006 Notice du test d’effet de ciseaux tarifaires te´le´phonie fixe Fixed telephony
Germany BNetzA 2007 Notes on margin squeezes as defined by section 28(2) para 2 TKG Guidelines
Ireland ComReg 2011 Response to Consultation Document No. 10/76 and decisions amending price
control obligations and withdrawing and further specifying transparency obli-
gations
Call origination and
termination
2012 Further specification to the price control obligation and an amendment to the
transparency obligation, D06/12
Wholesale broadband
access
Italy AGCOM 2010 Delibera 499/10/CONS and Appendix Guidelines (Fixed net-
works)
Netherlands OPTA 2001 OPTA and NMa Price Squeeze Guidelines (OPTA/EGM/2000/200494, NMa
/2201/12)
Guidelines (Fixed net-
works)
Poland UKE 2009 UKE and TPSA Agreement concluded on 22 October 2009, and Annex 9 Wholesale broadband
access
Portugal Anacom 2007 Determination on the method to assess margin squeezes in Broadband offers
provided by the PT Group
Wholesale broadband
access
Spain CMT 2007 Resolucio´n MTZ 2006/1486 Guidelines
2008a Resolucio´n AEM 2008/215 Guidelines
2008b Voto Particular de Marcel Coderch e Inmaculada Lo´pez en su condicio´n de
Consejeros de la CMT en relacio´n a la Resolucio´n AEM 2008/215
United Kingdom Ofcom 2004 Direction Setting the Margin between IPStream and ATM interconnection
Prices (BT IPStream)
Broadband Internet
United States FCC 2005 In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of the
Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(FCC 04–290)
Guidelines
Table 4.5: Reviewed decisions and guidelines
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Part IV
Competition policy in the ICT
sector
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In Part IV we analyze research questions relative to (ex-post) competition
policy in the ICT sector. We argue that it may be particularly complicated
for competition authorities to intervene in markets in the ICT sector, as they
may have specific features that are rarely observable in other sectors. Hence, a
clear understanding of these markets and the effects of possible anticompetitive
conducts often requires particular theoretical analyses taking into account these
markets specificities.
In Chapter 5 we show that mobile telecommunications markets may provide
switching costs that allow firms to implement profitable bundling strategies. To
our knowledge, this rationale for product bundling is not observed in any other
market or industry, except in the case of retail banking (this example is detailed
in Chapter 5).
In Chapter 6 we demonstrate that the recent antitrust investigations in the
electronic book (ebook) markets, both in the United States and in the European
Union, have overlooked an important feature of these markets; namely that access
to ebooks is only available after the purchase of a reader device. As they manufac-
ture and sell them, ebook sellers (like Amazon, or Apple) also have market-power
over devices.
Overall, in Part IV we demonstrate that ex-post intervention in the ICT
sector may face implementation difficulties as competition policy relies heavily on
past decisions, which may have been taken regardless of the ICT sector typical
features. Hence, such intervention needs to be carefully implemented, by using
ad-hoc theoretical models for instance.
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Chapter 5
Bundling with Switching Costs
5.1 Introduction
In developing countries, mobile telecommunications markets are generally very
competitive, with an important number of firms providing pre-paid offers to con-
sumers that easily switch from one operator to another. Despite this very com-
petitive environment, some mobile operators perform way better than the others,
extracting high revenues, gaining large market shares, and having a low consumer
turnover rate. These operators generally managed to offer both tied mobile com-
munications and banking services, and these banking services are characterized
by high consumer switching costs.
As an example, we can consider the strategy of Safaricom, the main telecom-
munications operator, in the Kenyan market. Safaricom was able to operate as
a monopolist in the mobile-banking market, which is characterized by high non-
pecuniary switching costs due to time-consuming administrative steps to close
an account, because the regulation changes after Safaricom’s entry blockaded its
competitors. Making use of its mobile-banking service conditional on the pur-
chase of mobile-communications, Safaricom was able to make large profits in the
(competitive) mobile-communications market.
Similarly, switching costs and bundling strategies play an important role in
the retail banking industry. Indeed, whereas tying and bundling arrangements are
usually subject to antitrust laws in the U.S. and in Europe, specific rules apply
to the banking markets. In the U.S., Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company
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Act, established in 1970, sets a per se ban on the use of tying or bundling in
the banking industry (White [1995], Litan [2003], Naegele [2005]). In Europe,
concerns have been raised about the use of tying or bundling arrangements in the
banking sector by the European Commission in its 2007 Sector Inquiry.1
Why does bundling particularly matter in such markets? We argue that the
switching costs in these markets have a specific impact on the profitability of
bundling strategies. Mobile operators which introduced mobile-banking services
are able to earn high revenues in a competitive markets because there are high
switching costs of terminating a mobile-banking contract. Similarly, the banking
industry is characterized by the presence of high switching costs (Kiser [2002],
Hannan and Adams [2011]), which can be pecuniary (early termination fees) or
non-pecuniary costs (shoe-leather costs, administrative costs). These switching
costs and their impact on tying and bundling strategies therefore form the main
source of concern for antitrust authorities.3
However, as the Chicago School critique of the leverage theory argues, tying
and bundling may not be dominant strategies per se.4 Moreover, firms are not
always better-off in the presence of switching costs (Klemperer [1987], Cabral
[2012b]). Despite this, in this chapter we demonstrate that bundling can be
rational because of the presence of switching costs.
The basic idea of the chapter is the following: a firm can develop asymmetric
switching costs by bundling its monopolized good with switching costs to its
other good, sold in a competitive market. Using this asymmetry, the bundling
firm might overcome the loss of sales in its monopoly market through its extra-
profit in the competitive one.
We develop a theoretical model in which bundling can be a dominant strategy
because of the existence of switching costs. We find that if consumer switching
1It is a common practice for retail banks in Europe to make the purchase of a mortgage
conditional on the acceptance of a current account. In France, 86% of banks tie their products
in such a way, against 67% in Spain, 48 % in Italy, or 100% in Portugal.2 The same pattern
appears for tie-in sales of consumer loans and current accounts, or small and medium enterprises
business loans and current accounts. In some countries (Portugal, Greece, the Netherlands),
more than 30% of banks tie mortgages to life insurances. Source: Communication from the
Commission, Sector Inquiry under Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on retail banking
(Final Report), COM(2007) 33 final.
3For instance, the European Commission states that tying raises switching costs. See para-
graphs 34 and 37 of the Sector Inquiry.
4See Rey and Tirole [2007] for a review of the Chicago School argument.
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costs attached to the monopoly product are high enough and if the consumer
valuation for the monopoly product is low enough, the monopolist is better-off
when bundling its products together, thus shifting the switching costs from the
monopoly market to the competitive one. Moreover, we find that total welfare
always decreases with bundling, as this pricing strategy reduces output in the
monopoly market and increases consumers’ transportation costs in the competi-
tive market.
The profitability of tying and bundling has been questioned for a long time
by economists. The leverage theory, according to which a firm would find it
profitable to tie its monopoly product with its competitive one in order to drive
its competitor out of the market, used to serve as a basis for several court decisions
in the U.S. in the first half of the twentieth century, such as International Business
Machines Corp. v. United States or Standard Oil Co. v. United States.1 But
this theory has been criticized by the Chicago School along the lines of the one-
monopoly profit argument.2
However, since Whinston [1990], the Chicago School argument against the
leverage theory has proven to be less robust than expected. Some authors have
showed that the exclusion of a competitor through tying could be profitable be-
cause of the presence of economies of scale (Whinston [1990], Nalebuff [2004]),
network effects (Carlton and Waldman [2002]), or a phase of risky R&D invest-
ment (Choi and Stefanadis [2001]).
Other authors have demonstrated that tying could be a dominant strategy
without exclusion of the competitor. Tying might serve as a product differentia-
tion strategy, which can increase both duopolists’ profits (Carbajo, de Meza and
Seidmann [1990], Chen [1997]). It might also be used as a rent-shifting strategy,
allowing the monopolist to extract some of the surplus generated by the chal-
lenger’s superior complementary product (Carlton, Gans and Waldman [2010]),
or it might be profitable because of the existence of a phase of R&D investment
(Choi [2004]).3
1International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), and Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), respectively.
2See, for example, Director and Levi [1956], Bowman [1957], Posner [1976], and Bork [1978].
See also Rey and Tirole [2007] for a review.
3See also Armstrong and Vickers [2010] for a model in which both firms can bundle their
products and compete through non-linear tariffs.
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To our knowledge, the only paper which introduces switching costs in the ty-
ing literature so far is the one by Carlton and Waldman [2012]. They introduce
switching costs in the complementary product market and show that tying can
be optimal when firms can either sell or lease their products to consumers. Their
analysis differs from ours because, in their paper, tying can also be optimal with-
out switching costs. Moreover, in their setting, switching costs are attached to
both firms’ products in the tied market. Hence, our paper is the first to introduce
switching costs as a potential reason for the dominance of a bundling strategy.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces
the model. The analysis is developed in Section 5.3 and we draw welfare impli-
cations in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The model
5.2.1 Model set-up
There are two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, and two products, A and B. The market
for product A is called the primary market and the market for product B is called
the secondary market. Both markets are of size t. The products are independent,
that is, buying A is not required in order to consume B, and vice-versa. Firm
1 can be active in both markets, whereas firm 2 can be active in the market for
product B only.1
The market for product B is competitive and is represented by a Hotelling
line as in Klemperer [1987]. Firms 1 and 2 are located at positions 0 and t,
respectively. Consumers are uniformly distributed with unit density along the
line segment. A consumer located at x ∈ [0, t] has a transportation cost x when
buying product B from firm 1 and a transportation cost (t − x) when buying
product B from firm 2. All consumers have the same reservation price r for
product B, which is assumed to be high enough to ensure full participation.
They make a discrete choice between buying one product or the other.
In the market for product A, all consumers have the same reservation price,
V , and do not face any transportation cost. Firm 1 can choose to sell its products
1Firm 1 can be a monopolist in market for product A because it is the owner of a patent,
for instance.
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A and B independently, or together in a bundle.1 Without loss of generality, we
normalize product A’s marginal cost to zero.
We consider a two-period setting where t1 denotes the first period and t2 the
second one. In each period T ∈ {t1, t2}, firm 1 sets a price pTA for product A, and
firm i ∈ {1, 2}, sets a price pTi for product B. If firm 1 chooses to bundle, it sets
a price P¯ T for the bundle, whereas firm 2 sets a price p¯T2 for product B.
We make the standard assumption that consumers have independent prefer-
ences across periods for product B, so that they all relocate on the line segment
between period t1 and period t2.2
The market for product B is a market without exit costs, whereas market for
product A is a market with exit costs. An exit cost is a switching cost a consumer
has to incur when she stops consuming the good.3 That is, when a consumer buys
product A from firm 1 in period t1, she has to bear an exit cost of s ≥ 0 if she
stops consuming product A from firm 1 in period t2.4 When firm 1 only sells
the bundle A&B, this exit cost is transferred to the bundle and it becomes the
exit cost that consumers have to bear if they buy the bundle A&B from firm 1
in period t1 and buy product B from firm 2 in period t2. We assume that all
consumers have the same exit cost.
The timing of the game is as follows. Before the first period starts, firm 1
(the monopolist) chooses whether or not to bundle its products. Then, in the
first period of the game, both firms set their first-period prices (P¯ t1 and p¯t12 if
firm 1 bundles, or pt1A , p
t1
1 and p
t1
2 if it does not), and consumers make their
purchasing decisions. In the second period of the game, consumers relocate on
the line segment, and firms set their second-period prices (P¯ t2 and p¯t22 if firm 1
bundles, or pt2A , p
t2
1 and p
t2
2 if it does not), and consumers make their purchasing
decisions.
We define qTi and π
T
i as firm i’s quantity and profit in period T , respectively.
Firms and consumers have the same discount factor δ, which we normalize to 1.5
1Throughout this chapter, “bundling” refers to pure bundling (or package tie-in).
2See, e.g., von Weizsa¨cker [1984], Klemperer [1987], Caminal and Matutes [1990], Shin and
Sudhir [2009], Chen and Pearcy [2010], and Rhodes [2012], who use second-period consumer’s
tastes for underlying product characteristics that are (or may be) independent of their first-
period tastes.
3Exit costs are sometimes also called ‘termination costs’ or ‘closing charges.’
4For example, s can be the shoe-leather cost of closing an account.
5This normalization is relaxed for the welfare analysis.
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We denote by Πi = π
t1
i + π
t2
i the total profit of firm i at the beginning of the
two-period game.
5.2.2 Bundling without exit costs
As a benchmark, we study how a bundling strategy influences the equilibrium
outcome when there are no exit costs attached to any of the products (i.e., s = 0).
This preliminary section is close to the one in Choi [2004].1 We show below
that bundling is not profitable per se. Hence, all the profit-increase induced by
bundling in our general model will be due to the existence of switching costs.
Independent pricing. When the monopolist does not bundle its products, the
equilibrium in period t1 is similar to the one in period t2, as profits in period t2
do not depend on period t1 market shares.
In the market for product A, which is of size t, firm 1 is a monopolist, and
all the consumers have the same valuation V . Therefore, firm 1 sets pTA = V and
earns a per-period profit of tV in this market. In the market for product B we
have a standard Hotelling game, hence, the equilibrium prices are pT∗i = c+ t, for
i ∈ {1, 2} and T ∈ {t1, t2}, and both firms earn t2/2 in each period.
Summing profits in all markets, firms 1 and 2 earn the following total profits:{
Π1 = π
t1
1 + π
t2
1 = t
2 + 2tV,
Π2 = π
t1
2 + π
t2
2 = t
2.
(5.1)
Bundling. When the monopolist chooses to bundle its products, similar to the
previous case, as profits in period t2 do not depend on period t1 market shares,
the equilibrium in period t1 is similar to the one in period t2.
A consumer located at x buys the bundle A&B from firm 1 rather than firm
2’s B product if and only if r+V − P¯ T − x ≥ r− p¯T2 − (t− x), with T ∈ {t1, t2}.
The first-order condition gives the equilibrium prices P¯ T∗ = c + t + V/3 and
p¯T∗2 = c + t − V/3, and the equilibrium quantities are q¯T∗1 = t/2 + V/6 and
q¯T∗2 = t/2− V/6.
1Both models are slightly different, as we use the two-period setting of Klemperer [1987],
with a market size of t and a unit transportation cost of 1, whereas Choi [2004] uses a market
size of 1 and a unit transportation cost of t, in a one-period setting.
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Similar to Choi [2004], we make the following assumption:
Assumption 5.1. V < 3t.
From the equilibrium demands, we can see that Assumption 5.1 ensures that
firm 2 is never excluded from the market when firm 1 bundles its products, and
when there are no exit costs attached to any product. Under this assumption,
firms 1 and 2 earn the following profits:{
Π¯1 = π¯
t1
1 + π¯
t2
1 = t
2 + 2tV
3
+ V
2
9
,
Π¯2 = π¯
t1
2 + π¯
t2
2 = t
2 − 2tV
3
+ V
2
9
.
(5.2)
We can then state the following result:
Lemma 5.1. Under Assumption 5.1, bundling is never a profit-maximizing strat-
egy for the monopolist when there are no exit costs attached to the tying good.
Proof. We have Π¯1−Π1 = V3 (V3 −4t). Hence, Π¯1−Π1 > 0⇔ V > 12t. Therefore,
under Assumption 5.1, bundling is never a profit-maximizing strategy for firm 1
when there are no exit costs attached to the tying good.
As under Assumption 5.1 bundling is not a profitable strategy per se, this
highlights the importance of exit costs in our analysis.1
5.3 Bundling and asymmetric exit costs
We now consider that the tying good is a product with consumer exit costs. That
is, if a consumer buys the tying good in the first period, she has to buy it also in
the second period, or to incur an exit cost s ≥ 0.
5.3.1 Independent sales
When the monopolist does not tie its products, then it sets different prices in
markets for products A and B.
In the market for product A, as consumers are rational and their total utility
of buying product A in both periods is 2V , firm 1 cannot set a first-period price
1See Carbajo, de Meza and Seidmann [1990] and Chen [1997] for an analysis in which
bundling can be a profitable product-differentiation strategy per se.
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for product A higher than V − s; otherwise consumers will never buy product
A. Indeed, a consumer who bought product A in period t1 is indifferent between
buying or not product A in period t2 if pt2A = V + s. Therefore, the monopolist
extracts all consumers’ surplus in the market for product A by setting prices
pt1A = V − s and pt2A = V + s.
As there are no exit costs in the market for product B, we have a standard
Hotelling game, as for the case of independent sales without exit costs.
To sum up, when firm 1 sells its products independently, the firms’ total profits
are the same as in the case of independent sales without exit costs, as expressed
in equation (5.1).
5.3.2 Tie-in sales
We now study under which conditions bundling with exit costs can be profitable,
when the monopolist’s competitor is not excluded from the tied product market.
This section’s model builds on Klemperer [1987], but also departs from his analy-
sis because only firm 1 can attach switching costs to its product (the bundle) and
we consider that all consumers (and not only a fraction of them) have changing
tastes from one period to another.
5.3.2.1 Second period
Consider that a fraction σ of consumers bought from firm 1 in the first period
while the remaining fraction (1 − σ) bought from firm 2. Let us assume that
both firms sold a positive number of outputs in period t1 (i.e., 0 < σ < 1). All
consumers now have uniformly redistributed tastes for firms’ B products.
Consider a firm 1’s first period consumer, located at x in the second period.
She buys firm 1’s bundle in period t2 if and only if:
r + V − P¯ t2 − x ≥ r − p¯t22 − s− (t− x); (5.3)
otherwise, she buys firm 2’s product B only.
Now, consider a firm 2’s first period consumer, located at x in the second
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period. She buys firm 2’s product in period t2 if and only if:
r + V − P¯ t2 − x ≤ r − p¯t22 − (t− x); (5.4)
otherwise, she buys firm 1’s bundle.
Following Klemperer [1987], we assume that at least one consumer, but not
all, switch from firm 1 to firm 2, and vice-versa, between periods. Therefore,
the period-t2 consumers whose tastes match perfectly with firm 1’s product B
(i.e., located at x = 0) must buy the bundle from firm 1. This implies that some
consumers who previously bought firm 1’s bundle also buy it in the second period.
Using equation (5.3), it must be that t+ p¯t22 − P¯ t2 + s+ V ≥ 0. Similarly, some
consumers who bought from firm 2 in the first period now buy firm 1’s bundle,
and, hence, using equation (5.4) with the reversed inequality sign, it must be that
t+ p¯t22 − P¯ t2 + V ≥ 0.
Respectively, the period-t2 consumers whose tastes match perfectly with firm
2’s product B (i.e., located at x = t) must buy this product. Some consumers
who bought from firm 1 in the first period buy from firm 2 in the second period.
Using equation (5.3) with the reversed inequality sign, it must be that t+ P¯ t2 −
p¯t22 − s − V ≥ 0. Similarly, some consumers who bought from firm 2 in the first
period now buy firm 1’s bundle, and, hence, using equation (5.4), it must be that
t+ P¯ t2 − p¯t22 − V ≥ 0.
These four conditions can be summarized as follows:
Condition 5.1. t ≥ |p¯t22 − P¯ t2 + s+ V | and t ≥ |p¯t22 − P¯ t2 + V |.
This condition is more restrictive than q¯t2∗2 > 0 only (i.e., non-exclusion of the
competitor), because it requires that firm 2 sells to both type of consumers in
period t2 (i.e., both to loyal and switching consumers).
Under Condition 5.1, we obtain the following second-period demand system:{
q¯t21 =
1
2
[σ(t+ p¯t22 − P¯ t2 + s+ V ) + (1− σ)(p¯t22 − P¯ t2 + t+ V )],
q¯t22 =
1
2
[σ(t+ P¯ t2 − p¯t22 − s− V ) + (1− σ)(P¯ t2 − p¯t22 + t− V )].
(5.5)
The first-order conditions for the two firms are ∂π¯t21 /∂P¯
t2 = ∂[(P¯ t2−c)q¯t21 ]/∂P¯ t2 =
0 and ∂π¯t22 /∂p¯
t2
2 = ∂[(p¯
t2
2 − c)q¯t22 ]/∂p¯t22 = 0.
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Period-t2 equilibrium prices and outputs are:{
P¯ t2∗ = c+ t+ V+sσ
3
,
p¯t2∗2 = c+ t− V+sσ3 ;
and
{
q¯t2∗1 =
t
2
+ V+sσ
6
,
q¯t2∗2 =
t
2
− V+sσ
6
.
(5.6)
The second-period second-order conditions are satisfied, as ∂2π¯t21 /(∂P¯
t2)2 =
−1 < 0 and ∂2π¯t22 /(∂p¯t22 )2 = −1 < 0.
From equation (5.6), we see that, for a given first-period firm-1 demand σ,
when firm 1 bundles its products, firm 2 is more aggressive than when firm 1 sells
under independent pricing (since p¯t2∗2 < p
t2∗
2 ). Moreover, exit costs make firm 2
even more aggressive. Nevertheless, we see from equation (5.6) that firm 2 serves
less consumers than under bundling without exit costs.
The resulting period-t2 equilibrium profits are:{
π¯t21 =
1
18
(3t+ V + sσ)2,
π¯t22 =
1
18
(3t− V − sσ)2. (5.7)
5.3.2.2 First period
We now analyze the first period of the game. Given period-t2 profits, and condi-
tional on σ, we can write the total profits as follows:{
Π¯1 = (P¯
t1 − c)tσ(P¯ t1, p¯t12 ) + 118(3t+ V + sσ(P¯ t1, p¯t12 ))2,
Π¯2 = (p¯
t1
2 − c)t(1− σ(P¯ t1, p¯t12 )) + 118(3t− V − sσ(P¯ t1, p¯t12 ))2.
(5.8)
We assume that consumers make rational expectations about firms’ second-
period prices. Consumers observe their first-period position in the market, but
they do not know what will be their position on the market line in the second
period.
Consider a first-period consumer located at z. Her first-period surplus from
buying from firms 1 and 2 are (r+V − P¯ t1− z) and (r− p¯t12 − t+ z), respectively.
If she chooses to buy from firm 1 in period t1, she will be indifferent between
purchasing the bundle from firm 1 or product B from firm 2 if she locates at xˆ,
defined such that r+V −P¯ t2− xˆ = r− p¯t22 −s−(t− xˆ). Therefore, this consumer’s
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second-period surplus is:
CSt21 =
1
t
∫ xˆ
0
(r + V − P¯ t2(σ)− x) dx+ 1
t
∫ t
xˆ
(r − p¯t22 (σ)− t− s+ x) dx,
(5.9)
with xˆ = (t+ p¯t22 (σ)− P¯ t2(σ) + V + s)/2.
Similarly, if she chooses to buy from firm 2 in period t1, she will be a period-
t2 marginal consumer if she locates at yˆ, defined such that r + V − P¯ t2 − yˆ =
r − p¯t22 − (t− yˆ). Therefore, her second-period surplus is:
CSt22 =
1
t
∫ yˆ
0
(r + V − P¯ t2(σ)− x) dx+ 1
t
∫ t
yˆ
(r − p¯t22 (σ)− t+ x) dx, (5.10)
with yˆ = (t+ p¯t22 (σ)− P¯ t2(σ) + V )/2.
We know that the first-period marginal consumer is located at z = σt and
is indifferent between buying from firm 1 or from firm 2, having rational expec-
tations about the second period outcome. Therefore, this indifferent consumer
obtains the same surplus under both choices:
(r + V − P¯ t1 − σt) + CSt21 = (r − p¯t12 − t+ σt) + CSt22 . (5.11)
Using second-period equilibrium prices from equation (5.6) and consumer sur-
plus values from equations (5.9) and (5.10), we solve for σ in equation (5.11). We
obtain:
σˆ(P¯ t1, p¯t12 ) =
3
4
+ 3t
s2+6t2
[p¯t12 − P¯ t1 + V (1 + s6t)− s+t2 ]. (5.12)
It is to be noted that tσˆ(P¯ t1, p¯t12 ) corresponds to firm 1’s demand in period t1,
when consumers have rational expectations about second-period prices.
Plugging σˆ(P¯ t1, p¯t12 ) into equation (5.8), we can now solve the following first-
order conditions for the first period: ∂Π¯1/∂P¯
t1 = 0 and ∂Π¯2/∂p¯
t1
2 = 0. Moreover,
it can be easily verified that the second-order conditions for the first period are
satisfied, as ∂2Π¯1/(∂P¯
t2)2 = ∂2Π¯2/(∂p¯
t2
2 )
2 = (−5s2t2 − 36t4)/(s2 + 6t2)2, and
t > 0.
As ∂σˆ/∂P¯ t1 < 0 from equation (5.12) and ∂π¯t21 /∂σ > 0 from equation (5.7),
we have ∂π¯t11 /∂P¯
t1 > 0. That is, firm 1 competes more aggressively in period t1
than if there were no exit costs. Similarly, as ∂π¯t22 /∂σ < 0 from equation (5.7) and
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because 3t− V − sσ > 0 from equation (5.6), and as ∂σˆ/∂p¯t12 > 0 from equation
(5.12), we find that ∂π¯t12 /∂p¯
t1
2 > 0; firm 2 also competes more aggressively in
period t1 than if there were no exit costs to be borne in period t2. Moreover, we
have demonstrated, in Section 5.2, that when firm 1 bundles its products in the
absence of exit costs, both firms commit to a more competitive pricing strategy
than with independent pricing. Hence, in the first period of this game with exit
costs, both firms price more aggressively than in the case of independent pricing.
From the first-order conditions, we obtain the first-period equilibrium prices
and demands: {
P¯ t1∗ = c+ t+ V
3
+ s
6
[ s
t
− 3 + s2+3st−2sV+6tV
7s2+54t2
],
p¯t1∗2 = c+ t− V3 + s6 [ st − 1− s
2+3st−2sV+6tV
7s2+54t2
],
(5.13)
and {
q¯t1∗1 =
3t
4
+ t[V (7s+18t)−9t(s+3t)]
2(7s2+54t2)
,
q¯t1∗2 =
t
4
− t[V (7s+18t)−9t(s+3t)]
2(7s2+54t2)
.
(5.14)
We can finally formulate firm 1’s total equilibrium profits:
Π¯1 = t
2 + 2tV
3
+ V
2
9
+ s( 5s
32
− t
6
+ 5V
24
)
+ s
7s2+54t2
( stV
6
− 17s2t
24
− 7st2
16
− 29t2V
4
+ 7sV
2
72
+ 5tV
2
2
)
− st2
(7s2+54t2)2
( s
3
16
− 9s2t
4
+ 13s
2V
4
+ sV
2
4
+ 9tV 2).
(5.15)
5.3.3 Bundling incentives
We now analyze firm 1’s bundling incentives. Bundling is a profitable strategy
if D(t, V, s) ≡ Π¯1 − Π1 ≥ 0, where Π1 and Π¯1 are defined in equations (5.1) and
(5.15), respectively.
Before stating our main result, we need to define smax(V, t), which delimits
the equilibrium domain for which both types of consumers (loyal and switching)
exist for both firms in period t2. More precisely, smax(V, t) is the maximum value
of s for which we have 0 < σ(P¯ t1∗, p¯t1∗2 ) < 1 and Condition 5.1 is satisfied, where
σ(P¯ t1∗, p¯t1∗2 ) is given by equation (5.13).
We can now state our main result:
Proposition 5.1. There exists at least one couple (s, V ) for which firm 1 is
better-off when bundling, for any t.
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Proof. See Appendix 5.6.1.
Proposition 5.1 demonstrates analytically that bundling might be profitable
for the monopolist when switching costs are attached to the tying product, with-
out exclusion of the competitor. This result is obtained by demonstrating that
there always exists at least one value of exit cost for which the competitor is not
excluded and for which bundling is profitable, at V = 0.
Even though bundling might be a profitable strategy, it would be interesting
to know for which range of switching costs this is the case. However, we cannot
answer this question relying on analytical solutions. In what follows, we therefore
normalize the market size parameter t to 1 in order to analyze graphically firm
1’s incentives to bundle.1
We plot smax(V, 1) in dashed line, which delimits the equilibrium domain. We
can verify that smax(V, t) crosses the horizontal axis at V = 3t, as we can see
that smax(3, 1) = 0. Moreover, we plot s¯(V, 1) in solid line, which represents
the couple values (s, V ) for which the monopolist is indifferent between bundling
and independent sales. For all parameters above this line that belong to the
equilibrium domain, bundling is a profit-maximizing strategy. Figure 5.1 below
shows that bundling is not always profitable, even if asymmetric exit costs are
set up from this strategy.
We can then state the following result:
Proposition 5.2. When t = 1, bundling can be a dominant non-exclusionary
strategy for firm 1 if consumers’ valuation for product A is low enough and if exit
costs associated with this product are high enough.
Proof. Numerical Proof. See Appendix 5.6.2.
Proposition 5.2 shows that a bundling strategy is only profitable for low con-
sumers’ valuations for the tying product and for exit costs above s¯(V, t). Oth-
erwise, independent sales of products is the most profitable strategy for the mo-
nopolist.
When some exit costs are attached to the bundle, firm 1 has an incentive
to be more aggressive in the first period in order to capture a large number
1We also performed some robustness checks with other market size values. Our results
remain unchanged.
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Figure 5.1: Firm 1’s incentive to bundle when t = 1
of consumers which could be exploited in the second period. However, when
it chooses to bundle its products, firm 1 incurs a profit loss in the monopolized
market as it reduces its output in this market. Therefore, tie-in sales are profitable
only when captive consumers bring about large second-period profits (i.e., s is
large) and when the profit loss in the monopolized market is limited (i.e., V is
small).
It is to be noted that, even with a pure exit cost asymmetry (i.e., for V = 0),
bundling is not always a profitable choice. This result, which could seem peculiar
at first, may be seen as the asymmetric version of Klemperer [1987], who showed
that, in a symmetric setting with rational consumers whose tastes are independent
between periods, firms are worse-off with exit costs. By contrast, in our setting,
firm 1 might be better-off with the asymmetric exit costs it sets when bundling
its products together.
Whereas the monopolist might be better-off with bundling, it is also interest-
ing to analyze the impact of this strategy on its competitor:
Corollary 5.1. When t = 1, firm 2 is worse-off when firm 1 bundles its products.
Proof. Numerical Proof. See Appendix 5.6.3.
Whereas bundling can be profitable for the monopolist for a certain range of
parameters, it is never profitable for the challenger that the monopolist bundles
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its products together. Therefore, a mono-line supplier is hurt when tying is a
profitable strategy for the multi-product firm. The effects of bundling on the
mono-line suppliers’ profits, and, hence, on competition, is at the core of the
antitrust debate (see, e.g., the European Commission’s Sector Inquiry on retail
banking).
Nevertheless, our analysis only focuses on tying as a non-exclusionary strategy;
so the effect on competition is limited. But one could easily conjecture that the
presence of switching costs might also lead to tying being a dominant exclusionary
strategy for the monopolist.
5.4 Welfare analysis
In this section, we analyze the welfare impact of bundling with asymmetric switch-
ing costs.
Independent sales. With independent sales, there is a duopoly in the market
for product B and a monopoly in the market for product A. Both markets are
covered, as consumers’ reservation value in market for product A (i.e., V ), is
uniform and consumers’ reservation value in market for product B (i.e., r), is
uniform and high enough (i.e., r >> t). Consumers’ total transportation costs
are minimized, and equal t2/4, as the indifferent consumer is located at position
t/2, the middle of the Hotelling line. Hence, total welfare is easily calculated and
equals (1 + δ)[V t+ (r − c)t− t2/4].
Tie-in sales. With tie-in sales and without exclusion of the competitor, the
market for product B is covered. However, the sales in the market for product
A are lower than under independent sales and they equal q¯t1∗1 in period t1 and
q¯t2∗1 in period t2, with q¯
ti∗
1 ≤ t, ∀i. Moreover, the total consumers’ transportation
costs are greater than or equal to t2/4 in each period (they are equal to t2/4, the
minimum, if the indifferent consumer is located at t/2), and there is a welfare
loss from incurred consumer switching costs with bundling. We can then state
the following result:
Proposition 5.3. Total welfare decreases with bundling.
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Proof. The market for product B is always covered. With independent sales,
there is no switching consumer, and, hence, the allocation is first-best. With
bundling, we observe a departure from this first-best, as there are some switching
consumers.
Proposition 5.3 simply states that, as the only welfare effect of bundling is to
reduce output in market for product A, to increase the consumers’ transportation
costs, and to create consumer switching costs, then total welfare decreases with
bundling.
Whereas bundling has a negative impact on total welfare, its effect on con-
sumer surplus is ambiguous. On the one hand, as indicated above, in market
for product B, consumer surplus decreases with bundling. On the other hand,
the impact of bundling is positive in market for product A, as consumer surplus
equals zero under independent pricing (because the firm extracts all surplus). In
the end, the overall effect of bundling on consumer surplus is indeterminate.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we elaborated a new rationale for product bundling. We demon-
strated that bundling can be a profitable strategy when consumer switching costs
are attached to the product which is solely sold by the monopolist.
We showed that bundling might be a dominant strategy when compared to
independent pricing, without exclusion of the competitor from the competitive
market. This result holds as long as the switching costs associated with the
monopolized product are high, and that the consumers’ valuation for this mo-
nopolized product is low. The monopolist hence has an incentive to develop
switching costs (e.g., administrative burdens) and then to tie its products. We
also demonstrated that bundling always reduces total welfare.
Our model explains why bundling is a popular strategy in markets with switch-
ing costs, such as mobile communications and banking services, or retail bank-
ing, as observed by the European Commission. Finally, our welfare analysis can
explain why specific rules, such as the Section 106 of the U.S. Bank Holding
Company Act, might be necessary to deal with tying and bundling strategies in
markets with switching costs.
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5.6 Appendix: Omitted proofs
5.6.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
We first determine smax(0, t). For V = 0, Condition 5.1 is equivalent to t ≥
max{2sσ/3, s(1−2σ/3)}. We have smax(0, t) = min{s1, s2}, with s1 and s2 being
the solutions to the equations t = 2sσ/3, and t = s(1−2σ/3), respectively. Using
equations (5.12) and (5.13), we obtain
s1 = t[
20
21
+ 178∗2
2
3
21(−28381+189√22865) 13
− 2
1
3
21
(−28381 + 189√22865) 13 ],
s1 ≈ 2.9111t,
(5.16)
and
s2 = t[
8
21
+ 724∗2
2
3
21(−26905+189√41513) 13
− 2
1
3
21
(−26905 + 189√41513) 13 ],
s2 ≈ 1.44007t.
(5.17)
Therefore, smax(0, t) = s2, and it is positive for any t > 0.
We now demonstrate that it is always profitable for firm 1 to engage in
bundling when V = 0 and s = smax(0, t). Plugging smax(0, t) into D(t, V, s), we
obtain D(t, 0, smax(0, t)) ≈ 0.0412791t2. Hence, we have D(t, 0, smax(0, t)) ≥ 0,
as t > 0. Therefore, it is always a dominant strategy for firm 1 to bundle its
product when V = 0 and s = smax(0, t).
5.6.2 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Plotting smax(V, t) over V ∈ [0, 3t] for t = 1 shows us that smax(V, 1) < 4. We
look for s ∈ [0, 4] solving the equation D(1, V, s) = 0.
We find numerically that only one real and positive solution to the equation
D(1, V, s) = 0 exists for V ∈ [0, 3t]. We call this solution s¯(V, 1). s¯(V, 1) always
exists, and is unique, for V ∈ [0, 3t], s ∈ [0, 4], and t = 1. Therefore, there exists
only one or zero real positive solution to the equation D(1, V, s¯(V, 1)) = 0 on the
equilibrium domain, as illustrated by Figure 5.1. Moreover, from Figure 5.1, we
can see that the only profitable bundling zone corresponds to low V and high s
values.
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5.6.3 Proof of Corollary 5.1
From equations (5.13) and (5.14), we can calculate firm 2’s profit when firm 1
ties its products together:
Π¯2 = t
2 − 2tV
3
+ V
2
9
+ s( 7s
96
− t
6
+ V
24
)
+ s
7s2+54t2
(−stV
6
− 13s2t
24
+ st
2
16
− 25t2V
4
+ 7sV
2
72
+ 5V
2
2
)
− st2
(7s2+54t2)2
( s
3
16
− 9s2t
4
+ 13s
2V
4
+ sV
2
4
+ 9tV 2).
(5.18)
From equations (5.1) and (5.18), we can compute D2(t, V, s) = Π¯2 −Π2, that
is, the difference in firm 2’s profits between the bundling and independent sales
situations.
We look for the solution of the equation D2(t = 1, V, s) = 0. We call s¯2(V, 1)
the real positive solution to the equation D2(1, V, s) = 0, for V ∈ [0, 3t], s ∈ [0, 5],
and t = 1. We find that s¯2(V, 1) exists and is unique. We plot s¯2(V, 1), the exit
costs from which it is profitable for firm 2 that firm 1 only sells bundles.
Figure 5.2: Difference in firm 2’s profit when t = 1
We see from Figure 5.2 that, on the existence domain defined by s ≤ smax(V, 1),
it is never profitable for firm 2 that firm 1 bundles its product into a bundle. It
is to be noted that this domain is defined such as firm 2 is never excluded from
the market; so firm 2 always makes a positive profit.
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Chapter 6
On the Antitrust Economics of
the Electronic Books Industry
6.1 Introduction
Following the 2007 introduction of the Amazon Kindle device, the market for
electronic books (ebooks) has grown from negligible to over $4 billion a year.
During this time, the prices of ebooks have evolved in an interesting way. Orig-
inally, Amazon was effectively a monopolist distributor, and it sold ebooks at
prices close to (and sometimes less than) the wholesale prices it paid to publish-
ers. When Apple entered the ebook market with its own ebook store and its own
electronic reader device (ereader), the iPad, it set up a new contract mode with
publishers. This so-called “agency contract” differs from the classic “wholesale
contract” used between Amazon and publishers in that it allowed publishers to
set the retail price of ebooks. With this type of contract, Apple sells access to
ebooks provided by publishers, and earns a share of revenue from ebook sales. Of
course, Apple and Amazon also make some profit selling their ereaders. Following
Apple’s entry in the market, the major publishers forced Amazon to change its
wholesale agreements to agency contracts.
This move had multiple effects. Because ebook prices have (apparently) gone
up, a class-action was launched against Apple and the main publishers in the U.S.
in August 2011, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a suit against Apple
and the publishers in April 2012. Simultaneously, the European Commission (EC)
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started to investigate the case. Both the DOJ and the EC claimed that Apple
and the major publishers colluded on the type of contract (the agency contract)
in order to raise ebook prices and earn supra-competitive profits. Therefore they
have asked the major publishers to terminate their agency contracts with Amazon.
The authorities’ decisions were based on the collusive behavior, and the impos-
sibility for distributors such as Amazon to set the retail price.1 However, antitrust
investigations surprisingly disregarded the pricing of ereaders which give access to
ebooks. In this paper, we study the relation between these prices and the ebook
prices. There are some evidence that ereader and ebook prices are somehow re-
lated. For instance, Jeff Bezos, Amazon’s CEO and founder, claimed that it sets
low prices for its Kindle. “We sell the hardware at cost (...). We want to make
money when people use our devices, not when they buy them,” he explained in
a BBC interview in October 2012, 11th.2
The “agency mode” we study in this paper, by which the publisher is allowed
to set the retail price is related to the literature on resale price maintenance
(RPM). Whereas RPM is not per se forbidden in the U.S., it is still carefully
scrutinized by competition authorities, notably because of its collusive power (see,
e.g., Jullien and Rey [2007], Dobson and Waterson [2007], Rey and Verge´ [2008,
2010]). Note that the legal difference between RPM and agency mode is that
distributors do not sell any product (nor do they have any stock) in the agency
mode; they only sell a license to use the publishers’ products (see Stoeppelwerth
[2011]).
In this paper, we study distortions arising in both wholesale and agency
modes. We analyze the equilibrium outcomes in both modes and, in particu-
lar, how retail prices compare to each other. More specifically, we show that in
equilibrium the agency mode retail price can be higher than (or equal to) that
in the wholesale mode, but that many common demand forms used in economics
modeling restrict the analysis and induce a lower price in the agency mode.
We also extend the literature on two-part tariffs by a monopoly by introducing
1See Genesove and Mullin [2001] for a collusion case on the type of contracts used in the
sugar industry.
2Losing money on one product while making profit on another is a well-known practice,
called loss leading (Ambrus and Weinstein [2008], Chen and Rey [2012]). But in the present
case, the vertical relationship between publishers and distributors plays an important role which
is not captured by papers in the literature.
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heterogeneous consumer valuations for access to variable goods (see, e.g., Oi
[1971], Schmalensee [1981]; and Varian [1989], and Wilson [1997] for reviews).
Our analysis also relates more broadly to the literature on multi-dimensional
non-linear pricing (see Rochet and Stole [2002], and Veiga and Weyl [2012]).
Research on the ebook market is in its early stages, and the focus of the exist-
ing papers of which we are aware is quite different from ours. The closest work to
ours is likely Johnson [2012b], who concentrates on the role that most favoured
nation clauses play under both types of contracting arrangement. In another pa-
per, Johnson [2012a] focuses on the role played by switching costs consumers face
when changing distributor. Abhishek, Jerath and Zhang [2013] study entry and
compare equilibrium outcomes in wholesale and agency modes when a monopolist
publisher sells online goods through two competing distributors and this impacts
its traditional brick-and-mortar business through spillovers. Importantly, note
that none of the aforementioned papers consider ereader devices. Gans [2012],
on the other hand, considers both media and devices but does not examine the
impact of wholesale versus agency contracts.
Whereas we motivate this paper with examples from the ebook industry, our
results also apply to other industries where an access device is valuable and allows
consumers to buy some variable goods, such as telephony, or mobile applications.
The rest of this paper is as follows. In Section 6.2, we study a simple model
in order to compare distortions arising when two vertically-related monopolists
contract using the wholesale or the agency mode. In doing so, we show that,
while wholesale mode often leads to higher prices than agency, this result is by
no means general, and we explore the circumstances under which the opposite is
true. In Section 6.3 we introduce the sale of ereaders and show that, when this
ingredient is present, it can lead firms to set higher ebook prices in the agency
mode than in the wholesale mode. Section 6.4 concludes.
6.2 Economics of “simple” wholesale and agency
modes
In this section, we study the simplest case of vertically related monopolists con-
tracting in either “wholesale mode” or the “agency mode.” We first show that,
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when demand for ebooks is of constant elasticity, the two modes always lead
to the same equilibrium price. We then proceed to more general analysis, both
by developing a simple, graphical representation of firms’ pricing incentives and
by considering the adjustable pass through class of demand functions [Fabinger
and Weyl, 2012], whose flexibility allows for the equality arising under constant
elasticity to be broken in either direction.
6.2.1 The basic model
A single publisher sells products to a single distributor, which then sells to final
consumers. Assume that demand for the product, D(·), is twice-differentiable
and decreasing in the retail price p. We call p(·) the inverse demand function.
Assume that the publisher faces a constant marginal cost c ≥ 0 for each product.1
We now describe the two pricing arrangements.
Wholesale mode. The publisher chooses a wholesale price at which it sells (or
licenses) products to the distributor. The distributor is then free to set the final
price consumers must pay to purchase each unit. Formally, in the first stage, the
publisher sets w, and, in the second stage, the distributor sets pw. Such a model
roughly corresponds to the terms under which Amazon and ebook publishers
interacted before Apple’s entry in the market.
Agency mode. The distributor announces a share of the total sales revenue
that it will keep, offering the complementary share to the publisher. The publisher
then sets the final price. Formally, in the first stage, the distributor sets the
revenue share α ∈ [0, 1], and, in the second stage, the publisher sets pa. This
model more closely fits the arrangement that has prevailed between publishers
and both Amazon and Apple, after the latter’s entry into the market in 2010.
Before analyzing the results, we briefly motivate the modeling setup. An
initial concern may be that, by comparing these two modes with one another in
this way, we are, in addition, reversing the bargaining power of the two firms.
1For these digital goods, physical marginal cost is likely best approximated by zero; however,
if publishers’ contracts with digital good authors or developers require the former to pay a
royalty to the latter for each unit sold, marginal cost may effectively be positive. See below in
this section for further discussion of this issue.
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While we are sympathetic to this potential criticism, we believe, for the following
reasons, that this approach is the most reasonable one for the current analysis.
First, the sine qua non of a comparison between these two modes is that, under
wholesale, the distributor sets the final price, whereas, under agency, the publisher
sets the final price. Second, given this first point, among the “simple” timing
arrangements, the one that we have chosen for each mode is the only one that
leads to a reasonable equilibrium prediction.
For example, if, in agency mode, the publisher moves first, then, assuming it
chooses a price that is both itself nonzero and that leads to nonzero book sales,
i.e., p ∈ (0, pmax), then the distributor will always set α equal to one, extracting
all revenue. Anticipating this, so long as c > 0, the publisher will always choose
some p ≥ pmax, causing the market to break down. If the two move simultane-
ously, a similar result holds. Thus, the only feasible way to “hold fixed” the two
firms’ bargaining power while comparing the two modes would involves introduc-
ing significant additional machinery to the model (e.g., using Nash Bargaining
Solution) at the cost of significant additional complication. Moreover, to the ex-
tent final prices are, in fact, easier to adjust on a rolling basis than inter-firm
transfer arrangements, the timing we assume may indeed be quite realistic.
6.2.2 Constant elasticity demand
Let us first consider a simple example leading to striking results, in order to
motivate our analysis. Consider the case of constant-elasticity demand functions:
D(p) = βp−ǫ, with β > 0 and ǫ > 1. Assume that the publisher’s marginal cost
is strictly positive, i.e., c > 0. The game is solved by backward induction in both
modes.
Wholesale mode. In the last stage of the game in the wholesale mode, the
publisher has already set the wholesale price w. The distributor profit is then
πD(p) = (p − w)βp−ǫ. The first-order condition (FOC), ∂πD/∂p = 0, leads to
pw = ǫw/(ǫ− 1) in equilibrium.
In the first stage of the game, the publisher sets w in order to maximize its
profit πP (w) = (w − c)βp−ǫw , with the price pw derived as above. The FOC,
∂πP/∂w = 0, gives us w = ǫc/(ǫ − 1) in equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium
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retail price pw in the wholesale mode in the constant-elasticity demand case is:
pw = c/(1− 1/ǫ)2.
Agency mode. In the last stage of the game in the agency mode, the distrib-
utor has already set the revenue share α. The publisher profit is then πP (p) =
[(1−α)p− c]βp−ǫ. The FOC, ∂πP/∂p = 0, induces that the publisher sets a price
pa = ǫ/(ǫ− 1) ∗ c/(1− α) in equilibrium.
In the first stage of the game, the distributor sets α in order to maximize
its profit πD(α) = αpaβp
−ǫ
a , with the price pa derived as above. The FOC,
∂πD/∂α = 0, leads to α = 1/ǫ in equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium retail price
pa in the agency mode in the constant-elasticity demand case, pa = c/(1− 1/ǫ)2,
equals pw. This result is summarized in Proposition 6.1 below.
Proposition 6.1. The equilibrium retail prices in the wholesale mode and in the
agency mode are equal when demand is of constant elasticity.
The results obtained in this simple example, namely that equilibrium retail
prices in both modes are equal when the demand function has a constant elasticity,
show that a deeper economic analysis is needed in order to determine the effect on
retail prices from a switch from one mode to the other. Below, we first present a
graphical analysis to give clearer insights, and then we provide analytical results.
6.2.3 Graphical analysis
In order to give a better intuition for our results, we assume, for this graphical
analysis only, that there exists some “maximum price,” pmax, at or above which
demand is zero, i.e., D(pmax) = 0, and that there exists some finite maximum
quantity demanded in the market when the price is zero, qmax ≡ D(0). (We allow
for vertical and horizontal demand function asymptotes in the analytical analysis
below.)
Zero marginal costs. First consider the case where c = 0. Here, it is immedi-
ately clear that, while the wholesale mode leads to double marginalization, and
thus an equilibrium price higher than pm, the one that would be charged by an in-
tegrated monopolist, the agency mode does not give distorted pricing incentives.
To see the latter point formally, note that a change in α constitutes a proportional
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reduction in the publisher’s profits, not just revenue, and thus the publisher never
has an incentive to deviate from pm (although, in this game’s unique SPE, the
distributor sets α = 1, and thus, the publisher receives no profits).1
General graphical analysis. We now analyze the pricing incentives that arise
more generally under the two modes. To do this, we appeal to a graphical rep-
resentation, for each mode, that illustrates the price-quantity pair that arises in
equilibrium. We now describe the “algorithm” one may use to draw such a graph
for each mode.For each mode, begin by drawing the final inverse demand curve,
p(q), and the (straight) marginal cost curve, c. Then draw the “market marginal
revenue curve,” MR(q) ≡ p(q) + qp′(q).
For wholesale mode, draw the “marginal revenue curve of the marginal revenue
curve,” MMR(q) ≡ MR(q) + qMR′(q). Then, simply take the intersection of
MMR(q) and c to determine the equilibrium quantity, q∗w. (pw ≡ p(q∗w) is then
the equilibrium price.) All curves in the wholesale mode are represented in Figure
6.1 below.
Figure 6.1: Equilibrium in the wholesale mode
For agency mode, first note that each candidate α causes a distinct degree
1When c = 0, agency mode closely resembles the “ultimatum game.”
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of rotation of the curves p(q) and MR(q), anchored, respectively, at the points
(qmax, 0) and (q˙, 0) (where q˙ is formally defined by MR(q˙) = 0). These rotated
curves represent the inverse demand curve and the marginal revenue curve facing
the publisher when it choses its price, given α (see the top graphic in Figure 6.2
below). Let α denote the highest value of α such that, if the distributor sets it
as such, the publisher cannot possibly earn positive profits (formally, let α be
defined implicitly by (1− α)p(0) = c).
For each α ∈ [0, α], find the intersection of the curve (1−α)MR(q) and c, as in
the bottom-left graphic in Figure 6.2, and then for each q defined by this intersec-
tion, trace out the curve of “prices,” ISC(q) ≡ (1−α(q))p(q). Define this curve as
the Input Supply Curve. This name follows from the fact that it reflects the set of
price-quantity pairs at which the distributor can “buy” products, under the inter-
pretation that it “sells” them at some point along the final market demand curve.
Next, draw the “Marginal Input Supply Curve,”MISC(q) ≡ ISC(q)+qISC ′(q).
To determine the equilibrium quantity, q∗a, take the intersection of MISC(q) and
MR(q), as in the bottom-right graphic in Figure 6.2. (pa ≡ p(q∗a) is then the
equilibrium price.)
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Building on this representation of the two sales modes, we now turn to an
analytical analysis.
6.2.4 Analytical results
We now determine necessary conditions for the retail equilibrium price in one
mode to be greater than the price in the other mode. We use the variables
defined previously.
We call R(q) = p(q)q the revenue of an hypothetic integrated monopolist. We
have the marginal revenue MR(q) = p(q) + qp′(q), and its derivative MR′(q) =
2p′(q) + qp′′(q). Thus, we have in the wholesale mode: MMR(q) = MR(q) +
qMR′(q) = p(q) + 3qp′(q) + q2p′′(q).
In the agency mode, we know from the publisher’s FOC that: 1 − α =
c/MR(q). Thus, ISC(q) = cp(q)/MR(q), andMISC(q) = ISC(q)+qISC ′(q) =
c(1 − R(q) ∗MR′(q)/MR2(q)). Finally, note that, from the second-order condi-
tion, we have, in any mode: 2p′(q) + qp′′(q) < 0. For exposition simplicity, we
omit function arguments in the following when they are not necessary.
The equilibrium in the wholesale mode can be defined as the intersection of
the MMR and c curves, or as the intersection of the MR and c− qMR′ curves.
Indeed, as MMR =MR + qMR′, we have:
MMR = c⇔MR = c− qMR′. (6.1)
Similarly, the equilibrium in the agency mode can be defined either as the
intersection of the MISC and MR curves, or the intersection of the marginal
cost c and MR3/(MR2 − R ∗MR′) curves. This is so because MISC = c(1 −
R ∗MR′/MR2), and, hence:
MISC =MR⇔ c = MR
3
MR2 −R ∗MR′ . (6.2)
We can thus use equilibrium functions that equal either marginal revenue or
cost to compare both modes.
Let us focus on equilibrium functions that equal marginal cost. We compare
cw(q) ≡ MR + qMR′ and ca(q) ≡ MR3/(MR2 − R ∗MR′). The two functions
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cw(q) and ca(q) give the marginal costs in the wholesale and agency modes, re-
spectively, for which the quantity q would be the equilibrium quantity in each
mode. In equilibrium, the agency mode price pa is lower than the wholesale mode
price pw when ca − cw > 0, and vice-versa. Indeed, ca − cw > 0 leads to a higher
equilibrium quantity in the agency mode than in the wholesale mode. We have:
ca − cw = −MR′
(
q − R ∗MR
MR2 −R ∗MR′
)
. (6.3)
Simple algebra shows that ca − cw > 0 is equivalent to:
qp′
p
< 1 +
qp′′
p′
, (6.4)
First, note that both the slope of the inverse demand function and its curvature
(or convexity), −qp′′/p′, play a role in how equilibrium prices in both modes
compare with each other.1 Furthermore, as stated in Proposition 6.2 below, we see
from inequality (6.4) that any concave demand function will lead to equilibrium
prices in the agency mode that are lower than that in the wholesale mode. Indeed,
concavity of demand is equivalent to p′′ < 0, ∀q, and thus 1 + qp′′/p′ > 1;
additionally, we know that qp′/p < 0, so the inequality (6.4) is always verified.
Proposition 6.2. In equilibrium, the agency mode retail price is lower than
the wholesale mode retail price when the demand function is concave (i.e., when
p′′ < 0, ∀q).
We can also express this condition over ca − cw as a function of the pass-
through rate dp/dc an hypothetical integrated monopolist would face; as with
constant marginal costs we have:
dp
dc
=
1
1− µ′ =
1
2 + qp
′′
p′
. (6.5)
Therefore, ca − cw > 0 is equivalent to:
dp
dc
<
ǫ
ǫ− 1 ⇔ µ
′ <
1
ǫ
, (6.6)
1From a variable change, we find that inequality (6.4) expressed as a function of the variable
p can be written as: D(p)/(pD′(p)) < 1−D(p)D′′(p)/D′(p)2.
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with ǫ = −p/q ∗ ∂q/∂p > 1.
We can thus find whether the equilibrium price is lower in the wholesale mode
or the agency mode by comparing the pass-through rate to the ratio ǫ/(ǫ− 1), as
expressed in Proposition 6.3 below.
Proposition 6.3. When the pass-through rate is greater (resp., lower) than the
ratio ǫ/(ǫ − 1) for any positive quantity, the equilibrium price is lower (resp.,
higher) in the wholesale mode than in the agency mode.
Finally, the inequality ca − cw > 0 is also equivalent to the ratio of marginal
revenue over price being decreasing in the quantity. (This can also be expressed
as the elasticity of demand being decreasing in the quantity, as MR/p = 1− 1/ǫ,
with ǫ > 1.) Indeed, ca − cw > 0 is also equivalent to:
∂
∂q
(
MR
p
)
< 0. (6.7)
The latter formulation gives a straightforward graphical intuition: when the
marginal revenue decreases more rapidly than the inverse demand over the range
of interest such that the ratio MR/p decreases with the quantity, the equilibrium
price in the agency mode is lower than that in the wholesale mode.
While the above analysis leads to straightforward results regarding the equi-
librium price level in both modes, it is limited in that it is only a local comparison
between the functions ca and cw. (Propositions 6.2 and 6.3 are direct translations
of local results to global conditions.) As these two functions could well intersect
several times, we need to restrict our analysis to simple results over global con-
ditions that allow us to determine which mode leads to a lower equilibrium price
for any marginal cost. Below, we first study in details these global conditions
when ca and cw never cross. Then we provide an example where ca and cw cross
at least once. We leave the analysis of more complicated demand functions which
would lead to the functions ca and cw to cross once or several times for future
research.
6.2.4.1 Global conditions 1: ca(q) and cw(q) never cross
As we can only determine whether the retail price is lower or higher in one mode
than the other when the sign of ca−cw does not change over the range of interest,
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let us first consider below some precise cases where ca and cw never intersect.
In this case, we have that ca − cw > 0, and thus the equilibrium price is
lower in the agency mode, for any marginal cost. This is straightforward from
the graphical analysis when using inequality (6.7), as marginal revenue equals
price when q = 0 and the MR curve is below the inverse demand curve at any
positive quantity, until it crosses the horizontal axis at q˙ (we haveMR(q˙) = 0, by
definition). This shows that, we always have ca − cw ≥ 0 globally on the interval
defined by q ∈ [0, q˙], regardless of how many times the two functions intersect, as
MR(q˙)/p(q˙)−MR(0)/p(0) = −1 < 0.1 Thus, when they never cross, ca− cw > 0
is actually satisfied at the local level for each and every quantity.
Log-concavity. Using inequality (6.6), we can easily verify that the equilibrium
price in the agency mode is lower than that in the wholesale mode for a wide class
of functions. Indeed, as explained by Weyl and Fabinger [2013], any log-concave
demand gives dp/dc < 1, and, thus, induces a lower equilibrium price in the
agency mode than in the wholesale mode, as ǫ > 1.2 For instance, any linear
demand function gives a pass-through rate of 1/2, and, hence, leads to pa < pw.
This result is summarized in Proposition 6.4 below.
Proposition 6.4. Log-concave demand forms induce equilibrium retail prices to
be higher in the wholesale mode than in the agency mode.
Constant pass-through. The price comparison between both modes is also
straightforward when we study demand functions with a constant pass-through
dp/dc = 1/(1 − µ′). In a recent working paper, Fabinger and Weyl [2012] show
that constant pass-through demand functions can be expressed as:
D(p) = σ
[
1 +
µ′
1− µ′
p
m
]−1
µ′
, (6.8)
1It can be the case that the inverse demand function follows a vertical asymptote when
q 7−→ 0 and/or an horizontal one when q˙ 7−→ ∞. In these cases, we have limq 7−→0MR(q) = p
and limq 7−→q˙ MR(q) = 0. Thus, we have limq 7−→q˙ MR(q)/p(q)−limq 7−→0MR(q)/p(q) = −1 < 0,
and ca − cw is globally negative on the interval (0, q˙).
2Log-concavity of demand is equivalent to 0 ≤ 1 + qp′′/p′.
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with σ > 0, m > 0, and µ′ < 1. Calculating the elasticity of demand, we obtain
that:
1
ǫ
= µ′ +
m(1− µ′)
p
. (6.9)
Thus, as the second term in the right-hand side of equation (6.9) is positive, we
can see that 1/ǫ is greater than (or equal to) µ′. Therefore, the equilibrium price
is lower in the agency mode than that in the wholesale mode from inequality
(6.6), as stated in Proposition 6.5 below.
Proposition 6.5. The equilibrium retail price in the agency mode is lower than
(or equal to) that in the wholesale mode when the demand function has a constant
pass-through.
A special result occurs when m 7−→ 0, or µ′ 7−→ 1. In these cases which
define constant-elasticity demand forms, we have 1/ǫ 7−→ µ′ from equation (6.9),
and prices are equal in both modes as shown in Subsection 6.2.2. Furthermore,
writing the pass-through rate as a function of the elasticity of demand as in
Bulow and Pfleiderer [1983], that is dp/dc = ǫ/(ǫ− 1+(p/ǫ)∗dǫ/dp), we see that
the equilibrium price in the wholesale mode equals the equilibrium price in the
agency mode only when dǫ/dp = 0.1 Hence, both equilibrium retail prices are
equal, for any marginal cost, only for constant-elasticity demand functions, as
expressed in Proposition 6.6 below. (Note that, with constant-elasticity demand
and a marginal cost close to zero, the equilibrium quantity goes toward infinity
in both modes.)
Proposition 6.6. Constant-elasticity demand functions are the only demand
forms for which retail prices in the wholesale and in the agency mode are equal
for any marginal cost, in equilibrium.
6.2.4.2 Global conditions 2: ca(q) and cw(q) cross at least once
As explained above, we always have ca − cw ≥ 0 globally on the interval [0, q˙]
(or (0, q˙)), regardless of how many times the two functions ca and cw intersect.
When they do intersect at least once, we know that the equilibrium price in the
wholesale mode is lower than that in the agency mode for the range over which
ca − cw < 0.
1Constant-elasticity demand functions have a pass-through equal to dp/dc = ǫ/(ǫ− 1).
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Using the adjustable pass-through (Apt) demand function defined by Fabinger
and Weyl [2012], we can determine demand functions such that the equilibrium
price in the wholesale mode, pw, is lower than that in the agency mode, pa. For
instance, the Apt demand with parameters µ′ = 0.7, α = 2, m = 0.01, and
σ = 0.5, leads to ca − cw < 0, and thus to pw < pa, for any constant marginal
cost above 0.019. (For marginal costs below this threshold we have that ca − cw
is positive, so pa < pw.)
6.2.5 Discussion
In this section, we have done three things. First, we have defined two versions of
a game that represent, respectively, wholesale and agency contracting arrange-
ments. Second, we have shown that when demand is of the constant elasticity
form, the two arrangements lead to the same equilibrium price. Third, we have
illustrated that, on the one hand, when demand is relatively concave, the stan-
dard intuition holds, whereby wholesale pricing leads to higher prices due to
double marginalization. On the other hand, when demand is sufficiently convex
and marginal costs not too small, then agency pricing leads to higher prices than
wholesale.
While this analysis constitutes one mechanism that could have led ebook
prices to increase when the industry switched from using wholesale to using
agency contracts, it is certainly an open question whether the demand for books
is typically of the form that would be consistent with such a mechanism. Given
that each book can reasonably thought of as having its own “locally monopolis-
tic” demand curve, it is very likely that some books have demand curves that,
according to this sections model, would lead the equilibrium price to increase af-
ter the shift of contracting modes whereas others have demand curves that would
lead the price to decrease. An interesting idea for future research would be to
estimate the demand for a large set of ebooks using the Apt specification and
test whether, following the change in contracting modes, the subsequent changes
in their prices are consistent with this model’s prediction.
We now extend the model to include the sale of access devices, and study
the interaction between their presence and the shift between contracting arrange-
ments.
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6.3 Model with access device sales
In this section, we develop a very stylized model in a context in which there are
two types of goods sold by firms: variable goods (ebooks) and access devices
(ereaders). It shows that when firms switch from the wholesale mode to the
agency mode, we can simultaneously observe an increase in variable good prices
and a decrease in access device prices.1 As a result, a deeper analysis is needed
in order to draw some conclusions of this switch from one mode to another on
welfare or consumer surplus.
In the remainder of this paper, and in contrast to Section 6.2, we do not
endogenize the contract terms w (the wholesale price in the wholesale mode) or
α (the revenue share in the agency mode). Doing so allows us to study a wider
range of contract terms, which possibly result from negotiation on the contract
terms in the first step. Also, considering w or α as parameters rather than
endogenous variables makes the analysis more tractable.
6.3.1 Firms and contracts
There are two firms in the industry, each of them operating as a monopolist
in one of two vertically-related markets.2 The publisher sells variable goods to
the distributor, through a wholesale or an agency contract. With a wholesale
contract, the distributor buys each good at price w and is free to set the price
paid by consumers. By contrast, with an agency contract, and the retail price p
is set by the publisher, and the distributor earns a share α of revenue from the
variable good sales.
The distributor also sells an access device (ereaders) to consumers at price
T . Buying an access device is a prerequisite for consumers in order to buy the
variable goods; and consumers make a discrete choice of buying the device. For
instance, in the ebook industry, a consumer is unable to read an ebook without
a reading device to do so; and distributors such as Apple or Amazon which resell
1The price of Amazon’s Kindle has significantly dropped over the past few years. However,
it is hard to disentangle the effect we highlight in this paper from the results of competition or
cost reduction.
2While these vertically-related markets actually are oligopolistic (with five or six major book
publishers, and two major distributors), we focus on the monopoly case in order to understand
precisely the role of access devices in the market.
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ebooks through their online stores also are the biggest ereader manufacturers
(with the iPad and the Kindle, respectively). Similarly, in the telephony industry,
consumers need a phone to be connected to the network in order to buy minutes
of calls.
We assume that variable goods and access devices have constant marginal
costs, c and K, respectively.
6.3.2 Consumers
Consumers are of bi-dimensional types. Consumer i is characterized by her val-
uation for the access device xi ∈ x and her taste for variable goods bi ∈ b. In
the ebook case, access devices are tablets or ereaders, that consumers effectively
value on their own, as they can use them to download free ebooks (such as public
domain ebooks) or applications, to browse the internet, to watch movies, etc.
Variable goods are ebooks, or applications, that consumers might read on their
device. Similarly, in the telephony industry, consumer subscribe to telephony
offers not only to make some calls, but also because they value the connection to
the network, through which they can receive calls from other consumers.
As consumers are heterogeneous in both types x and b, our analysis corre-
sponds to a generalized version of Schmalensee [1981], with consumers also val-
uating ‘access’ to the variable good. We call a consumer who buys the access
device a “participating consumer.”
A participating consumer i has a gross utility V (bi, q) of consuming q variable
goods. Assume ∂V/∂q > 0 and ∂2V/∂q2 < 0, so the marginal utility of consuming
a variable good is positive and decreasing in the number of goods a consumer
purchases. Assume also that V (bi, q) is increasing in bi.
Therefore, consumer i’s net utility is:
u(bi, xi, p, T ) = xi + V (bi, q)− pq − T. (6.10)
We call q(p, bi) the number of variable goods a participating consumer buys, given
her type bi and the price p. q(p, bi) is decreasing in price p and increasing in type
bi. A consumer with types (xi, bi) would like to maximize her net utility by
choosing the number of variable goods q = q(p, bi) she buys, given prices p and
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T :
q(p, bi) = argmaxq(u(bi, xi, p, T )) = argmaxq(V (bi, q)− pq),
q(p, bi) = q s.t.
∂
∂q
(xi + V (bi, q)− pq − T ) = 0,
q(p, bi) = q s.t. p =
∂V (bi,q)
∂q
,
(6.11)
with the condition that q ≥ 0.
6.3.3 Timing
We assume that both firms have negotiated and set the contract terms (i.e, w, or
α) before the beginning of the game. Hence, we take the contract terms as given
parameters in this analysis so far. The timing is as follows:
1. First, firms set their retail prices simultaneously.
2. Then, consumers purchase the product.
We assume that both retail prices, for the variable goods and the access de-
vices, are set simultaneously. We think this is a good approximation because
both ebooks and ereaders are durable goods.1 Another reason why we use simul-
taneous pricing is that we do not want to introduce other effects due to sequential
pricing when we compare both modes.
6.3.4 The model
We call f(x, b) the probability density function. We define xˆ(p, T, bi) as the device
valuation of a marginal consumer with taste for variable goods bi, at prices p and
T . We have:
xˆ(p, T, bi) = xi s.t. u(bi, xi, p, T ) = 0,
xˆ(p, T, bi) = T − V (q(p, bi), bi) + pq(p, bi).
(6.12)
As xi ∈ (−∞,+∞), we know that xˆ(p, T, bi) exists for any p, T and bi. We
also have ∂xˆ(p, T, bi)/∂T = 1, and ∂xˆ(p, T, bi)/∂p = q(p, bi).
1By contrast, Gans [2012] argues that ereaders or tablets are durable goods, whereas ebooks
or applications are not. (One can also see ereaders as ‘more’ durable goods than ebooks.) Thus,
in his analysis, ebook or application publishers can adjust their prices after the distributor has
set the access device price.
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Furthermore, we define N as the number of participating consumers, that is,
the number of consumers who buy an access device. We have:
N ≡
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
xˆ(p,T,z)
f(y, z)dydz. (6.13)
Similarly, we define Q as the total number of variable goods sold, according to
the following formula:
Q ≡
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
xˆ(p,T,z)
q(p, z)f(y, z)dydz. (6.14)
Finally, we call M the number of marginal consumers for given prices p and
T ; that is all consumers with u(bi, xi, p, T ) = 0. (As the consumer type is bi-
dimensional, there exist several marginal consumer types for given prices.) We
have:
M ≡
∫ +∞
−∞
f(xˆ(p, T, z), z)dz. (6.15)
We also use the following notations:
• We use an ‘upper-line’ over a variable in order to represent the inframarginal
consumers’ average valuation of this variable; that is, X ≡ E[X | ui ≥ 0],
∀X.
• We use a ‘tilde’ over a variable in order to represent the marginal consumers’
average valuation of this variable; that is, X˜ ≡ E[X | ui = 0], ∀X.
Therefore, with our newly defined variables and notations, we can write down
the derivatives of our main variables with respect to retail prices p and T . We
obtain:
• NT = ∂N/∂T = −M ;
• Np = ∂N/∂p = −ME[q | ui = 0] = −Mq˜;
• QT = ∂Q/∂T = −ME[q | ui = 0] = −Mq˜;
• Qp = ∂Q/∂p = −ME[q2 | ui = 0] + σ = −Mq˜2 + σ, where σ ≡ N ∂q∂p is the
inframarginal substitution effect, which is negative.
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From the derivatives, we see that all marginal consumers stop consuming
when the price of access devices T increases, whereas only marginal consumers
who bought a strictly positive number of variable goods stop consuming when
the price of variable goods p increases.
6.3.5 An example
In order to understand why such analysis is necessary to assert welfare effects
of a switch from one mode to another, let us focus on a simple example with
precise demand forms, before turning to a more general model in the following
subsections.
Assume that consumer i, of type (xi, bi), has a valuation xi ∈ [0, 1] for the
access device, which is drawn from a uniform probability density function. Addi-
tionally, consumer i has a gross utility V (bi, q) = bi
√
q from purchasing q variable
goods. We assume that bi ∈ [0, 1] and is drawn from a uniform probability den-
sity function. Finally, assume that consumers are uniformly distributed in both
dimensions, and we normalize the total number of consumers to 1.
From Roy’s identity, we know that consumer i buys qi = b
2
i /(4p
2) variable
goods at total price pqi in equilibrium in order to maximize V (bi, q)− pq. Hence,
the net utility of purchasing the access device and variable goods for consumer i
is:
u(bi, xi, p, T ) = xi − T + V (bi, qi)− pqi = xi − T + b
2
i
4p
. (6.16)
For any given bi, xˆ(p, T, bi) is the access device valuation which defines a
marginal consumer with variable good type bi. As marginal consumers are defined
by zero utility from purchasing, we have, from equation (6.16):
xˆ(p, T, bi) = T − b
2
i
4p
. (6.17)
We can now determine the total number of participating consumers N in
equilibrium, i.e., those who buy an access device, as well as the total number of
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variable goods sold, Q. We obtain, from equations (6.13) and(6.14):
N = 1− T + 1
12p
,
Q =
1− T
12p2
+
1
80p3
.
(6.18)
We can thus write down the profit functions and the FOCs in both the whole-
sale and the agency modes.
6.3.5.1 Wholesale mode - Example
In the wholesale mode, the distributor sets both price p and T . Its profit function
is:
πD(p, T ) = (p− w)Q+ (T −K)N. (6.19)
By contrast, the publisher earns πP = (w−c)Q. Note that we consider w as a
parameter in this analysis. From the distributor’s profit function, we obtain the
FOCs: 
0 =
∂πD
∂p
= Q+ (p− w)Qp + (T −K)Np,
0 =
∂πD
∂T
= N + (p− w)QT + (T −K)NT ,
(6.20)
with NT = −1, Np = −1/(12p2), QT = −1/(12p2), and Qp = −(1 − T )/(6p3) −
3/(80p4), from the equation system (6.18).
6.3.5.2 Agency mode - Example
In the agency mode, the distributor sets the access device price T , whereas the
publisher sets the variable good price p. The profit function of the publisher is:
πP (p) = [(1− α)p− c]Q; (6.21)
and the profit function of the distributor is:
πD(T ) = αpQ+ (T −K)N. (6.22)
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The FOCs are: 
0 =
∂πP
∂p
= (1− α)Q+ [(1− α)p− c]Qp,
0 =
∂πD
∂T
= N + (T −K)NT + αpQT ,
(6.23)
with, from the equation system (6.18): NT = −1, QT = −1/(12p2), and Qp =
−(1− T )/(6p3)− 3/(80p4).
6.3.5.3 Comparative statics - Example
We can then solve numerically the equation systems given by the FOCs in both
modes, focusing on interior solutions.1
Figure 6.3 below compares retail prices in the wholesale and agency modes,
both for variable goods and access devices, as functions of the wholesale mark-up
w− c and the revenue share α, for marginal cost values of c = 0.07, and K = 0.2.
(These marginal costs ensure the interior solution exists for any w − c ∈ [0, 1)
and any α ∈ [0, 1).)
Figure 6.3: Prices in the wholesale and the agency modes (c = 0.07, and K = 0.2)
The left graphic of Figure 6.3 shows the outcome of the comparison between
variable good prices in the wholesale and the agency modes. We see that when
the share of revenue α kept by the distributor is high, the price of variable goods
1We focus on numerical solutions because we just want to highlight the relationship between
the prices of variable goods and access devices. We derive analytical (implicit) solutions from
the FOCs without using any particular demand form in Section 6.3.
6.3. Model with access device sales 169
in the agency mode is higher than in the wholesale mode. For medium values of
α, this price is higher in the agency mode when the wholesale price is close to the
variable good marginal cost in the wholesale mode (that is, when w − c is close
to zero).
The right graphic of Figure 6.3 represent the comparison between the prices
of access devices in both modes. It shows that for low α, the price in the agency
mode is above the price in the wholesale mode, but for low mark-ups in the
wholesale price w. However, when the distributor keeps a high share of revenues
from variable good sales, the access device price is higher in the wholesale mode
than in the agency mode.
We see from Figure 6.3 that when α is high enough (above 0.16 in our ex-
ample), any increase in the price of variable goods that follows a shift from the
wholesale mode to the agency mode occurs in conjunction with a decrease in
the price of access devices. Therefore, changes in welfare or consumer surplus
that follow the transition from one mode to another are not straightforward and
should not be analyzed upon changes in the variable good price only.
Figure 6.4: Distributor’s profit (left) and publisher’s profit (right) in the wholesale
and the agency modes (c = 0.07, and K = 0.2)
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 represent the comparisons between firms’ profits and wel-
fare and consumer surplus, respectively, in both modes. We see from these figures
that a higher variable good price in the wholesale mode than in the agency mode
almost always induces higher distributor’s profit, consumer surplus, and welfare
in the agency mode than that in the wholesale mode. Therefore, in our example,
a price increase resulting from a switch from the wholesale to the agency mode
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Figure 6.5: Welfare and consumer surplus in the wholesale and the agency modes
(c = 0.07, and K = 0.2)
in the variable good market almost always indicates a decrease in welfare and
consumer surplus.1 In this case, requiring both firms to contract according to
the wholesale mode, as did the DOJ in the ebook antitrust case, is almost always
welfare improving.
This example indicates that a deep economic analysis is necessary to under-
stand the impact of switching from one mode to another. To this end, we provide
a general characterization of equilibrium outcomes in both wholesale and agency
modes with access device sales in the following. In contrast to the above example,
we do not use any particular demand forms.
6.3.6 Wholesale mode - General case
We now determine the optimal two-part tariff with heterogeneous participation
in the wholesale mode. In this mode, the distributor earns p − w for each sold
variable good and T −K for each sold access device. It’s profit function is:
πD(p, T ) = (p− w)Q+ (T −K)N. (6.24)
By contrast, the publisher earns πP = (w − c)Q. Note that we consider w as
1The correlation between having a lower variable good price in the agency mode and a
higher welfare in the same mode equals 0.944 in our example.
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a parameter in this analysis. We have the FOCs:
0 =
∂πD
∂p
= Q+ (p− w)Qp + (T −K)Np,
0 =
∂πD
∂T
= N + (p− w)QT + (T −K)NT .
(6.25)
Noting that Q = Nq, we obtain:{
0 = Nq + (p− w)σ − (p− w)Mq˜2 − (T −K)Mq˜,
0 = N − (p− w)Mq˜ − (T −K)M. (6.26)
Finally, we can determine the equilibrium prices.
Proposition 6.7. In the wholesale mode, the equilibrium prices are:
p = w +
N
M
(
q˜2 − q˜ 2
)
− σ
(q − q˜) ,
T = K +
N
M
(
q˜2 − q˜ 2
)
− σ
(
q˜2 − qq˜ − σ
M
)
.
(6.27)
As there is more than one type of marginal consumers, which differs to the
standard case where consumers only differ in type bi,
1 the variance of variable
good consumption by marginal consumers, Var(q | u = 0) = q˜2 − q˜ 2, is strictly
positive. This is so because consumers at the margin do not all buy the same
number of variable goods. By contrast, in the one-type case we have q˜2 = q˜ 2,
as the number of variable goods bought is constant within the set of marginal
consumers.
This additional term, Var(q | u = 0), precisely comes from the fact that the
distributor takes into account its own profit loss in the access device market due
to an increase in the price of variable goods when setting both prices.
We can rearrange the first equation in the equation system (6.27) to obtain:
p− w
p
=
1
ǫ¯p
(
1− q˜
q
)
, (6.28)
with ǫ¯p = −qp(p/Q) = −(Qp − (Np/NT )QT )(p/Q), as in Schmalensee [1981];
1See, e.g., Oi [1971], Schmalensee [1981], and the reviews by Varian [1989], and Wilson
[1997].
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where qp is the compensated derivative of Q with respect to p, with T adjusted so
as to hold N constant. In our bi-dimensional setting, we have ǫ¯p = (MVar(q | u =
0)− σ)(p/Q).1
This result also relates to Rochet and Stole [2002].2 They introduce an ‘out-
side opportunity cost’ in the classic Mussa-Rosen framework. In their paper,
consumers’ type is bi-dimensional, in the quality-valuation and in this oppor-
tunity cost. This opportunity cost corresponds to the inverse of consumer i’s
valuation for the access device in our framework, i.e., to −xi. Note that, how-
ever, Rochet and Stole [2002] do not study the impact of vertical relations and
different types of contracts in their paper.
From the top line in the equation system (6.27), we can see that p − w al-
ways has the same sign than q − q˜, as in the one-dimension two-part tariff in
Schmalensee [1981]. However, we can give new insights on the sign of T − K.
First, when all consumers are identical in their variable good consumption, i.e.,
when q = q˜, the variable good is priced at the wholesale price w and the ac-
cess device is priced above cost, as explained by Oi [1971]. Second, when the
average variable good consumption is larger for marginal than for inframarginal
consumers (i.e., when q < q˜), the variable good is priced below the wholesale
price, and profit is earned by the distributor through an above-cost access de-
vice price; i.e., T −K > 0, as in Schmalensee [1981]. Finally, when the average
consumer buys more variable goods than the average marginal consumer (i.e.,
q > q˜), the sign of T −K is generally ambiguous, as in Schmalensee [1981], only
if q˜2 < qq˜. By contrast, when q˜2 > qq˜, there is no ambiguity and the price of
access devices is above marginal cost, i.e., T −K > 0. The latter case can occur
only in our framework, because we have different marginal consumer types, and
this can allow for q > q˜ and q˜2 > qq˜ simultaneously.
These results are summarized in Proposition 6.8 below.
Proposition 6.8. In the wholesale mode, (p − w) has the sign of (q − q˜); and
(T −K) > 0 when (i) q = q˜, when (ii) q < q˜, or when (iii) q > q˜ and q˜2 > qq˜.
1See also the paper by Veiga andWeyl [2012], where the authors generalize monopoly pricing
when consumers have multi-dimensional heterogeneity. They find that the term including this
variance is responsible for a sorting effect, which translates changes in the firm’s attributes into
changes in the consumer’s population, keeping the overall number of consumers constant.
2See also Rochet and Stole [1997] for an extended analysis.
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If we implement the optimal prices from the equation system (6.27) in the
firms’ profit functions, we obtain:
π∗P = (w − c)Nq,
π∗D =
N2
M
(
q˜2 − q˜ 2
)
− σ
[
(q − q˜)2 +
(
q˜2 − q˜ 2
)
− σ
M
]
. (6.29)
Homogeneity in access valuation. Our analysis encompasses the case where
consumers are homogeneous in their valuation for the access devices and only
differ in their valuation for variable goods, i.e., xi = x, ∀i. In this case, the
analysis is similar to the one for setting a two-part tariff when the consumers
have x = 0, as studied by Oi [1971] or Schmalensee [1981]. Indeed, there is only
one type of marginal consumers, and we have q˜ 2 = q˜2, and, hence, Var(q | u =
0) = q˜2 − q˜ 2 = 0.
We obtain, similarly to equations (15) and (16) in Schmalensee [1981]:1
p− w = N−σ (q − q˜) ,
T −K = N−σ
(
q˜ 2 − qq˜ − σ
M
)
.
(6.30)
Welfare analysis. We can also study total welfare, in order to find the optimal
price a benevolent planner would set, and how much profit-maximization diverges
from the social optimum. We have the welfare function:
W =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
xˆ(p,T,z)
(y + V (q(p, z), z)− pq(p, z) + (p− c)q(p, z)−K)f(y, z)dydz
(6.31)
Using Roy’s identity and the definition of xˆ we obtain:
∂W
∂p
= −Mq˜(T −K)−Mq˜2(p− c) + (p− c)σ,
∂W
∂T
= −M(T −K)−Mq˜(p− c).
(6.32)
Note from the second line in the equation system (6.32) that there is no infra-
marginal welfare effect from an increase in the access device price T , because the
1Note that there is a sign inversion in Schmalensee [1981], equation (16).
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this would simply be a transfer from consumers to the distributor.
As straightforward question is then: in our framework, does marginal cost
pricing allow for welfare maximization? We can write down the FOCs to answer
this question: 
∂W
∂p
= 0,
∂W
∂T
= 0.
(6.33)
We obtain: {
(T −K) = −q˜(p− c),
0 =
[
M
(
q˜2 − q˜ 2
)
− σ
]
(p− c). (6.34)
The second equation in the system of equations (6.34) shows us that either p = c
or M(q˜2 − q˜ 2) − σ = 0 at the social optimum. Therefore, when the variable
good is sold at the marginal cost (i.e., p = c), and, from the top line in the
equation system (6.34), the access device is also sold at marginal cost, the social
optimum is obtained. In this case, marginal cost pricing for both products is
welfare maximizing. Note that this result is an extension of what is already
known from the literature when consumers do not value the access device (see
Varian [1989], section 2.2.4, p. 610). This result is summarized in Proposition
6.9 below.
Proposition 6.9. The social optimum is obtained with marginal cost pricing for
both types of products.
Instead, when M(q˜2− q˜ 2)−σ = 0, we obtain different results. As M(q˜2− q˜ 2)
and −σ are positive, the above equality occurs if and only if q˜2 − q˜ 2 = 0 and
σ = 0 simultaneously. The first equality tells us that, at the margin, all consumers
buy the same number of variable goods, i.e. q˜2 = q˜ 2, and the second equality
tells us that the inframarginal demand is inelastic. Hence, when the inframarginal
demand is inelastic and all consumers buy q variable goods, welfare maximization
can be obtained without marginal cost pricing and (T −K) has an opposite sign
to (p− c), or is equal to zero if q = 0.
6.3.7 Agency mode - General case
We now turn to analyzing the optimal retail prices in the agency mode. Recall
that in this mode the publisher sets the variable good price whereas the distributor
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only sets the device price. Also, both prices are set simultaneously, and α is the
share of revenues that is captured by the distributor. We assume that both firms
earn a positive share of revenues from the variable good sales, that is, α ∈ (0, 1).
The profit function of the publisher is:
πP (p) = [(1− α)p− c]Q; (6.35)
and the profit function of the distributor is:
πD(T ) = αpQ+ (T −K)N. (6.36)
We have the FOCs:
0 =
∂πP
∂p
= (1− α)Q+ [(1− α)p− c]Qp,
0 =
∂πD
∂T
= N + (T −K)NT + αpQT .
(6.37)
Solving this equation system, we obtain: 0 = Nq +
(
p− c
1− α
)
σ −
(
p− c
1− α
)
Mq˜2,
0 = N − αpMq˜ − (T −K)M.
(6.38)
Finally, we can determine the equilibrium prices.
Proposition 6.10. In the agency mode, the equilibrium prices are:
p =
c
1− α +
N
Mq˜2 − σ
q,
T = K +
N
Mq˜2 − σ
(
q˜2 − αqq˜ − σ
M
)
− αc
1− αq˜.
(6.39)
In contrast to the results obtained for the wholesale case, the equilibrium
prices do not depend on the variance in consumption of the variable goods by
marginal consumers. This is so because the publisher does not take into account
the distributor’s profit loss in the access device market due to an increase in the
price of variable goods, with the agency contract.
Note that the publisher’s price for variable goods p is always above cost when
agency contracts are used. By contrast, the price set by the distributor for the
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access device might be below or above cost. This is so because the distributor
might push demand by setting a low price for access device, thus earning large
revenues through the sale of variable goods.
If we implement the optimal prices from the equation system (6.39) in the
publisher’s and the distributor’s profit functions in equations (6.35) and (6.36),
respectively, we obtain:
π∗P = (1− α)
N2q2
Mq˜2 − σ
,
π∗D =
N2
Mq˜2 − σ
[
q˜2 + αq (q − q˜)− σ
M
]
+
αc
1− αN (q − q˜) .
(6.40)
Note that when α ≈ 0, that is when the publisher acquires all revenues from
the variable good sales, the distributor’s profit simply equals the monopoly profit
on the access device market, i.e., N2/M .
As for the previous section, it is difficult to compare prices in both contract
regimes in a general way, as they depend on the bargaining power under whole-
sale contracts, and the revenue share transferred to the distributor under agency
contracts.
6.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the differences between the wholesale and the agency
contractual arrangement for the sale of electronic books. In particular, we have
shown that, contrary to what one might expect, in a very simple model, agency
mode can lead to higher equilibrium prices than wholesale mode. More specif-
ically, when demand has constant elasticity, the two modes always lead to the
same price, and when demand is sufficiently convex and marginal costs not too
small, agency pricing leads to higher prices than wholesale.
We then consider the role of access devices (i.e., reading devices such as Kin-
dles and iPads). We have shown that the interplay between usage goods and
the access device pricing should be taken into account by antitrust authorities in
order to assess the impact of a shift from the wholesale mode to the agency mode
on social welfare or consumer surplus. Furthermore, we have explained in detail
how heterogeneity in access device valuation plays a role when firms set optimal
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tariffs in the wholesale mode. In doing so, we generalize the classic formula for
two-part tariff, as demonstrated in Schmalensee [1981].
In considering this industry, it is also worth remembering that factors other
than access device pricing could also potentially explain the increase in ebook
prices when shifting to the agency mode. In particular, U.S. and European an-
titrust authorities focused on firms’ collusive behaviors induced by the agency
mode. Finally, a challenging yet important extension would be to introduce
competition to our model, building on the literature on two-part tariffs in an
oligopolistic setting (see, e.g., Stole [1995], Armstrong and Vickers [2001, 2010];
or Stole [2007] for a review), and on non-linear pricing by duopolists (see Ver-
boven [1999], Rochet and Stole [2002], Yang and Ye [2008], Veiga and Weyl
[2012]). Product differentiation and compatibility decisions in the device market
could also be interesting to consider.
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Part V
The interplay between regulation
and competition policy: The case
of margin squeeze
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In Part V we analyze research questions relative to the use of (ex-post) com-
petition policy in ex-ante regulated markets in the ICT sector. More specifically,
we study margin squeeze conducts in the telecommunications industry. The goal
of this analysis is to understand whether advantages or weaknesses from ex-ante
and ex-post regulation add up when ex-post competition policy is enforced in
ex-ante regulated markets.
In Chapter 7 we study margin squeeze as an entry-deterrence strategy in an ex-
ante regulated market. We show that a margin squeeze in an ex-ante regulated
market only occurs when the access is regulated above cost (this might be so
either because of imperfect regulation, or because of the objective function of the
ex-ante authority). Standard competition policy rules defining predatory pricing
and refusal-to-deal might thus be inappropriate to deter anticompetitive conducts
in a market with ex-ante regulation.
In Chapter 8 we analyze the impact of access regulation on a firm’s incentive
to abuse of its dominant position. More precisely, we show that an increase in
the regulated access charge can increase or decrease the incumbent’s incentive to
undertake a margin squeeze. Indeed, it simultaneously raises the incumbent’s up-
stream profit when it sells input to its competitor, and lowers the cost of abusing
of its dominant position. When the discount factor is low enough, the latter effect
may dominate, and an increase in the access charge can intensify the incumbent’s
incentive to undertake a margin squeeze. Hence, ex-ante regulation directly im-
pacts the incumbent’s incentive to undertake an anticompetitive strategy.
Overall, in Part V we demonstrate that the interplay between ex-ante and
ex-post regulations can be quite difficult to deal with. Indeed, ex-ante regulation
may become a concern for ex-post competition policy as it can modify a well-
known abuse (as predatory pricing or refusal-to-deal) into a new anticompetitive
conducts (margin squeeze) to which case law might be unadapted. Similarly, ex-
ante regulation can directly impact a firm’s anticompetitive conduct, which can
be dealt with ex-post by competition authorities.
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Chapter 7
Margin Squeeze and Monopoly
Maintenance in Regulated
Industries
7.1 Introduction
In March 2012, the General Court of the European Union confirmed the fine of
more than e151 million imposed on the Spanish telecommunications incumbent
by the European Commission for a margin squeeze in the broadband market.
More generally, in recent years, U.S. and European antitrust jurisdictions have
dealt with important margin squeeze cases in ex-ante regulated network industries
such as telecommunications,1 energy,2 and utilities.3
On the one hand, U.S. and European antitrust jurisdictions agree on the
definition of a margin squeeze. A margin squeeze (or price squeeze) is an anti-
competitive conduct set up by a vertically-integrated firm which is dominant in
the upstream market. It occurs when the vertically-integrated firm sets its retail
1See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities v. Deutsche Telekom (Case
COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), and Commission of the European Communities v. Tele-
fonica (Case COMP/38.784) in Europe; and Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Commu-
nications, Inc. (Case 129 S. Ct. 1109) in the U.S.
2See, e.g., the French Autorite´ de la concurrence’s decision (2007) in Direct e´nergie v Elec-
tricite´ de France (EDF) (Case 07-D-43).
3See, e.g., the British OFWAT’s decision (2004) in Albion Water v Dwˆr Cymru (Case
CA98/00/48).
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price too low relative to its access charge for downstream competitors to survive.1
One the other hand, major transatlantic differences have emerged in the legal
treatment of margin squeeze cases. For example, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the Sherman Act does not recognize margin squeeze as a theory of
harm in monopolization cases when there is no antitrust upstream duty-to-deal,
the European Court of Justice stated that margin squeeze constitutes a stand-
alone infringement.
These differences reflect a vivid debate in the policy literature on whether
or not margin squeeze should be dealt with by competition authorities in ex-
ante regulated markets, and whether or not margin squeeze should be recognized
as a stand-alone conduct. Sidak [2008] states that “[i]t is neither feasible nor
advisable to use antitrust law to make a vertically integrated firm responsible
for ensuring the profitability of its competitors in the downstream market.”2 By
contrast, Heimler [2010] explains that competition authorities should be allowed
to intervene in margin squeeze cases because regulatory authorities may have to
set above-cost access charges.
Carlton [2008] and Sidak [2008] also claim that a margin squeeze should not
to be recognized as an ex-post anticompetitive conduct. They ask antitrust au-
thorities and courts to rely on other types of abuses, such as predation or refusal-
to-deal, in order to prove an anticompetitive conduct. In the linkLine case, the
Supreme Court followed this argument.3 But, as Heimler [2010] explains, the
Supreme Court did not explain whether or not a margin squeeze could be recog-
nized as a stand-alone abuse when there exists an antitrust duty-to-deal.
Hence, margin squeeze is currently quite debated in the policy literature,
mainly because theories underlying margin squeeze strategies are missing. In
this chapter, we develop a theory for margin squeeze based on vertical defen-
sive leveraging. We show that an incumbent can undertake a margin squeeze in
1In the literature and in recent case law, the access charge is sometimes called ‘input price,’
‘wholesale price,’ or ‘upstream price.’
2This is also the point of view of the Supreme Court, which stated, in the linkLine case,
that this is the role of an ex-ante regulatory authority to consider precisely the margin between
the retail and upstream prices set by an incumbent.
3It is to note that, whereas Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (formerly Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community) penalizes the
abuse of dominance, section 2 of the Sherman Act penalizes illegal acquisition or maintenance
of monopoly power (see Sidak [2008]).
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equilibrium in order to maintain its upstream monopoly position.
We develop a theoretical model in which margin squeeze might arise in equi-
librium as an entry-deterrence strategy. In our two-period model, foreclosure of
a more efficient downstream competitor occurs because the vertically-integrated
incumbent aims at maintaining its upstream monopoly in the long-run. By deter-
ring entry in the downstream market in the first period, the incumbent reduces
the entrant’s overall profit and may render second-period entry in the upstream
market unprofitable. This strategy corresponds to a vertical variant of the well-
known defensive leverage argument (see, e.g., Carlton and Waldman [2002] for
an illustration of defensive leveraging through tie-in sales).
Building our discussion on our model and on the case law, we explain why a
margin squeeze should be defined as a stand-alone conduct when a competition
authority intervenes ex-post in an ex-ante regulated market. More precisely, we
explain why a margin squeeze conduct differs from other existing abuses, and why
such conduct should be considered as abusive when the access charge is regulated.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 presents background infor-
mation regarding the existing literature, and addresses the current legal environ-
ments in Europe and in the U.S., by reviewing the recent case law. Section 7.3
introduces the model. In Section 7.4, we show that a margin squeeze can be a
dominant strategy for the monopolist, in order to protect its upstream monopoly
position. We provide a comprehensive discussion about margin squeeze being
defined as a stand-alone abuse in Section 7.5. Finally, Section 7.6 concludes. All
proofs are relegated to Appendix 7.7.1.
7.2 Background information
In this Section, we review the relevant literature and we specify the recent case
law in Europe and in the U.S.
7.2.1 Literature review
The relevant literature encompasses both literature on vertical foreclosure and
the interplay between margin squeeze and regulation.
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7.2.1.1 Vertical foreclosure and the leverage theory
As a margin squeeze is a vertical foreclosure strategy, it is concerned with the
one-monopoly argument from the Chicago School critique of the leverage con-
cept. This argument states that, as there is only one final monopoly profit to be
extracted in vertically-related markets, a vertically-integrated incumbent should
always serve a more efficient downstream competitor (see, e.g., Posner [1976],
Bork [1978], or Rey and Tirole [2007] for a review).
One explanation to counter the Chicago School argument and to explain the
rationality of foreclosure is defensive leverage. This explanation has been de-
veloped in the tying literature, for horizontally-related markets. The defensive
leverage consists in foreclosing a secondary market in order to protect a monopoly
position in the primary market. Indeed, an incumbent may have incentives to
foreclose a potential competitor when entry in one market encourages entry in the
other market. Several arguments can justify this link between the two markets:
Carlton and Waldman [2002] study markets with economies of scale and scope or
network effects, and Choi and Stefanadis [2001] give a rationale for the defensive
leverage when entry is risky (i.e., when R&D may not succeed).
Even if vertical and horizontal structures differ, this defensive leverage strat-
egy can be extended to vertically-related markets. For instance, as Riordan [2008]
explains, when present downstream entry might lead to future upstream entry,
a vertically integrated incumbent might refuse to deal in the first period, in or-
der to deter this two-level entry strategy. Similarly, Chen [2013] gives a rational
explanation for refusal-to-deal in an unregulated environment.
When access is regulated, however, a refusal-to-deal is not a feasible fore-
closure strategy. Indeed, it seems particularly relevant to study margin squeeze
abuses in regulated markets. As Vickers [2010] puts it “the presence of regulation
is one reason why the Chicago School ‘one monopoly profit’ argument for scep-
ticism about leverage claims may not apply.” In our model, the access charge is
set by the regulatory authority and has two effects on the equilibrium. Indeed, it
prevents the incumbent to extract a full monopoly rent, and it prevents the in-
cumbent to engage in a refusal-to-deal strategy to protect its upstream monopoly
position.
Note that the vertical defensive leverage argument we illustrate in this chapter
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differs from the Bell doctrine, according to which a regulated monopolist might
find it profitable to leverage market power from the regulated to the competitive
segment of the market.1 Indeed, in our model, if there was no regulation at all,
the incumbent might still find it profitable to foreclose the market (through a
less costly strategy than a margin squeeze, e.g., a refusal-to-deal) to maintain its
upstream monopoly position.
The model we develop in this chapter could also be regarded as a vertical
variant of the one developed by Fumagalli and Motta [2012]. In their paper, they
detail a theory for predatory pricing based on intertemporal price discrimination
and economies of scale or scope. In our model the same reasoning appears;
having first-period positive output is a key element for overall profitability, as
there are common sunk costs in operating first as downstream entrant and then
as a vertically-integrated competitor. However, strategic foreclosure can occur at
a price above cost in our model.
7.2.1.2 Margin squeeze and regulation
The literature on margin squeeze conducts in regulated industries is scarce. Biglaiser
and DeGraba [2001] demonstrate that a margin squeeze can occur in equilibrium
when the upstream market is regulated and the entrant faces profit hurdles. How-
ever, their model does not illustrate vertical defensive leveraging, because the en-
trant cannot bypass the upstream input. Furthermore, there are several reasons
for which the Chicago school argument breaks down in their model: namely the
entrant is less efficient than the incumbent, and firms compete using two-part
tariffs.
In a recent paper, Chone´, Komly and Meunier [2010] show that, when the
regulated access charge is above cost, an ex-post ban on margin squeeze harms
consumers for a given market structure, but that it may also increase consumer
surplus when it alters this market structure and favors efficient entry. In Chone´,
Komly and Meunier [2010], however, margin squeeze never occurs in equilibrium
and entry is deterred because of the off-equilibrium threat of margin squeeze.
In our paper, we explain why margin squeeze can occur as a foreclosure strat-
1See, e.g., Joskow and Noll [1999] for a detailed review of the Bell doctrine. Note also
that the Bell doctrine is also called Baxter’s law, after William Francis Baxter, the assistant
attorney general who settled the AT&T break-up in 1982.
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egy in equilibrium, due to economies of scope between the downstream and the
upstream market. In this regard, our paper is the first to give a rationale for a
margin squeeze strategy which occurs in equilibrium in a model of complete and
perfect information.1
Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001] also demonstrate that, in their model with hor-
izontal differentiation, the incentive to squeeze always decreases in the access
charge. By contrast, Gaudin [2013b], using a model with homogeneous products,
shows that raising the regulated access charge may either increase or decrease
the incumbent’s incentive to squeeze. In particular, the outcome depends on the
price-cost margin and the demand elasticity at the squeezing price.
Finally, Bouckaert and Verboven [2004] study how margin squeeze tests are
relevant in different regulatory configurations (when upstream and retail prices
are regulated, when only upstream prices are regulated, and when there is no
regulation). Under exogenously cost-oriented upstream prices, they state that a
margin squeeze strategy is similar to predation, as the vertically-integrated firm
only sets its retail prices.
7.2.2 Legal environment
We address the current legal environments in Europe and in the U.S. concerning
margin squeeze by reviewing the recent case law.
7.2.2.1 Recent case law in Europe
In Europe, two recent margin squeeze cases concerning ex-ante regulated telecom-
munications incumbents have received a lot of attention. First, in 2003, in Com-
mission of the European Communities v. Deutsche Telekom,2 the European Com-
mission fined the German telecommunications incumbent e12.6 millions for an
abusive margin squeeze, which occurred from 1998 to 2001 in the fixed local access
sector. This case was much debated, mainly because it drew new frontiers be-
tween regulation and competition policy, as Deutsche Telekom’s upstream charge
was regulated by the German regulatory authority. The European Commission
1In Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001] margin squeeze is a feasible strategy because of profit
hurdles, which are usually justified by imperfect information in the financial market.
2Case COMP/C- 1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 - Deutsche Telekom AG, case T-271/03 before the
European Court of First Instance and case C-280/08 P before the European Court of Justice.
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decision was upheld by the European Court of First Instance in 2008, and con-
firmed by the European Court of Justice, which dismissed in 2010 the appeal
brought by Deutsche Telekom.
The different European courts confirmed the European Commission’s decision
that Deutsche Telekom had to comply with European competition policy laws,
even if its pricing strategy had been approved by its National Regulatory Au-
thority. The European Commission stated that, even if its wholesale charge was
regulated, the German incumbent had enough flexibility to put an end to the
margin squeeze, notably by increasing its retail prices for access services.
In Commission of the European Communities v. Telefonica,1 the European
Commission fined Telefonica, the Spanish telecommunications incumbent, e151.875
million for abusing its dominant position in the Spanish broadband market through
a margin squeeze from September 2001 to September 2006. The margin squeeze
occurred between Telefonica’s retail price and its regional and national wholesale
access prices. The incumbent’s national wholesale price was not regulated and
its regional price was subject to an ex-ante price cap, set in 2001 on the basis of
the incumbent’s forecasts. At the time of the abuse, Telefonica also provided a
wholesale access through local loop unbundling at a cost-oriented regulated price.
The General Court confirmed the European Commission’s fine in March 2012.
7.2.2.2 Recent case law in the U.S.
In the U.S., the Supreme Court’s decision in the case Pacific Bell Telephone Co.
v. linkLine Communications, Inc. clearly widened the gap between transatlantic
views on margin squeeze abuses.2 This case concerned a margin squeeze claim in
the Californian broadband DSL market, in which the incumbent had a regulatory
upstream duty-to-deal (i.e., it had to set an upstream price lower than its retail
price). The Supreme Court rejected the margin squeeze allegation, arguing that
if the retail prices are not predatory and if there is no antitrust duty-to-deal, an
incumbent is free to set its prices. More precisely, the Supreme Court stated that
the “[p]laintiffs price-squeeze claim, looking to the relation between retail and
1Case COMP/38.784 Wanadoo Espan˜a vs. Telefonica and cases T-336/07 Telefonica v.
Commission and T-398/07 Spain v. Commission before the General Court.
2Supreme Court’s decision, Docket No. 07-512. See also the document “OECD Policy
Roundtables, Margin Squeeze,” 2009 (DAF/COMP(2009)36), to notice the divergences in the
contributions of the European Commission and the United States.
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wholesale prices, is thus nothing more than an amalgamation of a meritless claim
at the retail level and a meritless claim at the wholesale level.”
7.3 The model
We set-up a two-period model in order to give a rationale for a margin squeeze
strategy.
Firms. There are two firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant. The in-
cumbent I is vertically-integrated and operates in both the upstream and down-
stream markets. It has an upstream constant marginal cost uI and a downstream
constant marginal cost cI . The incumbent can sell the upstream input to a down-
stream competitor, at no extra cost.
The potential entrant E can enter the market as a pure downstream operator
or as a vertically-integrated firm. In order to vertically-integrate, the entrant
must build both the downstream and upstream facility components. We use the
following definitions in the chapter: the entrant enters the market when it builds
its downstream facilities; and it invests when it builds its upstream facilities.
To build its downstream facilities, it has to incur a sunk cost f . The entrant
has a downstream constant marginal cost cE, with cE ≤ cI . That is, we assume
that the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent in the downstream market.
As a downstream operator, E relies on the incumbent’s upstream input and needs
one unit of input to produce one unit of output.
Similarly, the entrant has to incur a sunk cost F to build its upstream facili-
ties. When it invests in its own upstream facilities, the entrant has an upstream
constant marginal cost uE. The entrant is more efficient than the incumbent for
the provision of the upstream component (i.e., uE ≤ uI), because its technology
is more recent. We assume that when it is indifferent between entering (resp.,
investing) or not, E always chooses to enter (invest).
Finally, we assume that upstream investment is only feasible in the second
period. This assumption mirrors the common thinking that, in network indus-
tries, short-run entry as a vertically-integrated firm in a market dominated by an
incumbent may be too costly. As an example, an entrant could invest in its own
upstream facilities only after the first period, because a new technology appears
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such that the sunk cost to build upstream facilities is infinitely high in the first
period, and equals F in the second period.1 Note that the entrant can become a
vertically-integrated competitor in the second period even if it remained outside
the market in the first period.
Regulation. We assume that the upstream market is regulated; that is, there
is a regulatory authority which sets the price of the incumbent’s essential input
(the access charge), a. We assume that a is set above the upstream cost, i.e.,
a > uI . The regulatory authority only sets one access charge for the whole game.
Finally, the regulatory authority does not regulate retail prices.
Above-cost regulated access charges are common in the literature. For in-
stance, in Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001] there is an (exogenous) above-cost access
charge because of Universal Service Obligations. In Chone´, Komly and Meunier
[2010], the authors argue that the regulatory authority might not set the ac-
cess charge at cost, because “[r]egulators may want to encourage competitors to
invest in upstream infrastructures, in a long term perspective.” Similarly, Heim-
ler [2010] explains that a regulatory authority might set an access charge above
cost, for instance because it may favor “the entry of higher-cost competitors that
eventually would become more efficient than the incumbent.”
Consumers. The firms provide homogeneous products and compete in prices.
In each period, demand is characterized by the continuous, decreasing, and posi-
tive function D(p), where p is the retail price to which consumers buy the good.
Each consumer buys only one unit of the downstream product in each period.
We assume that the profit function (p−c)D(p) is continuous and strictly concave
in p, for any marginal cost c.
When both firms set the same retail prices, we assume that consumers buy
from the firm they know best, i.e., the incumbent.
Following Carlton and Waldman [2002], we assume that the cohort of con-
sumers in the first period differs from the cohort of consumers in the second
period, that is, no first-period consumer exists in the second period.2
1See Bourreau and Dog˘an [2005] who assume that the entrant cannot build his facility at
time zero but that the facility cost decreases over time.
2This is also similar to consumers in both periods being myopic, that is, if we assume
consumers in a given period are only concerned by this period prices.
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Timing. The regulated access charge is exogenously set by the regulator for
the whole game before any firms’ decision. The timing of the game is then as
follows.
1. First period:
(a) I and E simultaneously set their retail prices for the first period.
(b) E chooses whether or not to enter the downstream market.
(c) Consumers purchase the product.
2. Second period:
(a) I and E simultaneously set their retail prices for the second period.
(b) E chooses whether or not to invest in upstream facilities if it en-
tered in the first period, or whether or not to enter the market (as
a downstream- or a vertically-integrated firm) if it did not.
(c) Consumers purchase the product.
In this game, we assume that both firms commit to their prices before E’s
entry and/or investment decision, as in Fumagalli and Motta [2012]. As an exam-
ple of such commitment, suppose that the firms’ and buyers’ contracts are made
on the basis of tender offers (as in public-private procurement markets) or that
buyers are large businesses which can negotiate prices with both firms prior to
their purchase decision, and that entry and investment take time because firms
have to build some infrastructures to deliver the products or services, such as a
telecommunications network.1
Note that if the incumbent was unable to commit to its first-period retail price
before the potential competitor’s entry decision, a margin squeeze would never
occur in equilibrium. Indeed, if the incumbent’s pricing decision occurs after the
1An example of large businesses which can negotiate prices prior to their decisions is given
by the 2012 case Cogent Communications v. France Te´le´com in the internet connection peering
market, before the French Competition Authority (decision 12-D-18). In this case, Cogent, an
international transit operator, whose clients are national Internet Service Providers and Content
Providers, claimed that France Te´le´com entailed a margin squeeze in the internet connection
peering market by using its vertically-integrated structure. Indeed, France Te´le´com is an ISP
through its Orange brand, and an international transit operator through its subsidiary Open
Transit.
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competitor can sunk its fixed cost of entry f , then, either entry is accommodated
and there is no incentive for the incumbent to engage in a margin squeeze,1 or
entry is deterred because of the off-equilibrium threat of a margin squeeze, as in
Chone´, Komly and Meunier [2010].
Finally, we assume that both firms discount their future profits at the same
discount rate. Without loss of generality, we assume that the discount factor
equals one. We look for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. We
solve the game by backward induction.
7.4 Margin squeeze to maintain an upstream
monopoly position
We know explain how a margin squeeze can occur in equilibrium.
7.4.1 Second period
At the beginning of the second period, the potential competitor may or may not
already have entered the downstream market. We study these two distinct cases
below.
E entered the downstream market in the first period. If the competitor
entered as a downstream operator, it only decides whether or not to invest in its
upstream facilities.
On the one hand, if the entrant’s price is higher than the incumbent’s, the
entrant does not sell any product. Therefore, it will never invest in its upstream
facilities. On the other hand, if its (positive) price is lower than the incumbent’s,
it will earn positive revenues. In this case, the incumbent will be better off
undercutting any price above a + cI and serving the market itself. Therefore, it
is not an equilibrium for the entrant to set a price above a + cI and to remain
a downstream operator. We assume that the entrant can never set its monopoly
price pm(c), that is pm(a+ cE) > p
m(uE + cE) > a+ cI .
1It could nevertheless entail a margin squeeze if the entrant has to face other constraints,
such as profit hurdles (see Bolton and Scharfstein [1990], and Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001]).
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Suppose that the entrant’s price pE is below the incumbent’s one. E can
stay a downstream operator and make profit πDE (pE) ≡ (pE − (a + cE))D(pE),
or it can invest in its upstream facilities at the fixed cost F and become a
vertically-integrated firm making (gross of fixed cost) profit πV IE (pE) ≡ (pE −
(uE + cE))D(pE).
We need to to know at which retail price would the entrant prefer to be a
downstream competitor rather than a vertically-integrated firm. We call p˜E the
price at which the entrant is indifferent between investing or not, knowing that it
serves the market, i.e., πDE (p˜E) = π
V I
E (p˜E)− F . In the following, we assume that
p˜E is unique. We can now state the following lemma:
Lemma 7.1. For any p < p˜E, we have π
D
E (p) < π
V I
E (p)− F , and vice-versa.
Proof. See Appendix 7.7.1.
In the following, we assume that p˜E > a + cI (we study the case where
p˜E ≤ a+ cI in Appendix 7.7.2). In this case, whenever it serves the market, that
is, when pE < pI , the entrant will always invest in its own upstream facilities.
Indeed, at any price, it would prefer to be a vertically-integrated firm rather than
a downstream operator. Anticipating this, the incumbent will undercut any price
above uI + cI , its own marginal cost.
If the entrant is cost-efficient enough then there is Bertrand competition be-
tween both firms and E serves all consumers at pE = uI + cI − ǫ, with ǫ being
very small. Its net profit is then πV IE (uI + cI) − F . The incumbent makes no
profit at all.
Otherwise, the incumbent serves the market at the entrant’s average cost
(taking into account the fixed cost F ) and the entrant makes no profit.
Comparing the profits made by the entrant in both situations, we can state
the following result:
Lemma 7.2. Suppose the competitor entered the downstream market in the first
period. Then, it invests in its own upstream facilities in the second period if and
only if πV IE (uI + cI)− F ≥ 0.
Proof. Omitted.
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We call Condition 7.1 the condition on parameters for which the entrant
would invest in its own upstream facilities in the second period if it entered the
downstream market in the first period:
Condition 7.1. F ≤ (uI + cI − (uE + cE))D(uI + cI).
E did not enter the downstream market in the first period. If it did
not enter the downstream market in the first period, the entrant can choose in
the second period to stay outside the market, to enter the downstream market
only, or to enter as a vertically-integrated firm.
As p˜E > a + cI , the entrant will always prefer to be a vertically-integrated
firm rather than a downstream operator. Therefore, E’s choice is reduced to two
options: to become a vertically-integrated firm, or to remain outside the market.
First, suppose that pE < pI . The entrant serves the market and, as it invests
as p˜E > a + cI , the incumbent makes zero profit. As above, the incumbent will
anticipate this strategy and undercut any price above uI + cI . Therefore, the
entrant will make a positive profit if and only if πV IE (uI + cI)− F − f ≥ 0.
Reciprocally, when pI ≤ pE the incumbent serves the market at price p∗I such
that πV IE (p
∗
I)−F −f = 0, which the is highest price the entrant cannot undercut.
In this case, the entrant does not enter the market because of this limit pricing
strategy.
Comparing the profits made by the entrant in both situations, we can state
the following lemma:
Lemma 7.3. Suppose the competitor did not enter in the first period. Then, it
remains outside the market in the second period if and only if πV IE (uI+cI)−F−f <
0.
Proof. Omitted.
7.4.2 First period
We study the possible equilibria of the game, according to different values of the
downstream entry fixed cost f . We are interested in the case where the entrant
has to enter in the first period to become a vertically-integrated competitor in
the second period.
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If pI < pE, E stays outside the market in the first period. In this case and
if πV IE (uI + cI) − F < f , we know from Lemma 7.3 that E will never enter the
market.
If pE < pI , E pays the fixed cost f , enters as a downstream operator, and
serves the retail market in the first period. In this case and if Condition 7.1 is
satisfied, we know from Lemma 7.2 that E will become a vertically-integrated firm
in the second period, and that the incumbent will only earn upstream revenues
from the first period.
Proposition 7.1. For a given access charge, if Conditions 7.1 is satisfied, there
exist f and f such that, if f < f ≤ f , the unique equilibrium is characterized by:
(i) Either E never enters any market, or (ii) E enters the downstream market in
the first period and invests in upstream facilities in the second period.
Proof. See Appendix 7.7.1.
Proposition 7.1 shows that, for some values of the downstream fixed cost of en-
try f , being a downstream competitor in the first period is a key strategic element
in order to become a vertically-integrated competitor in the second period. When
f < f ≤ f , if the potential entrant does not compete as a downstream operator
in the first period, it will be unable to enter the market (neither downstream, nor
upstream) in the second period.
In Proposition 7.1, we introduced f , the lowest downstream entry cost for
which a potential competitor which stayed outside the market in the first period
would remain outside the market in the second period: f ≡ πV IE (uI + cI) − F .
By contrast, when f ≤ f , E always finds it profitable to enter as a vertically-
integrated firm in the second period, regardless of its first-period situation.
We also introduced f , the highest downstream entry cost for which down-
stream entry in the market in the first period followed by upstream investment
in the second period might be profitable: f ≡ πDE (a+ cI) + f . By contrast, when
f > f , E never finds it profitable to enter the market.
7.4.3 Margin squeeze as an equilibrium
From Proposition 7.1, the incumbent knows that, when f < f ≤ f , the potential
competitor has to enter in the first period to become a vertically-integrated oper-
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ator in the second period. If it does not, it will never enter the market. Therefore,
the incumbent might choose to deter entry in the first period, in order to protect
its upstream monopoly in the second period.
Proposition 7.2. For a given access charge, if Condition 7.1 is satisfied and
f < f ≤ f , there exists a unique pˆI such that, if (pˆI − (a + cI))D(pˆI) + (p∗I −
(uI + cI))D(p
∗
I) > 0, the unique equilibrium is characterized by the outcome: (i)
I serves the first period market by setting a retail price pˆI such that pˆI < a+ cI ,
and (ii) E never enters the market.
Proof. See Appendix 7.7.1.
We call Condition 7.2 the condition on parameters for which the incumbent
always would find it profitable to deter entry:
Condition 7.2. (pˆI − (a+ cI))D(pˆI) + (p∗I − (uI + cI))D(p∗I) > 0.
In Proposition 7.2, we introduce pˆI as the first-period price at which the
incumbent can deter entry. When, in the first period, I sets a retail price below
pˆI , then, as f < f ≤ f and following Proposition 7.1, the potential competitor
never enters any market. The existence of pˆI represents the deterrence ability of
the incumbent; at this price, the incumbent knows that entry would be deterred.
In the proof of Proposition 7.2, we demonstrate that pˆI always exists, is unique,
is included in [a+ cE, a+ cI ], and that it verifies (pˆI − (a+ cE))D(pˆI)− f + f = 0
by definition.
In his opinion on the Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB margin
squeeze case,1 advocate general Maza´k from the European Court stated that
“[t]here is a margin squeeze if the difference between the retail prices charged by
a dominant undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors for
comparable products is negative, or insufficient to cover the product-specific costs
to the dominant undertaking of providing its own retail products on the down-
stream market.” This corresponds to the standard so-called Equally Efficient
Operator definition of margin squeeze, used by European courts and competition
authorities.
1Case C-52/09, request from the Stockholm District Court to the European Court for
preliminary ruling.
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Applying this definition to our model would lead to say that the incumbent
entails a margin squeeze if it sets a price pI < a+ cI such that entry is deterred.
Note that the price pˆI might be above or below the incumbent’s total cost u+ cI .
This is the reason why we say this model illustrates a margin squeeze, and not
predatory pricing (i.e., below-cost pricing). According to our definition of margin
squeeze, predatory pricing is a special case of margin squeeze in vertically-related
markets. Note also that, whenever pˆI ≥ uI + cI , a ban on predation (i.e., below-
cost pricing) would not suffice to prevent entry-deterrence.
The margin squeeze we illustrate in our model goes beyond the Bell doc-
trine, according to which regulation might induce anticompetitive conducts from
a vertically-integrated firm. According to Joskow and Noll [1999], in the AT&T
divestiture the Bell doctrine made it clear that “regulation was an essential com-
ponent of creating the incentive and opportunity for sustained, successful anti-
competitive behavior and market distortions.” By contrast, in our model, im-
perfect regulation is not always an essential component of creating the incentive
for this anticompetitive behavior. Indeed, this behavior may be induced by the
defensive leverage strategy only, and might also take place in an unregulated
environment as a refusal-to-deal (see Chen [2013]), or in a perfectly regulated
environment (when a = uI) as below-cost predation.
1 However, imperfect regula-
tion is an essential component for this anticompetitive behavior to take the form
of a margin squeeze, and not one of the above-mentioned conducts.
Proposition 7.2 gives a rational explanation for margin squeeze when the ac-
cess charge is regulated. It builds on vertical defensive leveraging, according to
which an incumbent can foreclose a more efficient downstream entrant in order
to prevent this entrant to invest in its own upstream facilities, and hence, in
order to maintain an upstream monopoly position. Our model builds on a frame-
work where there are bypass opportunities and access regulation, as in Avenali,
Matteucci and Reverberi [2010] and Bourreau and Dog˘an [2005].2
Finally, note that a regulatory authority having power over the access charge
might be able to prevent the incumbent to entail a margin squeeze if it could set
1Baxter [1983] explains that one of the necessary conditions for the Bell doctrine to hold
is that the regulatory authority “must have ineffective control over transactions between the
affiliated entreprises,” which excludes that the access charge is set at cost.
2For a model illustrating the vertical dynamic leverage argument without access regulation,
see Chen [2013].
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different access charge values for different periods of time. Indeed, the regulatory
authority might set access charges such that the entrant has enough incentives to
enter in the first period and to invest in the second one, and that the incumbent
finds it profitable to earn upstream revenues in the first period. Additionally, if
the incumbent prefers to deter entry in order to maintain its upstream monopoly
even when the first-period access charge is low (or a cost), margin squeeze occurs
at a predatory (below cost) price, and, hence, can be avoided if predatory bans
are applicable.
However, an entrant may be simultaneously close to investing in its upstream
network in high-density areas and far from investing in low-density areas, because
of differences in network fixed costs between areas. In other words, the first period
does not last the same in high- or low-density areas. Therefore, a period-by-period
access charge regulation is hard to monitor accurately for the regulatory authority,
as regulatory rules are generally stated at a country/region level. Similarly, the
regulatory authority might be unable to set a time-dependent access charge if
there are several entrants, which have entered the market in different periods of
time (see Avenali, Matteucci and Reverberi [2010]).
7.5 Discussion: Margin squeeze as an ex-post
stand-alone abuse
We showed that it can be a dominant strategy for a regulated incumbent to exert
a margin squeeze in order to foreclose a downstream rival, and, hence, to protect
its upstream monopoly position. In this section, we explain why this margin
squeeze strategy constitutes a stand-alone abuse when analyzed ex-post. First,
we explain why the type of margin squeeze we illustrated in our model differs
from well-defined abuses such as below-cost pricing, price discrimination, tying,
and refusal-to-deal. Second, we explain why this type of margin squeeze should
be considered as an abuse of dominance.
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7.5.1 Margin squeeze under regulation: A specific form
of predation?
There exist several definitions to predatory pricing. If we follow an economics-
based definition of predation, a margin squeeze can be defined as a predatory
conduct.
Economics-based approach to predation. An economics-driven definition
of predation is given by Bolton, Brodley and Riordan [2000]. They define pre-
dation as “a price reduction that is profitable only because of the added market
power the predator gains from eliminating, disciplining or otherwise inhibiting the
competitive conduct of a rival or potential rival. Stated more precisely, a preda-
tory price is a price that is profit maximizing only because of its exclusionary or
other anticompetitive effects.”1
Similarly, de la Mano and Durand [2010] call for a three-step structured rule
of reason to assess predation. They state that predation must verify (i) evidence
of profit sacrifice, (ii) evidence of likely exclusion, and (iii) evidence of likely
recoupment, in order to be distinguished from fair price competition.
The margin squeeze we illustrate in our model correspond to these definitions,
as the incumbent incurs a loss or forgoes upstream profits in the first period in
order to foreclose a more efficient potential competitor, with a view to maintaining
its upstream monopoly position. We also observe a recoupment in the second
period as the incumbent sets a high non-competitive price after entry is deterred.
1According to this definition, predation may be used to induce a rival’s exit and/or to deter
entry. We adopt this definition as we focus on the case defined by our theoretical analysis, in
which a margin squeeze can be set by the incumbent for entry deterrence purposes only. This
dual-property of predation (exit and/or entry deterrence) has also been used by some other
authors to define predation. For instance, Joskow and Klevorick [1979] stated that “[p]redatory
pricing behavior involves a reduction of prices in the short run so as to drive competing firms
out of the market or to discourage entry of new firms in an effort to gain larger profits via higher
prices in the long run than would have been earned if the price reduction had not occurred.”
It is also the one used by the European Commission, as stated in its 2009 Guidance document,
in which the Commission refers to “actual or potential competitors.” It is to note, however,
that some other authors only define predation as a mean to exclude actual competitors (as an
example, in the OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, predatory pricing is defined as a strategy
of “driving competitors out of the market,” with a reference to entry deterrence only after the
exclusion of actual competitors, so as to avoid re-entry).
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Form-based approach to predation. A form-based approach to predation,
as applied by courts, generally requires below-cost pricing (the Areeda-Turner
test). That is, the predatory price has to be below a certain measure of costs. In
our model, the margin squeeze might occur at pˆI < uI+cI , but also at pˆI ≥ uI+cI ,
and, hence, can be defined as below-cost or above-cost predatory pricing.1
Or, above-cost predatory pricing is generally not recognized as an anticom-
petitive conduct. Indeed, as Elhauge [2003] and Carlton [2008] argue, restrictions
on above-cost pricing conducts might wrongfully restrict price competition and
protect less efficient competitors, and, therefore, might reduce social welfare.
More precisely, Carlton [2008] states that U.S. courts treat above-cost preda-
tory pricing as lawful because a rule that would penalize above-cost prices would
be (i) difficult to administer, (ii) unpredictable in application, and (iii) would dis-
courage pro-consumer price cutting. Similarly, Elhauge [2003] argues that there
are inherent implementation difficulties associated to an above-cost predation
ban, and that such a rule is not administrable. In addition, he states that only
less efficient entrants would be penalized by an above-cost predatory price.
However, some of these arguments do not hold when we consider the vertical
structure in which a margin squeeze takes place. A margin squeeze might be easily
detected through a so-called “imputation test,” which compares the incumbent’s
retail price, the access charge set by the regulatory authority, and the downstream
average variable cost of the incumbent. This test hence defines a margin squeeze
as a pricing conduct such as pI < a + cI .
2 This test is comparable to a price-
cost comparison for below-cost pricing regarding implementation difficulties and
ex-ante predictability.
Therefore, even if it fits the above-cost predation definition, a margin squeeze
does not verify the main economic argument for which above-cost predation is
considered as lawful by courts or authorities.
Hence, a margin squeeze under a regulated access charge may or may not
correspond to predation, regarding which definition we use for predation. On
1See, e.g., Edlin [2002] for an essay on the anticompetitive effects of above-cost predatory
pricing.
2Note that, whereas European authorities and courts rely on this imputation test to detect
a margin squeeze, the U.S. Supreme Court does not recognize such a test. As it states in its
linkLine decision: “[w]hether or not that test is administrable, it lacks any grounding in our
antitrust jurisprudence.”
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the one hand, when a broad economics-based definition is given for predation, all
the deterrence strategies in our model may be considered as predatory conducts.
On the other hand, when a form-based approach to predation is employed, such
strategies may correspond either to below-cost or above-cost predatory pricing.
When above-cost prices are not considered as predatory by courts, all the anti-
competitive effects arising from a margin squeeze cannot be managed under the
existing rules that condemn predatory pricing, and a margin squeeze would have
to be categorized as an independent anticompetitive conduct.
7.5.2 Margin squeeze differs from other anticompetitive
conducts
We now explain why the margin squeeze conduct we outline in our model differs
from refusals-to-deal, tying, and price-discrimination.
Refusal-to-deal. In our model, there is ex-ante regulation at the upstream
level as the access charge is set by the regulatory authority. Therefore, in this
regard, the incumbent has a duty-to-deal with the competitor and there cannot
be any refusal-to-deal.1 Indeed, as Vickers [2010] puts it, “regulation gives more,
not less, reason to apply competition law to refusal to supply cases,” because “in
regulated industries, unlike elsewhere, there is typically a duty to deal in the first
place.”
Tying. A tying strategy and the margin squeeze we illustrate in our model
of vertically-related markets are different conducts. One reason is that, whereas
under tying all goods are sold directly to final consumers, in a margin squeeze the
input is sold to a downstream competitor. The vertical structure of our model
1Whereas in EU competition authorities generally view a regulatory duty-to-deal as creating
a baseline for the application of competition laws, in the U.S. a court may distinguish an
antitrust duty-to-deal from a regulatory duty-to-deal. This is what happened in the linkLine
case; the incumbent was subject to a regulatory duty-to-deal which the Supreme Court did
not recognize as binding under antitrust laws (the access charge was not regulated, but the
incumbent had to set a retail price higher than or equal to its upstream charge). Instead, the
Supreme Court stated there was no existing antitrust duty-to-deal, and, hence, that the case
could not be brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as long as the incumbent’s prices
were not predatory.
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is therefore a key element for the incumbent to abuse its upstream dominant
position.
Another difference between tying and a margin squeeze conduct is that, in
our model, the access charge is regulated.1 Therefore, the incumbent only has
one instrument to set up this anticompetitive conduct; its retail price.
Price-discrimination. In our model, we suppose that vertical integration does
not permit the setting of an internal price for the input. Therefore, the squeeze
in our model cannot be analyzed according to a price-discrimination conduct.
However, if the setting of an internal price was feasible, the incumbent would
be able to abuse its upstream dominant position by setting discriminatory prices
between its own downstream retailer and its competitor. If the anticompetitive
conduct is proven and the incumbent stated that it charged the same price for
both downstream firms, this would mean that the incumbent’s downstream divi-
sion engaged in a below-cost predatory pricing conduct.
We have explained why the margin squeeze such in our model is a stand-
alone conduct, as it differs from well-established conducts as below-cost predation,
refusal-to-deal, tying, or price discrimination. It is to note that the European
Commission, followed by European courts, have given margin squeeze a stand-
alone definition. That is, in EU law, there is no need to demonstrate that access
charges or retail tariffs are abusive on their own for a margin squeeze to be
recognized as abusive. By contrast, in the U.S., the Supreme Court stated so far
that a margin squeeze is not a stand-alone anticompetitive abuse under section
2 of the Sherman Act, and that margin squeeze cases might only be condemned
under antitrust laws if anticompetitive predation or refusal-to-deal is proven.2
7.5.3 Margin squeeze as an anticompetitive abuse
We demonstrated that a margin squeeze under access regulation is a stand-alone
conduct. We now show that this conduct should be defined as abusive.
1See, e.g., the paper by Carlton and Waldman [2002] in which the incumbent is uncon-
strained in setting its primary product price.
2It is to note, however, that the Supreme Court has not defined yet margin squeeze in the
presence of an antitrust duty-to-deal.
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Firstly, Carlton [2008] claims that a margin squeeze ban would cause con-
sumer harm, because such a ban would induce downstream competitors to raise
their retail prices as they would be protected by an ‘umbrella’ from tough price
competition; and, hence, that a margin squeeze should not be considered as a
stand-alone anticompetitive conduct. Similarly, Sidak [2008] concludes that such
a ban “would create a powerful incentive for the vertically integrated firm to raise
its retail price to reduce the risk of antitrust lawsuits by unprofitable downstream
competitors.”
As Chone´, Komly and Meunier [2010] demonstrate using a theoretical model,
if the (more efficient) downstream competitor would also enter or stay in the mar-
ket under a lower retail price set by the incumbent, a margin squeeze ban would
allow the competitor to raise its price, as compared to the no-ban case. However,
Chone´, Komly and Meunier [2010] also explain why such a ban would bring ef-
ficiency, when the downstream competitor would be foreclosed if the incumbent
was entailing a margin squeeze. In this regard, declaring a margin squeeze as
abusive would be welfare-enhancing.
The welfare impact of the umbrella effect is related to the shape of the demand
curve, and to the surplus split between the two firms. Firstly, when the demand
curve is steep on the interval [a+ cE, a+ cI ], the impact of the umbrella effect on
social surplus is low, as demand is almost the same for any price in this interval.
Secondly, if the entrant is able to extract all extra-surplus introduced by its lower
downstream cost, there is no umbrella effect.
Secondly, another argument from the opponents of the recognition of margin
squeeze as an abuse of dominant position is that a margin squeeze ban harms
vertical integration incentives and favors double-marginalization. We argue that
our analysis opposes three counter-arguments to this claim. First, in our model
the incumbent already is vertically-integrated at the beginning of the game, as
it is a former monopolist. Hence, there is no further integration incentives to be
gained. Second, when the access charge is regulated, the incumbent might not
be able to use fully its upstream monopoly power. Hence, the upstream margin
might not always be important. Third, in our model the incumbent engages in a
margin squeeze strategy in order to prevent the alternative competitor to invest
in its own upstream facilities. Or, if the competitor manages to do so, it would
become a (more efficient) vertically-integrated firm and this would put an end to
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double marginalization.
In this discussion, we exposed why the margin squeeze we illustrate in our
model should be defined as a stand-alone conduct, and why a margin squeeze,
when the access charge is regulated, may harm competition and should be con-
sidered as an anticompetitive abuse. We did not answer the question, however,
on whether a margin squeeze should in general be dealt with by regulatory or
competition authorities. Nevertheless, when the downstream market is outside
the intervention scope of the regulatory authority, only competition agencies are
always able to deal, ex-post, with margin squeeze abuses.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed a theory for a margin squeeze strategy based on
vertical defensive leveraging. We set-up a two-period model of competition be-
tween an incumbent and a potential entrant in order to show that margin squeeze
can occur as an entry-deterrence strategy in equilibrium, when the access charge
is regulated.
The vertically-integrated incumbent might engage in a margin squeeze to deter
entry, in order to maintain its upstream monopoly position in the second period.
The logic of foreclosure hence follows the vertical defensive leverage argument,
according to which the incumbent monopolizes the downstream market because
it will lose its upstream monopoly position if it does not.
In this chapter, we only focused on the case of an incumbent entailing a
margin squeeze when the price of the upstream essential input is regulated. Our
analysis could thus be extended with discussions on margin squeeze conducts in
other regulatory configurations (for instance, under no regulation, or price-cap
regulation at the upstream level).
7.7 Appendix
7.7.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 7.1. We know that πDE (p) ≤ πV IE (p), ∀p, because when it
is a vertically-integrated firm, the entrant benefits from lower marginal costs.
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When we take into account the fixed cost F , the profit curve πV IE (p) is translated
downward. We assumed that p˜E is unique, that is, the profit curves π
D
E (p) and
πV IE (p) − F , which are strictly concave, cross only once, at price p˜E. Below this
point, the profit curve πV IE (p)− F will be above πDE (p), and vice-versa.
Proof of Proposition 7.1. We assume that Condition 7.1 is satisfied. By com-
paring the two options the E has in the first period, we can see that it will set
a price lower than the incumbent’s one in the first period (and then invest in its
own upstream facilities in the second period) if and only if it makes total positive
profits. Indeed, it will make zero profit if it does not enter in the first period and
if πV IE (uI + cI)−F ≡ f < f , as we know from Lemma 7.3 that E will never enter
the market.
Furthermore, I will never set a price below a+ cI . Indeed, even if it seeks to
maximize its first-period profit only, the incumbent will undercut any price below
a + cI , as it would be more profitable for it to serve the market at such a price
rather than to earn upstream revenues.
Therefore, E will never enter the market when it cannot make overall positive
profit with a price a + cI in the first period. At such a price, its total profit
equals (cI − cE)D(a+ cI)− f + f . We define f ≡ (cI − cE)D(a+ cI) + f as the
highest downstream entry cost for which E can profitably enter the market when
Condition 7.1 is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 7.2. We demonstrate the proof in two steps. First, we
define pˆI as the incumbent first-period price at which the entrant is indifferent
between entering or not the market, when f < f ≤ f . Second, we define when it
is profitable for the incumbent to deter entry.
When f < f ≤ f , the incumbent can set a first-period price that is so low
that the potential competitor would prefer not to enter, in any period. We define
pˆI as the incumbent first-period price at which the entrant is indifferent between
entering the downstream market (and then invest, from Proposition 7.1) and
not entering the downstream market (and then stay outside the market, from
Proposition 7.1), in the first period. We write pˆI such that: (pˆI−(a+cE))D(pˆI)−
f + f = 0.
If we write g(p) ≡ (p− (a+ cE))D(p)− f + f , we can state that g(a+ cI) > 0,
as f ≤ f ; and that g(a+ cE) < 0, as f < f , and f is positive. Or, g(p) is a sum
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of continuous functions and, hence, is continuous. Therefore, there exists at least
one p˙ ∈ [a+ cE, a+ cI ] such that g(p˙) = 0.
Furthermore, as (p− c)D(p) is strictly concave in p, then g(.) is also strictly
concave. Therefore, there exists only one p˙ ∈ [a+ cE, a+ cI ] such that g(p˙) = 0.
We call this price pˆI .
To foreclose the entrant, the incumbent would set a price pˆI and would serve
all consumers. Indeed, if the incumbent sets a price above pˆI , the entrant would
enter the market in the first period (and then invest in the second period, from
Proposition 7.1). Additionally, if the incumbent sets a price below pˆI , the incum-
bent’s total profit increases in its retail price.
Finally, when f < f ≤ f , the incumbent always obtains greater profits by
squeezing the entrant if (pˆI − (uI + cI))D(pˆI) + (p∗I − (uI + cI))D(p∗I) > (a −
uI)D(pˆI).
7.7.2 Margin squeeze when p˜E ≤ a+ cI
In this appendix we explain why a margin squeeze may also arise in equilibrium
when p˜E ≤ a+ cI .
7.7.2.1 Second period
When p˜E ≤ a + cI , in the second period the entrant may be a downstream
operator.
E entered the downstream market in the first period. In this case, in
contrast to what we found above, the unique equilibrium with E investing in
upstream facilities is not the only equilibrium with E serving the market in the
second period. Indeed, E may remain a downstream operator in the second
period. More precisely, there exists a continuum of equilibria in which E serves
the downstream market at price pE and I earns upstream revenues in the first
period, with a+ cE ≤ pE ≤ a+ cI .
Indeed, both firms would undercut a price larger than a + cI , whereas none
of them would like to serve the market at a price below a + cE (the incumbent
prefers that its competitor serves the market at a price below a + cE and the
latter would make a negative profit doing so). Besides, the incumbent will never
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undercut the entrant when the latter sets a price in the interval [a + cE, a + cI ].
Indeed, for any retail price below a+cI , the incumbent earns a higher profit when
operating in the upstream market only than when serving the downstream market
itself. However, the incumbent would like the entrant to set the lowest feasible
retail price in order to increase demand and its upstream profit. By contrast,
the entrant earns a larger profit serving the market at a high retail price. Hence,
the entrant serving the retail market at a price pE with the incumbent earning
upstream revenues and setting a retail price slightly above the entrant’s one is an
equilibrium for any pE ∈ [a + cE, a + cI ]. The multiple equilibria correspond to
the different splits of the surplus from the entrant’s cost advantage between both
firms. Note that the existence of a continuum of equilibria is a standard result
in the literature (see Chone´, Komly and Meunier [2010]; or Choi and Stefanadis
[2001] and Carlton and Waldman [2002] for a similar result in horizontally-related
markets).
In addition, the incumbent would like to undercut any price below p˜E, because
it will not make any profit at this price, as the entrant will invest. Furthermore, I
cannot credibly commit to a price below uI+cI in the second period; and, finally,
E will not set any price below a + cE if it does not invest, because this would
give it a negative profit. Hence, for all prices in the interval [max{a + cE, uI +
cI , p˜E}, a+ cI ], there is a continuum of equilibria with E serving the downstream
market and I earning upstream revenues.
Lemma 7.4. Suppose the competitor entered the downstream market in the first
period. There is a continuum of equilibria where it serves the market as a down-
stream operator at price pE ∈ [max{a+ cE, uI + cI , p˜E}, a+ cI ].
Proof. Omitted.
Nevertheless, there might be an equilibrium in which E invests in its upstream
facilities, as stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 7.5. Suppose the competitor entered the downstream market in the first
period. Then, there is a unique equilibrium in which it invests in its own up-
stream facilities in the second period if and only if the following two conditions
are satisfied:
(i) p˜E > uI + cI or a+ cE > uI + cI > p˜E;
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(ii) πV IE (uI + cI)− F ≥ 0.
Otherwise, there is no such equilibrium.
Proof. We know that p˜E ≤ a+ cI . First, suppose that p˜E ≥ uI + cI . The incum-
bent would undercut any price between p˜E and uI+cI . Hence, the equilibrium in
which E invests occurs at price uI + cI . It is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
if it is profitable for the entrant to serve the market at this price.
Second, suppose that p˜E < uI + cI . When uI + cI > a + cE, the entrant
will never invest in its own facilities, as the incumbent cannot undercut any price
below uI + cI , and the entrant finds it more profitable to stay a downstream
operator at this price. By contrast, when a + cE > uI + cI , there is such an
equilibrium.
Note that both the entrant and the incumbent would benefit from any of the
equilibria where the entrant is a downstream operator as compared to the one
where the entrant invests in its facilities. However, the latest equilibrium might
occur because of mis-coordination between both firms.
E did not enter the downstream market in the first period. As above,
if E did not enter the downstream market in the first period, then it can set a
higher price than the incumbent to remain outside the market and make zero
profit, or it can undercut the incumbent and invest in upstream facilities at price
uI + cI and make profit π
V I
E (uI + cI)− F − f .
However, there is also another option: E can enter the downstream market
at price pE < pI , and make profit π
D
E (pE)− f . We define p¨ as the price at which
the entrant makes zero profit if it serves the market as a downstream firm, i.e.,
πDE (p¨)− f = 0.
Lemma 7.6. Suppose the competitor did not enter in the first period. Then, it
remains outside the market in the second period if and only if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(i) πV IE (uI + cI)− F − f < 0;
(ii) p¨ < max{a+ cE, uI + cI , p˜E}.
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Proof. Condition (i) ensures that the entrant will prefer to remain outside the
market than to become a vertically-integrated firm. Condition (ii) ensures that
the entrant will prefer to remain outside the market than to become a downstream
operator. Indeed, as the profit function is concave, whenever p¨ < max{a+cE, uI+
cI , p˜E} (where max{a + cE, uI + cI , p˜E} is the lowest equilibrium price at which
the entrant can be a downstream operator) the entrant does not earn a positive
profit by entering the downstream market.
7.7.2.2 First period
We see from Lemma 7.6 that for some parameters, as in Proposition 7.1, being a
downstream operator in the first period is a key element for the entrant to remain
in the market and to invest in the second period. Therefore, the incumbent might
entail a margin squeeze in order to deter entry, as in Proposition 7.2. Indeed, the
incumbent may fear that the selected equilibrium in the second period is the one
with the entrant investing when the latter enters in the first period, and, hence,
behave predatorily by entailing a margin squeeze.
Similarly, the incumbent might entail a margin squeeze if it is profitable for
it to become a monopolist, even though the entrant would not invest in the
second period. Indeed, following the Bell doctrine, the monopolist might prefer
to foreclose the market because it cannot extract a full monopoly rent because of
regulation.
This proves that margin squeeze can also occur in equilibrium when p˜E ≤
a+ cI .
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Chapter 8
The Interplay between Margin
Squeeze and Regulation
8.1 Introduction
Among economists and legal scholars, whether or not ex-post antitrust laws
should apply to ex-ante regulated markets is a long-standing debate. Therefore,
having a clear understanding of how ex-ante regulation influences anticompetitive
conducts is of prime importance. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, in
recent years, U.S. and European competition authorities and courts have dealt
with important predatory cases in ex-ante regulated industries, such as telecom-
munications,1 energy,2 and utilities.3
These industries are generally characterized by a vertically-integrated firm,
owner of an upstream essential facility, whose access charge is subject to ex-ante
regulation. In this case, a vertically-integrated firm which sets low retail prices
can foreclose the market by squeezing its competitor’s margin. Therefore, we
can consider margin squeeze (or price squeeze) as a predatory conduct.4 The
1See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities v. Deutsche Telekom (Case
COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), and Commission of the European Communities v. Tele-
fonica (Case COMP/38.784) in Europe; and Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Commu-
nications, Inc. (Case 129 S. Ct. 1109) in the U.S.
2See, e.g., the French Autorite´ de la concurrence’s decision (2007) in Direct e´nergie v Elec-
tricite´ de France (EDF) (Case 07-D-43).
3See, e.g., the British OFWAT’s decision (2004) in Albion Water v Dwˆr Cymru (Case
CA98/00/48).
4This pricing strategy differs from a raising rival’s cost strategy (or ‘non-price predation,’
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purpose of this chapter is precisely to understand the impact of the regulated
access charge on the vertically-integrated firm’s incentive to behave predatorily
and to foreclose the market.1
The regulated access charge influences the vertically-integrated incumbent’s
incentive to undertake a margin squeeze according to two opposite effects. On
the one hand, an increase in the access charge raises the incumbent’s upstream
revenues when it serves its downstream competitor, making margin squeeze less
likely. On the other hand, the incumbent’s ‘squeezing price’ – the retail price at
which competition is eliminated – increases in the access charge, because the latter
is part of the competitor’s marginal cost. In turn, this lowers the incumbent’s
cost to behave predatorily.
The tradeoff between these two effects has received little attention in the
literature. One notable exception is the contribution by Biglaiser and DeGraba
[2001]. The authors study a horizontally-differentiated market a` la Hotelling and
find out that the incentive to engage in a margin squeeze always decreases in the
access charge, as the ‘upstream-profit effect’ overcomes the ‘cost-reduction effect.’
This clear-cut result has been echoed by economists as well as policymakers (see
Vogelsang [2003], and the U.S. contribution in OECD [2009]).2
In this chapter, we show that the incentive to undertake a margin squeeze
might either decrease or increase in the access charge, in contrast to the result in
Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001]. We explain precisely the two effects at stake when
the access charge increases. We demonstrate that, as the cost-reduction effect
occurs in the first period only whereas the upstream-profit effect takes place in
both periods, a low-enough discount factor may induce the cost-reduction effect
to overcome the upstream-profit effect, thus leading the incentive to undertake a
margin squeeze to increase in the access charge.
see Salop and Scheffman [1983, 1987]), as the incumbent’s own cost is not directly affected
whether or not the cost of the downstream operator increases (i.e., when the access charge
increases).
1Such a conduct might occur below-cost (predation), or above-cost (margin squeeze), as the
access charge might be regulated above the upstream cost. For consistency reasons, we refer in
general to ‘margin squeeze strategies,’ acknowledging that the squeezing price might be below
or above cost.
2Vogelsang [2003] states, at p. 839, that “[w]hile higher access charges increase opportunities
for predation, they reduce the incentive to do so;” and in OECD [2009], p. 249, one can read
that “higher wholesale prices actually discourage using a margin squeeze to drive downstream
rivals out of the market.”
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This chapter relates to the literature on anticompetitive pricing conducts un-
dertaken by a vertically-integrated firm facing downstream competitors which
rely on its bottleneck input.1 The Chicago School claimed that a monopolist
owner of an essential facility would have no incentive to foreclose a more effi-
cient downstream competitor (Posner [1976], Bork [1978]). However, there are
some circumstances where the Chicago School argument does not hold (see, e.g.,
Rey and Tirole [2007] for a review). For instance, Chen [2013] shows that a
vertically-integrated incumbent may refuse to deal with a more efficient down-
stream competitor in order to protect its upstream monopoly position. Indeed,
the competitor’s entry in the downstream market might facilitate its investment
in the upstream market in the long run, because of economies of scope between
the downstream and upstream products for instance.
Similarly, as Vickers [2010] puts it, “the presence of regulation is one reason
why the Chicago School ‘one monopoly profit’ argument for scepticism about
leverage claims may not apply.” This is known as the Bell doctrine: a regulated
monopolist might find it profitable to leverage market power from the regulated
to the competitive segment of the market.2
this chapter differs from the existing literature as we do not restate why
regulation can induce anticompetitive conducts that would not take place without
regulation. Instead, we consider access regulation as given, and we analyze the
impact of the level of the regulated access charge on the incumbent’s incentive to
undertake a margin squeeze.
Apart from Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001], only few authors have studied mar-
gin squeeze strategies in a regulated environment. Bouckaert and Verboven [2004]
study the application of margin squeeze tests under different regulatory regimes.
They argue that margin squeeze tests should be used as an ex-post instrument
only when access charges are regulated and retail prices are left unregulated,
which is the framework we use in this chapter.
Chone´, Komly and Meunier [2010] analyze the welfare impact of an ex-post
margin squeeze ban under potential entry and ex-ante access regulation, taking
1In this chapter, we do not consider non-price discrimination (or sabotage) strategies. For a
review of this literature, see, e.g., Economides [1998], Mandy [2000], Weisman and Kang [2001],
and Mandy and Sappington [2007].
2The Bell doctrine is also called Baxter’s law, after William Francis Baxter, the assistant
attorney general who settled the AT&T break-up in 1982.
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into consideration the ‘umbrella effect.” This effect corresponds to the incum-
bent’s incentive to raise retail prices when margin squeeze is banned ex-post (see
also Carlton [2008]). They show that an ex-post margin squeeze ban can be wel-
fare increasing when it induces entry of the downstream competitor which would
have been otherwise foreclosed. However, they explain that such a ban may re-
duce welfare because of the umbrella effect if the competitor would have entered
the market anyway.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the interplay between engaging
in a margin squeeze and regulation of the access charge. We explain why a
regulatory authority should carefully monitor possible anticompetitive conducts
when raising the regulated price of the upstream input, as it may increase the
incumbent’s incentive to undertake a margin squeeze doing so.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. The model is introduced in Section
8.2. In Section 8.3, we solve the model, and we present our main results on
the incumbent’s incentive to undertake a margin squeeze in Section 8.4. Some
robustness checks and extensions are provided in Section 8.5, and Section 8.6
concludes.
8.2 The model
Firms. There are two firms, a vertically-integrated incumbent I and a down-
stream entrant E. The incumbent has a constant upstream marginal cost cu and
a constant downstream marginal cost cI . It can sell the upstream input to a
downstream competitor, at no extra cost.
As a downstream operator, E relies on the incumbent’s upstream input and
needs one unit of input to produce one unit of output. The entrant has a down-
stream constant marginal cost cE, with cE ≤ cI . That is, we assume that the
entrant is more efficient than the incumbent in the downstream market.1 The
firms provide homogeneous products and compete in linear prices. Finally, we
denote the incumbent’s discount factor by δ, with δ ≥ 0.
1In the opposite case, the competitor’s entry would not be welfare-enhancing, and, hence,
the need for regulation may not be justified.
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Consumers. In each period, demand is characterized by the continuous, de-
creasing, and non-negative function D(p), where p is the retail price at which
consumers buy the good. Each consumer buys only one unit of the downstream
product in each period. We assume that the profit function π(p; c) ≡ (p−c)D(p) is
continuous and strictly concave in p. For a given cost c, profit is hence maximized
at the monopoly price pm(c). We define πmI ≡ (pm(cI+cu)−(cI+cu))D(pm(cI+cu))
as the incumbent’s profit when it is a monopolist at the retail level. We denote
by Π the incumbent discounted profits.
When both firms set the same retail price, we assume, without lost of gen-
erality, that the incumbent serves the retail market. This is because consumers
feel more comfortable to buy from the firm they already know, when prices are
equal.
We assume that the cohort of consumers in the first period differs from the
cohort of consumers in the second period; that is, no first-period consumer exists
in the second period. Similarly, we could consider myopic consumers who would
only be concerned by the prices in the current period.
Regulation. The regulatory authority sets the incumbent’s access charge, a,
but does not regulate retail prices. The regulatory authority sets the access charge
above the incumbent upstream marginal cost to cover the per-period fixed costs
associated with broadband provision. Therefore, we assume that the regulated
access charge is defined on a bounded interval and is higher than the upstream
marginal cost; that is, a ∈ [a, a], with a ≥ cu.1
Besides, as we focus on situations where the incumbent is constrained by
regulation, we study the cases where a ≤ am, where am ≡ pm(cI + cu)− cI is the
access charge that corresponds to the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR),
or retail-minus.
As a technical assumption, we consider that the entrant does not have a strong
1As explained by Laffont and Tirole [2001], a regulatory authority generally sets a at an
intermediate level, as a high access charge sets high barriers to entry and might lead to ineffi-
cient duplication of the bottleneck, whereas a low access charge discourages incumbents from
investing, dissuades entrants from building their facilities, and might lead to inefficient entry.
Similarly, Heimler [2010] explains why a regulatory authority sets an above-cost access charge
to help entrants to build their own facilities, hence giving scope to the incumbent to undertake
a margin squeeze. In addition, a regulatory authority may set an above-cost access charge for
funding universal service obligations, or because of information asymmetries.
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downstream-cost advantage over the incumbent:
Assumption 8.1. pm(cE + a) ≥ a+ cI , ∀a ∈ [a, a].
Hence, if it would have to serve the market, the entrant could not do it at its
monopoly price.
Financial constraints. We follow the long-purse (or deep-pocket) argument
by assuming that the entrant is financially constrained and that its survival in
the second-period depends on its first-period profit level.1
Each firm needs to incur a fixed cost F at the beginning of each period, in
order to start production. We assume that both firms have incurred the fixed cost
for the first period at the beginning of the game; so they can both compete for
consumers. The incumbent has unlimited financial resources so it can use direct
finance to incur F in the second period, whereas the entrant has limited capital
A. Following Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001], we do not model the financial market
in which firms could borrow fundings (see Benoit [1984], Bolton and Scharfstein
[1990], or Holmstro¨m and Tirole [1997] for a theoretical justification of the long-
purse argument). Instead, we assume that the financial market is characterized
by information asymmetry and that the entrant’s capital is too small to convince
investors (see Holmstro¨m and Tirole [1997]); hence, the entrant has to rely solely
on its own capital A.
We assume that A = F + γ, with γ ≥ 0, so that the entrant cannot lose
‘too much’ in the first period if it wants to remain in the market in the second
period.2 If it loses more than γ (i.e., its first-period profit is strictly below −γ),
the entrant will not be able to start the second-period production because its
remaining capital would be below F .
Finally, following Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001], we assume barriers to re-
entry; that is, if the entrant makes zero sale in the first-period, it cannot re-enter
the market in the second period. In a nutshell, the entrant must serve the market
without making a too negative profit in the first period. If it does not, the
incumbent is a monopolist in the second period.
1See Motta [2004], p. 413, for a detailed explanation of the long-purse argument.
2We study the case where A ≤ F in Section 8.5.
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Timing. The regulated access charge is exogenously set by the regulator for
the whole game before any firm’s decision.1 The timing of the game is then as
follows.
1. First period:
(a) Both firms simultaneously set their retail prices.
(b) Then, consumers purchase the product.
(c) Finally, if E makes a first-period profit equal to or lower than −γ ≤ 0,
it leaves the market.
2. Second period:
(a) I and E (if it remains in the market) simultaneously set their retail
prices for the second period.
(b) Then, consumers purchase the product.
We look for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.
8.3 The equilibrium
We solve the game by backward induction, and start by the second period.
8.3.1 Second period
In the last period of the game, either the incumbent has driven its competitor
out of the market and is a monopolist or there is Bertrand competition between
firms.
If the incumbent is a monopolist, it earns a profit πmI and the entrant earns
zero profit. By contrast, if both firms are in the market, there exists a continuum
of equilibria, with the entrant E serving the market at price pE ∈ [a+ cE, a+ cI ].
Indeed, both firms would undercut a price larger than a + cI , whereas none of
them would like to serve the market at a price below a+cE (the incumbent prefers
1We analyze the case where the regulatory authority sets a time-dependent access charge
in Section 8.5.
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that its competitor serves the market at a price below a+cE and the latter would
make a negative profit doing so).
Besides, the incumbent will never undercut the entrant when the latter sets
a price in the interval [a + cE, a + cI ]. Indeed, for any retail price below a + cI ,
the incumbent earns a higher profit when operating in the upstream market only
than when serving the downstream market itself. However, the incumbent would
like the entrant to set the lowest feasible retail price in order to increase demand
and its upstream profit. By contrast, the entrant earns a larger profit serving the
market at a high retail price. Hence, the entrant serving the retail market at a
price pE with the incumbent earning upstream revenues and setting a retail price
slightly above the entrant’s one is an equilibrium for any pE ∈ [a+ cE, a+ cI ].1
In what follows, we focus on the case where the market is served at the
entrant’s preferred price (i.e., pE = a + cI), in order to cancel any umbrella
effect on welfare. Therefore, when there is no squeeze in the first period, the
incumbent’s second-period profit is πNS ≡ (a−cu)D(a+cI), whereas the entrant’s
profit equals πE ≡ (cI − cE)D(a + cI). We study the other cases, when the
equilibrium price is not pE = a+ cI , in a robustness check in Section 8.5.
We now turn to analyzing the firms’ first-period strategies.
8.3.2 First period
In the first period, the incumbent decides whether or not to engage in a margin
squeeze.
No margin squeeze. When the incumbent does not undertake a conduct that
squeeze its competitor out of the market, the game is exactly as in the second
period. In this case, the incumbent and its competitor earn πNS and πE, respec-
tively.
Without margin squeeze the entrant always remains in the market as we have
πE ≥ 0 ≥ −γ, because we assumed that cE ≤ cI .
1The existence of a continuum of equilibria is a standard result in the literature (see, e.g.,
Chone´, Komly and Meunier [2010]). See also Choi and Stefanadis [2001] and Carlton and
Waldman [2002] for a similar result in horizontally-related markets. Finally, note that if we
had cE > cI , the incumbent would always serve the market at price a+ cE .
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Finally, over the whole game, the incumbent earns the following profit when
it does not engage in a margin squeeze:
ΠNS = (1 + δ)πNS. (8.1)
Margin squeeze. When the incumbent undertakes a margin squeeze, it sets
the squeezing price, which is the highest price that the entrant cannot undercut
while making a first-period profit larger than or equal to −γ. Therefore, the
squeezing price, pˆ, is defined by:
(pˆ− (a+ cE))D(pˆ) = −γ. (8.2)
We can state the following result:
Proposition 8.1. The squeezing price pˆ exists, is unique, and is lower than
a+ cE.
Proof. The profit function π(p; a + cE) = (p− (a + cE))D(p) is strictly concave.
Hence, we have limp→−∞ π(p; a+cE) = −∞ if there is no vertical asymptote, and
limp→p0 π(p; a + cE) = −∞ if there is one at p0. Moreover, π(a + cI ; a + cE) >
0. Therefore, there exists a unique (possibly negative) price pˆ which cannot
profitably be undercut by the entrant for which (pˆ − (a + cE))D(pˆ) = −γ, with
γ ≥ 0. Furthermore, we have pˆ ≤ a + cE, because π(a + cE; a + cE) = 0 and it
must be that (pˆ− (a+ cE))D(pˆ) ≤ 0.
When it undertakes a margin squeeze, the incumbent earns the first-period
profit πS ≡ (pˆ − (cu + cI))D(pˆ). As the profit function is concave and pˆ ≤
a + cI < p
m(cI + cu), we have π
S ≤ πNS. Hence, it is costly for the incumbent
to undertake a margin squeeze; when it does so, its first-period profit is lowered.
When it undertakes a margin squeeze against its competitor, the incumbent’s
two-period profit is:
ΠS = πS + δπmI . (8.3)
In what follows, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 8.2. pˆ is continuous and twice-differentiable in a.
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Margin squeeze incentive. Having calculated the incumbent’s profits under
squeeze and no-squeeze decisions, we can determine its incentive to abuse of its
dominant position to drive its competitor out of the market. We call H the
incumbent’s incentive to engage in a margin squeeze. From equations (8.1) and
(8.3), we have:
H ≡ ΠS − ΠNS,
= πS + δπmI − (1 + δ)πNS.
(8.4)
8.4 Impact of the access charge on the incentive
to engage in a margin squeeze
We now analyze the impact of the access charge on the incentive to engage in a
margin squeeze. We have:
∂H
∂a
=
∂pˆ
∂a
∂πS
∂pˆ
− (1 + δ)∂πNS
∂a
, (8.5)
with ∂πS/∂pˆ = D(pˆ) + (pˆ − cu − cI)D′(pˆ), and ∂πNS/∂a = D(a + cI) + (a −
cu)D
′(a+ cI).
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (8.5) corresponds to the cost-
reduction effect, that is, the impact of the access charge on the cost of undertaking
a margin squeeze. The second term in the equation represents the upstream-profit
effect, that is, the impact of the access charge on upstream profits.
8.4.1 The effect of the access charge on the squeezing
price
The derivative of the squeezing price with respect to the access charge appears
in equation (8.5). From equation (8.2), we have:
∂pˆ
∂a
= [1 +
pˆ− (a+ cE)
pˆ
ǫ(pˆ)]−1,
= [1− γǫ(pˆ)
pˆD(pˆ)
]−1,
(8.6)
where ǫ(pˆ) ≡ pˆD′(pˆ)/D(pˆ) is the elasticity of demand evaluated at the squeezing
price pˆ.
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∂pˆ/∂a is the rate at which a change in the access charge is passed through
in the incumbent’s squeezing price pˆ. From equation (8.6), we see that this
rate depends on the entrant’s price-cost margin and the demand elasticity, both
evaluated at pˆ. Also, it can be expressed as a function of the survival loss γ, the
demand elasticity, and the revenue at the squeezing price.
This rate is equivalent to an out-of-equilibrium pass-through rate, keeping
profit constant (at the survival-loss level γ). Note that it is different from the
usual pass-through rate in the literature, which is defined at the profit-maximizing
price and that depends on second-order properties of the demand function (see,
e.g., Bulow and Pfleiderer [1983]).
As pˆ is twice-differentiable, ∂pˆ/∂a exists and is continuous for all a. From
equation (8.6), we have ∂pˆ/∂a ∈ (0, 1]; that is, the squeezing price always in-
creases in the access charge.
8.4.2 The effect of the access charge on the incentive to
undertake a margin squeeze
As the profit function is strictly concave, and as pˆ ≤ a + cI , we have ∂πS/∂pˆ ≥
∂πNS/∂a > 0. As ∂pˆ/∂a ∈ (0, 1], we find that the cost-reduction effect ∂pˆ/∂a ∗ ∂πS/∂pˆ
might be below or above ∂πNS/∂a, the upstream-profit effect component for the
first-period only.
We define the following condition:
Condition 8.1.
∂pˆ
∂a
∂πS
∂pˆ
>
∂πNS
∂a
.
We can now state our main result.
Proposition 8.2. For a given a there exists a unique δ∗(a) ≥ 0 such that the
incentive to undertake a margin squeeze decreases in the access charge for all δ >
δ∗(a), and increases in the access charge otherwise. Moreover, when Condition
8.1 holds for a given a, δ∗(a) > 0; otherwise, δ∗(a) = 0.
Proof. First, note that ∂pˆ/∂a, ∂πS/∂pˆ, and ∂πNS/∂a are all positive and finite,
and that they do not depend on δ. Therefore, ∂H/∂a is continuous and decreasing
in δ, for a given a. Second, when Condition 8.1 does not hold, ∂H/∂a is negative
222 8. The Interplay between Margin Squeeze and Regulation
for any δ ≥ 0. Therefore, δ∗(a) = 0. When Condition 8.1 holds, ∂H/∂a is positive
at δ = 0, but limδ→+∞ ∂H/∂a = −∞. As ∂H/∂a is monotone and continuous in
δ, there is strictly one positive δ∗(a) such that ∂H/∂a|δ=δ∗(a) = 0. In this case, we
find that δ∗(a) = (∂pˆ/∂a ∗ ∂πS/∂pˆ)/(∂πNS/∂a)− 1. We have ∂H/∂a < 0 when
δ > δ∗(a), and ∂H/∂a ≥ 0 otherwise.
On the one hand, an increase in the access charge raises the incumbent’s
upstream revenues when it serves its downstream competitor, and this upstream-
profit effect makes margin squeeze less likely. On the other hand, the incumbent’s
squeezing price pˆ increases in the access charge, and this lowers the incumbent’s
cost to engage in a margin squeeze. This is the cost-reduction effect of an increase
in the access charge.
Proposition 8.2 demonstrates that the incentive to engage in a margin squeeze
might be increasing in the access charge. When ∂pˆ/∂a is high enough and the
discount factor δ is low enough (i.e., below the threshold δ∗(a)), the incentive to
behave predatorily increases in the access charge. Indeed, the cost-reduction effect
only occurs in the first-period, when the incumbent undertakes a margin squeeze,
whereas the upstream-profit effect takes place in both periods. Therefore, the
cost-reduction effect may overcome the upstream-profit effect when the discount
factor is low enough. This result differs from the one from Biglaiser and DeGraba
[2001]. It shows that a regulatory authority may induce anticompetitive conducts
by raising the access charge. Therefore, a regulatory authority should carefully
monitor possible anticompetitive pricing conducts when increasing the price of
the upstream input.
What drives the difference between our result and the one in Biglaiser and
DeGraba [2001]? In their model, they assume no discounting and a covered
market (even though firms face a downward sloping demand from each consumer),
and they find that the incumbent’s incentive to undertake a margin squeeze always
decreases in the access charge. However, their result cannot be generalized if we
introduce a discount factor different from 1 in their model. This is because, for
some values of the discount factor, their model does not allow to state whether
the incentive to undertake a margin squeeze increases or decreases in the access
charge. The model we use is different and it allows us to state a clear-cut result
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for any discount factor.1
However, the result stated in Proposition 8.2 does not tell us when an in-
cumbent would actually squeeze its competitor. For instance, when δ = 0, the
incumbent would always serve the downstream entrant because H < 0 according
to equation (8.4), even if the incentive to engage in a margin squeeze increases in
the access charge.
Note that the threshold discount factor δ∗(a) might be above 1. Even though
this is not widespread in the literature, discount factors exceeding 1 are relevant.
For instance, as explained by Laffont and Tirole [1987], the “accounting period
in the second production stage might exceed that for the first production stage.”
Note also that the results from Proposition 8.2 are only valid for a given access
charge. However, Proposition 8.3 below and its corollary provide an extension of
the main result to all a.
Proposition 8.3. When δ > maxa{δ∗(a)} (resp., δ < mina{δ∗(a)}), the in-
centive to undertake a margin squeeze always decreases (resp., increases) in the
access charge.
Proof. We know that ∂pˆ/∂a, ∂πS/∂pˆ, and ∂πNS/∂a are continuous in a. Hence,
∂H/∂a is also continuous in a. Therefore, by continuity, if the incentive to en-
gage in a margin squeeze decreases (resp., increases) in a for any given a, it
decreases (resp., increases) in a. From Proposition 8.2, if δ is above (resp., be-
low) maxa{δ∗(a)} for any a ∈ [a, a], the incentive to undertake a margin squeeze
always decreases (resp., increases) in the access charge.
Corollary 8.1. When Condition 8.1 never holds, for any a ∈ [a, a], the incentive
to undertake a margin squeeze always decreases in the access charge.
1We focus on a framework with a more efficient entrant and linear price competition between
firms selling homogeneous products, whereas Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001] solve a model with
equally-efficient firms, two-part tariffs at the retail level, and horizontal differentiation. Besides
leading to more general results, our choices allow us to fit to the imputation test (i.e., the test
p ≥ a+ cI), widely used in competition policy to disentangle margin squeeze conducts from fair
competition. The test postulates linear price competition between firms selling homogeneous
products. When product differentiation is more relevant to a particular case, the above test
should be adjusted, just as the Areeda-Turner test for predation should be adjusted in such
a case (see Spector [2001, 2008]). Finally, as we explained in the previous section, the cost
advantage of the entrant allows it to serve the downstream market.
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Proof. When Condition 8.1 does not hold, we have δ∗(a) = 0, from Proposition
8.2. Hence, if Condition 8.1 is not satisfied for any a, then δ ≥ δ∗(a) for all a.
The rest follows from Proposition 8.3.
Proposition 8.3 and Corollary 8.1 give the necessary and sufficient conditions
for which the incentive to engage in a margin squeeze always decreases (or in-
creases) in the access charge. As an example, suppose that cE = 0 and that the
demand curve is almost flat on the interval [pˆ(a), a + cI ]. This means that the
demand is almost constant for any price between pˆ(a) and a+ cI . Therefore, we
have ∂pˆ/∂a ≈ 1, and Condition 8.1 holds. Hence, if δ is low enough, the incentive
to engage in a margin squeeze increases in the access charge.
This result means that when the above conditions are satisfied, and Proposi-
tion 8.3 applies, a regulatory authority could in principle know whether increas-
ing the access charge would lower or increase the incumbent’s incentive to behave
predatorily.
8.5 Robustness and extensions
In this section, we perform some robustness checks regarding our assumptions,
and provide some extensions to our baseline model.
8.5.1 Other equilibrium prices
When the incumbent does not squeeze the entrant, we explained that the latter
serves the market at a price pE ∈ [a+ cE, a+ cI ]. In our model we assumed that
the equilibrium price was the entrant’s preferred price, that is, pE = a + cI . If
we relax this assumption the incumbent’s profit when there is no squeeze, πNS,
changes, as we have πNS = (a− cu)D(pE).
For example, if the equilibrium price is the incumbent’s preferred price, that
is pE = a + cE, we have π
NS = (a − cu)D(a + cE) and ∂πNS/∂a = D(a +
cE) + (a − cu)D′(a + cE). As pˆ ≤ a + cE, we can easily see that we still have
∂πS/∂pˆ ≥ ∂πNS/∂a, with ∂πS/∂pˆ = D(pˆ) + (pˆ− cu − cI)D′(pˆ):
∂πS
∂pˆ
≥ D(a+ cE) + (a+ cE − cu − cI)D′(a+ cE),
≥ ∂πNS
∂a
− (cI − cE)D′(a+ cE) ≥ ∂π
NS
∂a
.
(8.7)
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Therefore, our results remain valid as Condition 8.1 may hold, which is a
necessary condition for the incentive to undertake a margin squeeze to increase
in the access charge.
However, in most cases where pE ∈ (a+cE, a+cI) is undetermined, Condition
8.1 may never hold. This depends on the derivative of the equilibrium price when
there is no squeeze with respect to the access charge, i.e., ∂pE/∂a.
8.5.2 The long-purse argument and profit hurdles
We argued that a margin squeeze is a feasible strategy, using the long-purse
argument. We considered that both firms can incur a loss in the first-period, but
that the entrant’s one is limited because of financial constraints.1 We simplified
the argument by assuming that the entrant’s capital A equals F + γ, with γ ≥ 0,
so that its loss cannot be greater than −γ, or it should exit the market.
We could also consider a framework where the entrant’s capital is such that
A = F − γ, with γ ≥ 0. In this framework, which is closer to that of Biglaiser
and DeGraba [2001], the entrant has to make a first-period profit that is above a
positive profit hurdle γ in order to remain in the market.
In this case, the equilibrium where the incumbent undertakes a margin squeeze
is modified. Indeed, in contrast to our main result where the incumbent serves
the market at a price below a + cE, there is a continuum of equilibria with the
entrant serving the market at a price pE ∈ [a+ cE, p˜], such that:
(p˜− (a+ cE))D(p˜) = γ, (8.8)
with the incumbent being a monopolist in the second period. Indeed, for any
price pE ∈ [a + cE, p˜], the entrant serves the market in the first period but its
profit is too small to allow it to remain in the market in the second period.
As previously, we assume that the entrant can survive in the second period
when there is no squeeze (i.e., when the equilibrium price is a + cI). Therefore,
we have p˜ ≤ a+ cI .
Even though the entrant serves the market when pE ∈ [a + cE, p˜], its first-
1Note that, the entrant incurs no loss at the equilibrium apart from the fixed cost F incurred
at the beginning of the first period, because it does not sell any product when there is a margin
squeeze, as the game is of perfect information.
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period profit would not allow it to survive in the second period. The incumbent
earns the upstream profit π˜S ≡ (a−cu)D(pE) in the first period, and the monopoly
profit in the second period.
However, the incumbent does not incur any loss in this case. Instead, its profit
when squeezing is even greater than the profit it earns when it does not engage in
a margin squeeze in the first period, i.e., π˜S ≥ πNS. This is because we assumed
that the non-squeezing equilibrium price is the entrant’s preferred one, a+cI ; and,
hence, a margin squeeze allows the incumbent to benefit from a lower equilibrium
price. Therefore, when A ≤ F , a margin squeeze occurs simply through a normal
profit maximization behavior from the incumbent, which should not be defined
as anticompetitive. This case should not be considered as a predatory strategy,
because there is no loss nor foregone profit from the incumbent in the first period.
8.5.3 The effect of the access charge on the entrant’s fi-
nancial constraints
If we suppose that the entrant’s financial constraints are set after the regulatory
authority has determined the access charge, the financial constraint parameter γ
is a function of the access charge a.1 In this case, the incumbent’s squeezing price
depends on the derivative of the constraints with respect to the access charge,
∂γ/∂a, and we have:
∂pˆ
∂a
= (1− ∂γ
∂a
1
D(pˆ)
)[1 +
pˆ− (a+ cE)
pˆ
ǫ(pˆ)]−1. (8.9)
When the entrant’s constraints increase in the access charge, i.e., when ∂γ/∂a <
0 , an increase in the access charge reduces the entrant’s capital. In this case,
the impact of the access charge on the squeezing price is greater than in the case
where the constraints do not depend on the access charge (i.e., ∂γ/∂a = 0), and,
hence, Condition 8.1 is more easily satisfied and the discount factor threshold is
increased.
By contrast, when the entrant’s constraints decrease in the access charge, i.e.,
1Biglaiser and DeGraba [2001] also analyze the effect of the access charge on the entrant’s
financial constraints. They find that when the entrant’s profit hurdle increases in the access
charge, the incumbent’s incentive to undertake a margin squeeze increases in the access charge
if the latter is high enough.
8.5. Robustness and extensions 227
when ∂γ/∂a > 0, an increase in the access charge increases the entrant’s capital,
and the impact of the access charge on the squeezing price is lower than in the
case where the constraints do not depend on the access charge.
8.5.4 Time-dependent regulation
Suppose that the regulatory authority cannot commit to the second-period access
charge at the beginning of the game. Therefore, the access charges in the first
and second periods might differ. We denote by ai the access charge in period i,
with i = {1, 2}.
When there is no squeeze, the incumbent’s total profit is ΠNS = πNS(a1) +
δπNS(a2), and, hence, H = π
S+ δπmI − [πNS(a1)+ δπNS(a2)]. Let us assume that
there is a projection from a1 to a2, so that a2 is a function of a1, and that a2(a1)
is twice-differentiable. Hence, we have:
∂H
∂a1
=
∂pˆ
∂a1
∂πS
∂pˆ
− ∂πNS
∂a1
− δ∂a2
∂a1
∂πNS
∂a2
. (8.10)
First, suppose that ∂a2/∂a1 is positive. Then, for a given a1, the results
from Proposition 8.2 remain valid, as the incentive to engage in a margin squeeze
increases (resp., decreases) in the access charge for any δ lower (resp., higher)
than the discount factor threshold. Only this threshold is modified, and the new
threshold is:
δ˙(a1) = max{0;
∂pˆ
∂a1
∂πS
∂pˆ
− ∂πNS
∂a1
∂a2
∂a1
∂πNS
∂a2
}. (8.11)
Second, suppose that ∂a2/∂a1 is negative. This means that if the regulatory
authority increases the access charge in the first period, it will decrease this price
in the second period, and reciprocally. In this case, the results from Proposition
8.2 are reversed and the incentive to undertake a margin squeeze increases (resp.,
decreases) in the access charge for all δ > δ˙(a1) (resp., δ < δ˙(a1)). Moreover,
when ∂pˆ/∂a1 ∗ ∂πS/∂pˆ > ∂πNS/∂a1 for a given a1, we have δ˙(a1) = 0; otherwise,
δ˙(a1) > 0.
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8.5.5 Margin squeeze incentive with bypass
We considered that the incumbent owns an essential facility. In some markets,
however, essential facilities can be bypassed as time goes by and new technologies
appear. For instance, in the telecommunications industry, the copper local loop
(the ‘last mile’ of the network) is still considered as an essential facility for provid-
ing ADSL services, even though some firms bypass this bottleneck by investing
in fiber local access networks in highly populated areas.
Let us assume that the entrant can bypass the incumbent’s network in the
second period, and that, if it does so, its upstream marginal cost equals the
incumbent’s one, cu. Hence, if it bypasses the incumbent’s network, the entrant
serves the market as it is more efficient than the incumbent (cE ≤ cI). Therefore,
the incumbent makes zero profit. If we suppose that the entrant bypasses the
incumbent’s input with probability 1− θ in the second period, this would change
the incumbent’s profit when it does not squeeze.1 Indeed, we would have ΠNS =
(1 + δθ)πNS; and, hence:
H = πS + δπmI − (1 + δθ)πNS. (8.12)
Our results may depend on the derivative of the probability of bypass with
respect to the access charge, ∂(1−θ)/∂a. Indeed, the probability of bypass usually
increases in the access charge, as a high access charge reduces the entrant’s profit
without bypass (i.e., ∂θ/∂a ≤ 0). In order to analyze the incentive to engage in a
margin squeeze, we define Θ ≡ θ+(∂θ/∂a∗πNS)/(∂πNS/∂a) as the overall effect
of bypass.
All of our results remain valid when Θ > 0, with a new threshold δ˜∗(a) =
max{0; δ∗(a)/Θ}. Besides, when ∂θ/∂a ≤ 0, we have Θ ≤ 1, and the incentive
to undertake a margin squeeze increases in the access charge for a larger range
of values of the discount factor δ when bypass is feasible, when Condition 8.1 is
satisfied.
Furthermore, when an increase in the access charge makes bypass a much
more feasible option, that is, when ∂θ/∂a is negative enough such that Θ ≤ 0,
the result is even simpler. Indeed, in this case, the incumbent’s incentive to
1Similarly, 1−θ might also be the incumbent’s first-period belief of the entrant’s probability
of bypass in the second period.
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undertake a margin squeeze increases in the access charge when Condition 8.1 is
satisfied, for any discount factor δ.
8.6 Conclusion
We analyzed the impact of a regulated access charge on a vertically-integrated
firm’s incentive to undertake a margin squeeze. We demonstrated that the in-
centive to engage in a margin squeeze may either increase or decrease in the
access charge, which is in contrast to the existing literature. Therefore, when
raising the price of the upstream input, a regulatory authority might increase the
incumbent’s incentive to abuse of its dominant position.
In particular, we showed that a low-enough discount factor could lead the
incumbent’s incentive to undertake a margin squeeze to increase in the access
charge. In this case, an increase in the access charge leads to a small upstream-
profit effect, and the cost-reduction effect may dominate.
Our general results also depend on the price-cost margin of the entrant and
the elasticity of demand evaluated at the squeezing price. We also explained why
our results are robust to different equilibrium prices and to a regulation that
evolves along time, and how they depend on the entrant’s probability of bypass
in the second period.
In addition to this analysis of the incentive to undertake a margin squeeze
when the access charge is regulated, it would be of interest to study this incentive
in an unregulated environment (as in Salop and Scheffman [1983, 1987], Salop
[2010], or Chen [2013]); or in an environment regulated by ex-post competition
law (see Chone´, Komly and Meunier [2010] and Chen [2013]).
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this last chapter, we briefly summarize our results and give directions for
further research projects.
9.1 Review of the main results
Below, we provide a brief summary of our main results.
9.1.1 Regulation in the telecommunications industry
In Chapter 3, we tested the ladder of investment hypothesis. The ladder of
investment is a regulatory approach, widely referred to in the European telecom-
munications regulatory framework. This regulation aims at resolving the static
vs. dynamic efficiency trade-off by providing a special type of one-way access reg-
ulation to entrants within a given technology infrastructure, Digital Subscriber
Line (DSL). Its ultimate goal is to favor entrants’ investments in the long run.
We demonstrated that the ladder of investment hypothesis was not validated, as
a higher number of local-loop unbundled lines does not induce a higher number
of new infrastructure lines built by entrants. However, we provide some evidence
that the ladder of investment approach allows entrants to invest progressively
within a given technology infrastructure owned by the incumbent (DSL), up to
the local loop.
Chapter 3 outlines why it is difficult to implement ex-ante regulatory rules
to solve the static vs. dynamic efficiency trade-off in the telecommunications
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industry. Indeed, effects of ex-ante regulation may be difficult to foresee without
a deep economic analysis, which might be lengthly or unfeasible ex-ante because
of uncertainty.
In Chapter 4, we studied when and how do European regulatory authorities
use ex-ante margin squeeze tests in order to set access rules in telecommunications
markets. We built a theoretical framework that allowed us to benchmark regu-
latory authorities’ choices in modeling Reasonably Efficient Operators (REOs)
in margin squeeze tests. We found that some implementation choices are very
similar across authorities’ decisions, whereas some others display a strong hetero-
geneity.
In Chapter 4 we showed that further guidance at the European level might be
needed for harmonizing regulations between countries. Indeed, some regulatory
authorities favor entry in the short run through their implementation choices,
whereas some others are more conservative, often with a view to favor the incum-
bent’s long-run investment incentives.
To summarize, in Part III we demonstrated that a major difficulty for ex-
ante regulatory intervention in telecommunications markets in Europe is related
to the ex-ante unforeseeable nature of regulatory rules and of the outcomes of
these rules. We argue that this problem might be (partially) solved either by
using deeper ex-ante economic analyses, or greater guidance or communication
between ex-ante regulatory authorities for experience-sharing.
9.1.2 Competition policy in the ICT sector
In Chapter 5 we showed that the sole presence of switching costs in a monopo-
lized market may provide sufficient incentives for a profitable bundling strategy.
We motivated this analysis with an example from mobile telecommunications
markets, and demonstrated that a high level of switching costs might allow a
dominant firm to earn higher profits when it bundles its products together.
The current policy framework used to analyze possible anticompetitive effects
of bundling may be incomplete as it does not take into account the strategy we
illustrate in Chapter 5. This is so because competition policy relies on economic
models and on the case law, which does not always take into account the typical
features of the ICT sector.
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In Chapter 6, we demonstrated that the recent antitrust investigations in the
ebook markets, in the United States and in the European Union, failed to take
into account an important feature of these markets; namely that access to ebooks
is only available after the purchase of a reading device. We established that this
specific industry feature induces strategic effects which play an important role in
the analysis of the impact of firms’ conducts, and that these strategic effects have
been overlooked in the antitrust investigations.
To summarize, in Part IV we demonstrated that ex-post intervention in the
ICT sector may face implementation difficulties as competition policy relies heav-
ily on past decisions and case law, which may have been made regardless of the
ICT sector specificities. Hence, such intervention needs to be carefully imple-
mented, by using particular analysis and ad-hoc theoretical models for instance.
By contrast, the commitment and foreseeable nature of ex-post competition pol-
icy, due to case law and the fact that competition policy heavily relies on past
decisions, is one of its main strengths.
9.1.3 The interplay between regulation and competition
policy
In Chapter 7 we analyzed margin squeeze as an entry-deterrence strategy in an ex-
ante regulated market. We demonstrated that a vertically-integrated incumbent
might undertake a margin squeeze in order to deter a more efficient downstream
competitor, as there is a threat that this competitor invests in its upstream
facilities in the long-run. The economic strategy of margin squeeze in a regulated
market we illustrated thus follows the defensive leverage argument.
In Chapter 7 we also showed that a margin squeeze in an ex-ante regulated
market only occurs when the access charge is set above cost. If it is not regulated
or regulated at cost, a margin squeeze never occurs. Indeed, in this case the
vertically-integrated incumbent either sets a high access charge and a high retail
price for the entrant to serve the retail market, or engages in below-cost predatory
pricing, or undertakes a refusal-to-deal. Therefore, standard competition policy
rules defining predatory pricing and refusal-to-deal might be inappropriate to
deter anticompetitive conducts in a market with ex-ante regulation.
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In Chapter 8 we studied how ex-ante regulation impacts a dominant firm’s
anticompetitive conduct. We showed that an increase in the access charge can
increase or decrease the vertically-integrated incumbent’s incentive to undertake
a margin squeeze, as it simultaneously increases the incumbent’s upstream profit
when it sells inputs to the downstream entrant, and lowers the cost of abusing of
its dominant position. When the discount factor is low enough, the latter effect
may dominate and an increase in the access charge can increase the incumbent’s
incentive to undertake a margin squeeze.
Chapter 8 highlights the relationship between ex-ante regulation and ex-post
competition policy, and more precisely, the potential negative impact of the for-
mer on the latter. Indeed, if both regulations are not well-coordinated, all positive
effects of ex-ante and ex-post regulation might disappear because of regulation-
induced anticompetitive conducts.
To summarize, in Part V we studied problems related to the application of
ex-post competition policy in ex-ante regulated markets. We showed that ex-
ante regulation may become a concern for ex-post competition policy as it can
modify a well-known abuse (as predatory pricing or refusal-to-deal) into a new
anticompetitive conduct (margin squeeze) to which case law might be unadapted.
In addition, ex-ante regulation may have a strong impact on a dominant firm’s
incentive to undertake an anticompetitive conduct.
9.1.4 General perspectives
In this thesis, we highlighted some positive and negative effects of both ex-ante
and ex-post regulation. In Part III we showed that ex-ante regulation typically
faces some reliability problems, because of its non-foreseeable nature and of the
wide range of applications of regulatory rules. By contrast, the ability of ex-ante
regulation to adapt to market specificities is generally beneficial.
In Part IV we explained why the lack of flexibility of ex-post competition
policy introduces some difficulties for analysis and may misguide decisions when
competition policy is applied in industries which have specific organizations, such
as in the ICT sector. However, the ex-ante predictability of ex-post rules due to
reliability over past decisions and case law allows ex-post competition policy to
avoid –or at least minimize– the ‘trial and error’ effect one can find in ex-ante
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regulation.
Therefore, the strengths of ex-ante regulation correspond to the weaknesses of
ex-post regulation, and vice-versa. Indeed, some of the main problems of ex-ante
regulation, i.e., the non-foreseeable nature of ex-ante rules and the wide range
of their possible applications, correspond to the strength of ex-post competition
policy, in particular because of the importance of case law in ex-post regulation.
By contrast, we also showed that the reverse holds regarding the adaptability of
regulatory rules to market specificities.
This link between ex-ante and ex-post advantages and weaknesses is mainly
due to three specific features of both types of regulation. First, the commitment
power of ex-post competition policy is quite stronger than the one of ex-ante
regulation, as competition authorities have to build on the past case law whereas
NRAs are more flexible in implementing regulatory rules to particular cases. Sec-
ond, ex-ante regulation is generally sector-specific, whereas ex-post competition
policy is not. This also makes ex-ante regulation more flexible than ex-post
regulation, as regard to special characteristics of the industry. Finally, the un-
foreseeable nature of ex-ante regulatory outcomes might be due to regulatory
capture, as it impacts ex-ante regulation more fiercely than ex-post competition
policy. This might explain, for instance, why we observed important differences
in the implementation of ex-ante margin squeeze tests between NRAs in Chapter
4.
One might wonder whether problems or benefits add up when enforcing ex-
post competition policy in ex-ante regulated markets. In Part V we studied such
interplay between both types of regulation. We showed that ex-ante regulation
may induce anticompetitive conducts or increase the incentive for a dominant firm
to undertake some, notably due to the lack of flexibility of ex-post competition
policy. As ex-ante regulatory authorities may not have sufficient tools to prevent
all anticompetitive conducts their regulations can induce, specific ex-post rules
should be implemented in ex-ante regulated markets. This is what we argued
for in Chapter 7 in the case of margin squeeze, hence defending the ‘European
view’ against the ‘U.S. view,’ the latter typically forbidding ex-post intervention
in ex-ante regulated markets.
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9.2 Future projects
We introduce below some ideas for future research, either by considering recent
regulatory debates in the ICT sector, competition policy in the telecommunica-
tions industry in non-regulated markets, and possible future ex-ante or ex-post
regulation of reputation systems on the internet.
9.2.1 Regulation in the ICT sector: Net neutrality and
advertising
Since the mid-2000s, the net neutrality debate has received a lot of attention
from practitioners, policymakers, and academics in the communications indus-
try. Net neutrality, broadly defined, means that every internet content provider
(CP) should be treated equally by internet service providers (ISPs), which own
the network infrastructures connecting to final consumers.1 A regime where net
neutrality is not imposed by public bodies would allow ISPs to charge CPs for
providing their services to consumers, sometimes through a quality-tariff menu,
or to charge consumers different prices according to the content provider they
reach.
Even though a vast literature has burgeoned, addressing the impact of net
neutrality on investment in network infrastructures subject to congestion (Choi
and Kim [2010], Economides and Hermalin [2013], Kra¨mer and Wiewiorra [2012],
Bourreau, Kourandi and Valletti [2012]), on innovation from CPs (Bourreau,
Kourandi and Valletti [2012], Reggiani and Valletti [2012]), or on the CPs’ busi-
ness model (Jullien and Sand-Zantman [2012]), the debate remains vivid in the
industry, as some important questions are still unresolved.
In most of the models cited above, advertising is a source of revenues for
CPs. Nevertheless, these models do not consider advertising as a nuisance for
consumers; in other words, the consumers’ utilities do not directly depend on the
advertising level. One justification of this assumption is that online advertising
mainly benefits consumers, for instance because it leads to better matching.
However, in traditional media markets (TV, radio, newspapers) it is well-
1See, e.g., Economides and T˚ag [2012] for an introduction to the net neutrality debate.
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known that consumers might also be reluctant to advertising (see, e.g., Anderson
and Coate [2005]). In the internet market, this effect might even be stronger than
for traditional media markets because of consumers’ privacy concerns related to
targeted advertising (Goldfarb and Tucker [2011]). Therefore, in some cases, the
consumers’ utility directly may decrease in the advertising level.
In this regard, there is a need for a better understanding of the relationship
between net neutrality and the provision of advertising in internet markets, when
consumers consider advertising as a nuisance. This trade-off might be analyzed
within a theoretical model.
9.2.2 Competition policy in the telecommunications in-
dustry: Margin squeeze in unregulated industries
Margin squeeze and refusal-to-deal can occur in both regulated and unregulated
markets. In this thesis, we studied margin squeeze conducts in ex-ante regulated
markets, and we based our motivation on recent case law. However, some of the
recent case law also considers margin squeeze in markets which are not subject
to ex-ante regulation.
For instance, the case Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB was a
request for preliminary ruling from the Stockholm District Court to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.1 The Swedish court was asked by the Swedish competition
authority (the Konkurrensverket) to fine the Swedish telecommunications incum-
bent, TeliaSonera, for setting a margin squeeze in the broadband market from
April 2000 until January 2003. At the time of the abuse, TeliaSonera had no
regulatory obligation to supply its competitors at the upstream level, but did it
on a voluntary basis. In this case, the European Court notably answered that
the absence of any regulatory duty-to-deal at the upstream level has no impact
on the question on whether the pricing practice is abusive or not.
As another example, in a recent case, the French Competition Authority’s
decision in the case Cogent Communications v. France Te´le´com addressed mar-
gin squeeze issues in the internet connection peering market. Cogent, an inter-
1Case C-52/09, request from the Stockholm District Court to the European Court for
preliminary ruling.
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national transit operator, whose clients are national Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and Content Providers (CPs), claimed that France Te´le´com entailed a
margin squeeze in the internet connection peering market. France Te´le´com is a
vertically-integrated company in this market, with its own ISP, Orange, and its
own transit subsidiary, Open Transit. In order to connect to Orange’s customers,
Cogent has to connect to Orange’s network directly, or through Open Transit’s
network. Cogent claim was that the free peering exchange points between its
own network and Open Transit’s network did not guarantee a proper connec-
tion, and that, hence, it was forced to accept a paid interconnection with Open
Transit to connect to Orange’s customers. The case was dismissed by the French
Competition Authority and is currently in appeal.1
Just as for margin squeeze conducts in regulated industry, there are only few
papers studying these conducts (see Salop [2010], and Chen [2013]). Hence, it
might be interesting to analyze carefully an incumbent’s motivations for under-
taking a margin squeeze when it used to serve its competitor on a voluntary
basis. Also, having a clear understanding of how margin squeeze conducts should
be dealt with by competition authorities, and their differences with refusal-to-deal
or predation, would be of great interest.
9.2.3 A need for ex-post or ex-ante regulation? Compet-
ing reputation systems on the internet
One of the reasons why internet marketplaces such as eBay or Amazon Market-
place have become so popular is that they have built efficient reputation systems
to develop trust between buyers and sellers. Indeed, trust between buyers and
sellers constitutes an important asset of peer-to-peer (P2P) markets, as these
platforms are subject to adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
In order to overcome the adverse selection and moral hazard problems and to
enhance trust, online P2P marketplaces have set reputation systems for buyers
to observe sellers’ quality or type, based on other buyers’ experience about past
transactions.
1Note that this case is the first to address the interplay between margin squeeze and net
neutrality.
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Reputation systems are valuable to develop trust between buyers and sellers
(see, e.g., Kennes and Schiff [2007], or Cabral [2012a]), and reputation constitutes
an important stream of research in the economics of internet markets (Levin
[2011]). The theoretical literature on reputation systems mainly built on the
effect of underprovision of evaluations (Avery, Resnick and Zeckhauser [1999]),
which are a public good, or on seller’s or platforms’ strategy such as offering
rebates to buyers for evaluation reports (Li [2010]).
The empirical literature is more voluminous, notably because online markets
such as eBay generally allow researchers to extract an important amount of data.
In this regard, the literature is composed of analyses on the effectiveness of a
reputation system (Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels [2004]), the value of reputation
for sellers (Livingston [2005], Resnick et al. [2006]), or the effect of reputation
on sales rate and exit (Cabral and Hortacsu [2010]), or on prices and sales in a
market with adverse selection (Dewan and Hsu [2004]).
What the literature has not addressed yet is that, in reality, platforms compete
with one another, and they all have their own proprietary reputation system. One
can conjecture that competition between platforms with proprietary reputation
systems have strong impacts on the reputation mechanism and its outcomes. It
would be of interest to analyze the impact of reputation systems on consumer
lock-in.1 Also, it would be interesting to consider interconnection between both
platforms’ reputation systems, or to find the optimal interconnection fee between
both reputation systems, or to study the ex-post or ex-ante regulation of such
interconnection
This research project is directly related to the current policy debate about
privacy concerns in digital (and non-digital) markets, and might help to solve
the following questions: Who does own one’s reputation (or historical data)? Or,
who can decide what information is available to whom?
1See Farrell and Klemperer [2007] for a review of the literature on switching costs and
lock-in.
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Régulation et politique de la concurrence dans le secteur des
TIC : Éssais d’économie industrielle
Germain GAUDIN
RESUME : Cette thèse aborde certaines caractéristiques des politiques de régulation et de la concur-
rence dans le secteur des Technologies de l’Information et de la Communication (TIC). Plusieurs probléma-
tiques de régulation ex-ante sont abordées, traitant de l’investissement dans les infrastructures de réseaux
fixes de télécommunications et de la mise en place de tests de ciseaux tarifaires par les autorités de régula-
tion du secteur des télécommunications en Europe. Sont également étudiées différentes problématiques de
politique de la concurrence, comme l’impact de la vente liée de produits créant des coûts de changement
pour les utilisateurs ou la prise en compte des terminaux d’accès pour l’analyse du marché du livre électro-
nique en droit de la concurrence. Les impacts de la régulation sectorielle sur la politique de la concurrence
sont également analysés, avec une application à la définition et la gestion par les autorités de concurrence
de la pratique de ciseau tarifaire dans les industries de réseaux. Enfin, cette thèse met en perspective dif-
férents avantages et inconvénients des interventions ex-ante et ex-post, respectivement par les autorités de
régulation sectorielle et de concurrence.
ABSTRACT : This thesis approaches several distinctive features of regulation and competition policy in
the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector. It tackles some issues in ex-ante regulation on
investment in new fixed telecommunications network infrastructures, and the application of margin squeeze
tests by European regulatory authorities in the telecommunications industry. It also analyzes issues related
to ex-post competition policy, such as the impact of bundling products with switching costs, or the competition
authorities’ investigations in the electronic book market. Further analysis on the impact of ex-ante regula-
tion on ex-post competition policy is provided, in particular via studies on the definition of a margin squeeze
conduct in network industries, and how competition authorities deal with it. Finally, this thesis evaluates se-
veral advantages and weaknesses of both ex-ante regulatory authorities’ and ex-post competition authorities’
interventions.
